Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida, 99-10054-CIV-PAINE/VITUNAC.
| Decision Date | 21 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-10054-CIV-PAINE/VITUNAC.,99-10054-CIV-PAINE/VITUNAC. |
| Citation | 280 F.Supp.2d 1367 |
| Parties | Elizabeth J. NEUMONT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Harold E. Wolfe, Jr., Eric M. Grant, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, Hartford, CT, William Hoffman Pincus, James Hermann Hicks, Hicks, Brams & Scher, West Palm Beach, FL, for plaintiffs.
Karen Kittian Cabanas, Morgan & Hendrick, Key West, FL, David L. Jordan, Florida Department of Community Affairs, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for defendant.
This matter is before the court on the following motions:
1. Defendant Monroe County's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count X through XIII, filed on March 12, 2003 (D.E.# 322);
2. Plaintiff's Renewed [Cross]-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count X, filed on March 28, 2003 (D.E.# 343).
This class action case focuses on a Monroe County Ordinance (Ordinance 004-1997). This ordinance, adopted in 1997 and enforced beginning December 15, 1998, places restrictions on certain uses of properties as vacation rentals. Plaintiffs are mostly property owners in Monroe County subject to the Ordinance, and originally brought thirteen claims against defendant Monroe County. Pursuant to this court's November 21, 2002, Order Adopting in Part Report and Recommendation (D.E.# 299), four counts remain:
Count X: Declaratory Judgment as to whether Ordinance is void ab initio because enacted in violation of Florida Statutes § 125.66
Count XI: Compensation for Taking of private property without due process of law
Count XII: Violation of Civil Rights under color of state law as a result of violation (Alleged in Count X)
Count XIII: Other damages resulting from wrongful enactment of Ordinance
While parties have previously moved for summary judgment on Count X, the court initially determined that there were existing issues of material fact regarding, inter alia, whether substantial and material changes were made during the enactment process, and, thus, denied summary judgment1. Parties now represent that the court has all necessary facts for determination of Count X. On Friday, May 2, 2003, the undersigned conducted a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment as to Count X. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and oral arguments in light of applicable law, the court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted for the reasons set forth below.
The procedure for disposition of a summary judgment motion is well established. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is authorized only when:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In applying this standard, the Adickes Court explained that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Id.
The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.1982). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
1. Article VIII, Section 1(f & g) of the Constitution of the State of Florida grants both charter and non-charter county governments the power to enact ordinances. Defendant Monroe County is covered by said provision of the Constitution of the State of Florida.
2. Florida Statutes § 125.66 governs the procedures by which a county is empowered to enact ordinances. Section 125.66, Fla. Stat., provides, in pertinent part,
In cases in which the proposed ordinance or resolution changes the actual list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category, or changes the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land involving 10 contiguous acres or more, the board of county commissioners shall provide for public notice and hearings as follows:
1. The board of county commissioners shall hold two advertised public hearings on the proposed ordinance or resolution. At least one hearing shall be held after 5 p.m. on a weekday, unless the board of county commissioners, by a majority plus one vote, elects to conduct that hearing at another time of day. The first public hearing shall be held at least 7 days after the day that the first advertisement is published. The second hearing shall be held at least 10 days after the first hearing and shall be advertised at least 5 days prior to the public hearing.
2. The required advertisements shall be no less than 2 columns wide by 10 inches long in a standard size or a tabloid size newspaper, and the headline in the advertisement shall be in a type no smaller than 18 point. The advertisement shall not be placed in that portion of the newspaper where legal notices and classified advertisements appear. The advertisement shall be placed in a newspaper of general paid circulation in the county and of general interest and readership in the community pursuant to chapter 50, not one of limited subject matter. It is the legislative intent that, whenever possible, the advertisement shall appear in a newspaper that is published at least 5 days a week unless the only newspaper in the community is published less than 5 days a week. The advertisement shall be in substantially the following form:
NOTICE OF (TYPE OF) CHANGE
The (name of local governmental unit) proposes to adopt the following by ordinance or resolution: (title of ordinance or resolution).
A public hearing on the ordinance or resolution will be held on (date and time) at (meeting place).
§ 125.66(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added).
3. Each Monroe County Land Use District is a "zoning category" within the meaning of § 125.66(4) Fla. Stat. See Plaintiffs' Seventh Request for Admissions ¶ 1 and Defendant's Response to Request for Admissions ¶ 1.
4. Prior to enacting the Ordinance, and pursuant to the requirements of § 125.66, Defendant advertised and held two required public hearings on the proposed ordinance. These hearings were held during meetings of the BOCC on December 10, 1996 (the "First Hearing") and February 3, 1997 (the "Second Hearing")3.
5. On or about November 7, 8, & 9, 1996, and January 11, 12, & 16, 1996, Defendant published notice that the subject Ordinance would be considered at public hearings4.
6. On or about November 7, 8, & 9, 1996, Defendant published its Notice of the First Hearing on the proposed ordinance.
7. The Notice of First Hearing published in November 1996 stated that "[c]opies of the proposed changes are available at the Planning Department offices in the Upper and Middle Keys during normal business hours." See Order Adopting in Part Report and Recommendation ("Order") at p. 7, ¶ 23.
8. At the time the Notice of First Hearing was published, the only available draft of the proposed ordinance was the September 17, 1996 draft (the "September 17th draft")5. See Order at pp. 7-8, ¶ 24.
9. At the First Hearing, the BOCC considered and discussed a draft ordinance dated December 10, 1996 (the "Dec. 10th draft") rather than the September 17th draft6. See Order at p. 8, ¶ 25.
10. The December 10th draft was not completed until December 10, 1996, and was not distributed to the BOCC until after the start of the First Hearing. See Order at p. 8, ¶ 26.
11. The December 10th draft was different than the September 17th draft in the following respects:
(a) The September 17th draft proposed a ban on vacation rentals throughout Monroe County, while the December 10th draft took a district-by-district approach to the ban;
(b) The September 17th draft prohibited vacation rentals in some select districts and allowed an option to created a sub-district where vacation rentals would be permitted, while the December 10th draft eliminated the sub-district option for these select districts;
(c) The September 17th draft proposed to create regulations of vacation rentals where allowed, while the December 10th draft substantially added to the quantity of regulations and the difficulty of meeting the regulatory burdens. See Order at pp. 8-9, ¶ 27.
12. On or about January 11, 12 & 16, 1997, Defendant published Notice of the Second...
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