Neujahr v. Neujahr

• Decision Date: 05 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-388,85-388
• Parties: Judy A. NEUJAHR, Appellee, v. Danny L. NEUJAHR, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 47

393 N.W.2d 47

223 Neb. 722

Judy A. NEUJAHR, Appellee, v. Danny L. NEUJAHR, Appellant.

No. 85-388.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Sept. 5, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Judgments: Final Orders: Words and Phrases. Litigation must be put to an end, and it is the function of a final judgment to do just that. A judgment is the final consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding.

2. Judgments: Final Orders. Neither what the parties thought the judge meant nor what the judge thought he or she meant, after time for appeal has passed, is of any relevance. What the decree, as it became final, means as a matter of law as determined from the four corners of the decree is what is relevant.

Carole McMahon-Boies, of Pepperl & Melcher, P.C., Lincoln, for appellant.

David L. Kimble, of Souchek & Kimble, Seward, for appellee.

KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.

KRIVOSHA, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the question of whether one may obtain an interpretation of a decree by merely filing a motion requesting the court which initially entered the decree to interpret its own decree after the decree has become final.

This is the second time this case has been before us. In May of 1982 the appellee, Judy A. Neujahr, and the appellant, Danny L. Neujahr, separated, and Ms. Neujahr soon thereafter filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in the district court for Seward County, Nebraska. On March 11, 1983, a decree of dissolution was entered. The decree provided, in relevant part:

Petitioner [Judy A. Neujahr] is hereby awarded the follow-described [sic] personal property: 1980 LeBaron automobile; all cash in checking accounts, savings accounts, and safety deposit boxes registered in petitioner's name; an Internal Revenue Service refund; all household goods except items specifically awarded the respondent; a Weed Eater; chain saw; chimney brush; electric drill and her clothing and personal effects and the clothing and personal effects of the minor children of the parties.

Respondent [Danny L. Neujahr] is hereby awarded the following-described personal property: 1968 Ford Pickup; 1972 Plymouth automobile; 1975 Toyota; 1930 Model A Ford; trailer house; United States Postal Service Pension; all cash in checking accounts, savings accounts, and safety deposit boxes registered in respondent's name; United States Postal Service Credit Union Account; all American Mutual Life Insurance Policies; all notes and accounts receivable; all tools, machinery and livestock equipment not specifically awarded to the petitioner; mixer and mixer bowl set; wood chairs; shoe shine kit; all guns and fishing equipment; personal effects and clothing of the respondent; radio; stereo equipment; bed, frame and mattress; roll top desk; kitchen accessories; towels and linens; antique telephone; buffet; pinball machine; juke box; and miscellaneous items in his possession.

Although much of the couple's personal property was specifically awarded in the decree, disputes immediately arose between the parties concerning their separate claims to many items not specially included in the decree. Ms. Neujahr filed two motions to cite Mr. Neujahr for contempt, claiming that Mr. Neujahr was refusing to deliver to her personal property awarded to her by the decree. One of those hearings resulted in the district court's entering a supplemental order. That order was appealed to this court and is found in Neujahr v. Neujahr, 218 Neb. 585, 357 N.W.2d 219 (1984) (Neujahr I ). In reversing the supplemental order entered by the district court in Neujahr I, we said at 588, 357 N.W.2d at 221-22:

[W]here modification of a dissolution decree is made during the 6-month period, § 42-372, such modification can be made only upon good cause shown, after notice to all interested parties and hearing. Absent notice and hearing, the July 11 order was void, and it is set aside. There being no evidence to support petitioner's contempt motions, the judgment of the district court is reversed with directions to dismiss the motions.

In deciding the matters in Neujahr I, we used some language which probably created some of the confusion in this case. We said specifically at 587, 357 N.W.2d at 221: "In their dispute the parties made no formal application to the court for either interpretation of the decree, Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963), or modification of the decree, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-372 (Reissue 1978)." It is true that in Kasparek v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 740, 119 N.W.2d 512, 518 (1963), one may find some language to the effect that "[i]f there was any question as to what the 1956 decree meant, it was possible for May to have secured a judicial interpretation of the decree." In neither Kasparek nor Neujahr I, however, did we indicate any specific procedure to be followed in seeking an "interpretation." Ms. Neujahr concluded that all she need do is file a motion setting out the disputed portion of the decree, the fact that "a disagreement has arixen [sic] between the parties," and a request that the court interpret its earlier decree, even though the decree was, at the time the request was made, already final. She then attached to that motion a list of some 49 items of personal property, which she alleged in her motion the decree did not specifically mention and therefore it was not clear if said items are "household goods," "machinery and tools," or "miscellaneous items" in the possession of the respondent. The items listed on exhibit A were such as "ping pong table," "decorative house trim," "trash barrel," "TV stand," "1980 state & federal tax return check," and "1-hay rope." The district court then proceeded to hold a hearing, at which the parties appeared in person and with counsel and gave testimony as to what it was they believed the district court meant when it entered its decree. The court then, apparently based upon the evidence of what the parties believed the judge meant when he entered his decree, expanded upon his decree by specifically assigning the 49 contested items to either Ms. Neujahr or Mr. Neujahr.

We regret that we must once again reverse and dismiss the proceedings. We do so because there simply is no procedure authorizing what was done in the current action.

If no attempt is made to have an appellate court review the decree within 6 months after it is entered, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-363 (Reissue 1984), the decree becomes final. As such, it is res judicata as to the rights of the parties. Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921). Only in rare instances is the final decree vulnerable to attack.

[J]urisdiction of the court in matters relating to divorce and alimony is given by statute, and every power exercised by the court in reference thereto must look to the statute or it does not exist. [Citation omitted.] We cannot change it; we must therefore take the decree as we find it, inasmuch as the interested parties have made no move to change it but have treated it as final.

Wharton v. Jackson, supra at 291, 185 N.W. at 429. This is so because the finality of a judgment must be respected in order to insure the rights of the parties.

Litigation must be put to an end, and it is the function of a final judgment to do just that. A judgment is the final consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. [Citation omitted.]

If a judgment can mean one thing one day and something else on another day, there would be no reason to suppose that the litigation had been set at rest. The same must be said if the judgment can mean one thing to one judge and something else to another judge. All are bound by the original language used, and all ought to interpret the language the same way. No court should express an opinion of what the judgment means until the judgment is called into question by some factual situation relating thereto. The judge who tried the case and who ought to know what he meant to say, after the time for appeal, etc., has passed cannot any more change or cancel one word of the judgment than can any other judge.

Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 335, 445 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1968). See, also, Fender

v. Fender, 249 Ga. 773, 294 S.E.2d 474 (1982).

In addition to direct appeal to this court, Nebraska law is replete with methods available to a litigant such as Ms. Neujahr. If the error is a clerical error or a scrivener's error, then the procedure is to file a petition seeking to correct the judgment nunc pro tunc. See Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976). If...