Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State

• Decision Date: 27 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 68949,No. 68975,68975
• Citation: 383 P.3d 246,132 Nev. Adv. Op. 77
• Parties: Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation; Nevada Checker Cab Corporation; and Nevada Star CAB Corporation, Petitioners, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Ronald J. Israel, District Judge, Respondents, and Christopher Thomas; and Christopher Craig, Real Parties in Interest. Boulder Cab, Inc., Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for The County of Clark; and the Honorable Timothy C. Williams, District Judge, Respondents, and Dan Herring, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

383 P.3d 246

132 Nev. Adv. Op. 77

Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation; Nevada Checker Cab Corporation; and Nevada Star CAB Corporation, Petitioners,

v.The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Ronald J. Israel, District Judge, Respondents,andChristopher Thomas; and Christopher Craig, Real Parties in Interest.

Boulder Cab, Inc., Petitioner,

v.The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for The County of Clark; and the Honorable Timothy C. Williams, District Judge, Respondents,andDan Herring, Real Party in Interest.

No. 68975

No. 68949

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED OCTOBER 27, 2016

Jackson Lewis P.C. and Paul T. Trimmer, Las Vegas; Marc C. Gordon and Tamer B. Botros, Las Vegas, for Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, Nevada Checker Cab Corporation, and Nevada Star Cab Corporation.

Winner & Carson, P.C., and Robert A. Winner, Las Vegas, for Boulder Cab, Inc.

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation and Leon M. Greenberg, Las Vegas, for Christopher Thomas, Christopher Craig, and Dan Herring.

Joshua D. Buck, Reno; Michael P. Balaban, Las Vegas; Christian J. Gabroy, Henderson, for Amicus Curiae Nevada National Employment Lawyers Association.

Hejmanowski & McCrea LLC and Malani L. Kotchka, Las Vegas, for Amiens Curiae Western Cab Company.

Littler Mendelson and Rick D. Roskelley, Roger L. Grandgenett, Montgomery Y. Paek, and Crystal J. Herrera, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Sun Cab, Inc.

Law Office of Richard Segerblom, Ltd., and Richard Segerblom, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae International Technical Professional Employee Union.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Bradley S. Schrager and Don Springmeyer, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Progressive Leadership Alliance of Nevada.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.¹

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

This court determined in Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. ––––, ––––, 327 P.3d 518 (2014), that the Minimum Wage Amendment, Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution, enacted by the voters in 2006, impliedly repealed NRS 608.250(2)(e)'s exemption of taxicab drivers from minimum wage requirements. In this opinion, we consider whether our holding in Thomas is effective from the date the opinion was published in 2014, only, or whether it should apply retroactively from the date the Amendment was enacted in 2006. As this court's function is to declare what the law is, not to create the law, we conclude that NRS 608.250(2)(e) was repealed when the Amendment became effective.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the 1970s, NRS 608.250 was amended to provide that taxicab drivers were exempt from the existing statutory minimum wage requirements. In 2004 and 2006, Nevada citizens voted to approve the Amendment, which amended the Constitution to set new minimum wage standards in Nevada but did not expressly repeal statutory provisions like NRS 608.250. The Amendment became effective on November 28, 2006.

In 2005, after voters had initially approved the Amendment and while it was pending a second vote, the then-attorney general released an opinion stating that the Amendment likely superseded NRS 608.250(2)'s exemptions of industries from minimum wage requirements. 05–04 Op. Att'y Gen. 12, 21 (2005). However, in 2009, a federal district court reached a different conclusion when it granted a limousine company's motion to dismiss a complaint filed by a group of limousine drivers requesting unpaid minimum wages. See Lucas v. Bell Trans, No. 2:08–cv–01792–RCJ–RJ, 2009 WL 2424557, at *8 (D. Nev. June 24, 2009), abrogation recognized in Thurmond v. Presidential Limousine, No. 2:15–cv–01066–MMD–PAL, 2016 WL 632222 (D. Nev. February 17, 2016). The court was considering whether the NRS 608.250 exemptions from minimum wage requirements were repealed by the Amendment's enactment in 2006, and it concluded that the exemptions were still valid, precluding the drivers' minimum wage claims. Id.

On June 26, 2014, this court published its opinion in Thomas, disagreeing with the Lucas decision and concluding that the Amendment impliedly repealed NRS 608.250(2)(e). 130 Nev. at ––––, 327 P.3d at 522. As a result, taxicab companies were required to pay taxicab drivers the minimum wage set forth in the Amendment. Id.

In two separate cases, real parties in interest Christopher Thomas, Christopher Craig, and Dan Herring (collectively, the taxicab drivers) filed class actions in district court against petitioners Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, Nevada Checker Cab Corporation, Nevada Star Cab Corporation, and Boulder Cab, Inc. (collectively, the taxicab companies), seeking unpaid taxicab driver wages dating back to the effective date of the Amendment. The taxicab companies filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that our holding in Thomas applied prospectively, not retroactively, which the district courts denied. The taxicab companies then filed these writ petitions challenging the district courts' orders, arguing that, under these circumstances, caselaw from the United States Supreme Court and this court provide that Thomas should apply only prospectively.² Given the identical legal issues, we consolidate these writ petitions for disposition. See NRAP 3(b).

DISCUSSION

Writ of mandamus

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. ––––, ––––, 312 P.3d 484, 486 (2013) (quoting Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) ); see NRS 34.160. Generally, “[w]rit relief is not available ... when an adequate and speedy legal remedy exists.” Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. “While an appeal generally constitutes an adequate and speedy remedy precluding writ relief, we have, nonetheless, exercised our discretion to intervene under circumstances of urgency or strong necessity, or when an important issue of law needs clarification and sound judicial economy and administration favor the granting of the petition.” Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906,908 (2008) (footnote and internal quotations omitted).

We are aware of at least five other cases that have been filed in Clark County raising the same or similar question we consider in these writ proceedings. Moreover, the issue impacts employees statewide. Thus, these petitions raise an important legal issue in need of clarification, and this court's review would promote sound judicial economy and administration.

We therefore exercise our discretion and consider these writ petitions to clarify whether our holding in Thomas is to be applied prospectively or retroactively.

The Nevada Constitution's minimum wage requirements became effective on the day the Amendment was enacted

The taxicab companies argue that under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), and Breithaupt v. USAA Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 110 Nev. 31, 867 P.2d 402 (1994), the holding in Thomas should apply purely prospectively because inequitable results will occur if taxicab drivers are provided back wages for work performed prior to the 2014 opinion. The taxicab companies further contend that they should not have been expected to predict that NRS 608.250(2)(e) was impliedly repealed, because the legal issue in Thomas was so close that three justices of this court dissented and the federal court in Lucas reached a different conclusion.

United States Supreme Court retroactivity precedent regarding civil laws on direct appeal

In Chevron Oil, the United States Supreme Court considered whether to apply its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), retroactively. 404 U.S. at 97–98, 92 S.Ct. 349. In Rodrigue, the Court concluded that state law remedies apply to claims filed under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act). 395 U.S. at 357–59, 89 S.Ct. 1835. As a result of Rodrigue, the Court in Chevron Oil determined that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations would typically apply to the injured respondent's action under the Lands Act. 404 U.S. at 99, 92 S.Ct. 349. However, if the one-year statute of limitations was applied against the injured respondent, his claim would have been barred because he filed the claim more than a year after the accident. Id. at 105, 92 S.Ct. 349.

The Court then considered whether retroactive application of its holding in Rodrigue was inappropriate under the circumstances presented. Id. at 105–08, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court articulated three factors to consider when determining retroactivity³ before declining to apply Rodrigue, and the state one-year statute of limitations, against the injured respondent in Chevron Oil. Id. at 106–07, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court reasoned that the injury at issue had occurred three years before the Rodrigue decision, and the lawsuit was filed one year before that decision. Id. at 105, 92 S.Ct. 349. The Court also noted that Rodrigue was a case of first impression in the Supreme Court, and it had overruled a long line of federal court precedent applying admiralty law, including the doctrine of laches. Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. 349. Ultimately, the Court concluded that it would be unfair and inconsistent with the Land Act's purposes to retroactively impose the one-year limitations period on the injured respondent. Id. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 349.

More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has strongly disapproved of the Chevron Oil factors when considering federal civil law. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94–97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (providing a comprehensive review of cases that call Chevron Oil into question). In American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, four dissenting justices concluded that limits on...