Nevitt v. U.S. Steel Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:12–cv–02150–AKK. |
| Citation | 29 A.D. Cases 1393,18 F.Supp.3d 1322 |
| Parties | Ezeikiel NEVITT, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Henry F. Sherrod, III, Henry F. Sherrod III, PC, Florence, AL, Adam M. Porter, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
Ezeikiel Nevitt pursues this case against United States Steel Corporation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Doc. 4 at 1. Nevitt alleges that U.S. Steel offered him a position at its plant, contingent on him passing a physical examination, then withdrew the offer after learning Nevitt suffered a back injury at a previous job. Id. at 2–4. Nevitt also alleges that U.S. Steel violated the medical examination and inquiry provisions of the ADA. Id. at 7. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on the failure-to-hire claim, docs. 25, 29, and U.S. Steel moves for summary judgment on the medical examination and inquiry claim as well. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. See docs. 25, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38. Based on a review of the evidence and the law, the court finds that, regardless of whether the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Nevitt or to U.S. Steel, there are questions of material fact that preclude the court from granting either party's motion for summary judgment on the failure-to-hire claim. Therefore, those motions are due to be denied. However, Nevitt has failed to meet his evidentiary burden with regards to his medical examination and inquiry claim. Consequently, U.S. Steel's motion for summary judgment on that claim is due to be granted.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56 [ ] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (alteration in original). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). Any factual disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party's favor when sufficient competent evidence supports the non-moving party's version of the disputed facts.See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276, 1278 (11th Cir.2002) (). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.1989) ). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
The facts underpinning this lawsuit are largely undisputed. On or about January 1, 2011,1 Nevitt suffered a back injury while working at a Cascades Sonoco paper plant when a machine malfunctioned and a load of paper weighing approximately 200 pounds struck him in the back. Doc. 29–1 at 66–68; id., ex. 19. Following the incident, Nevitt experienced pain, numbness, radiculopathy, and episodes of weakness during which his leg would give way. Doc. 35 at 6. To treat his condition, he took narcotics and muscle relaxers, underwent physical therapy, used a TENS unit, and received two epidural steroid injections. Id. He also remained on restricted duty for almost five months. Id. According to Nevitt, by June 2011 his back pain resolved and he was “full[y] active” again at work. Doc. 29–1 at 91–92. As part of his worker's compensation settlement, Nevitt resigned from Cascades Sonoco. Doc. 30 at 5.
On August 8, 2011, Nevitt applied for a position as a Utility Technician at U.S. Steel. Id. Following an interview, U.S. Steel extended a conditional offer to Nevitt, contingent on him passing a pre-employment fitness for duty examination, which included a physical examination and an assessment of his relevant medical history. Id. Thereafter, on August 24, 2011, Nevitt underwent a physical examination by a U.S. Steel nurse, doc. 30 at 6, which yielded normal results, doc. 25 at 2. However, during the examination, Nevitt told the nurse about the back injury he suffered at Cascades Sonoco. Id. Consequently, U.S. Steel requested that Nevitt provide additional information about the injury. Id.
Nevitt provided U.S. Steel with two doctor's notes: one from Dr. Robert Poczatek dated May 12, 2011, and one from Dr. Andrew Cordover, dated May 27, 2011. Doc. 30 at 6. Dr. Poczatek's May 12, 2011 note indicated that Nevitt continued to report lower back pain, which Nevitt “rate[d] as high as 5–6/10.” Doc. 26–7. Although Dr. Poczatek noted that twisting and frequent forward bending aggravated the pain, he stated that Nevitt could return to “regular work duties” if allowed to take a ten minute break every two hours. Id.2 Dr. Cordover's May 27, 2011 note also indicated that Nevitt continued to experience back pain, but that Dr. Cordover did not believe “any restrictions [were] necessary for Nevitt at [the] time.” Doc. 26–8.
Based on these two documents, U.S. Steel's medical director, Dr. Cheryl Szabo, concluded that Nevitt's ability to work was subject to the following restrictions: a lifting limit of twenty pounds, no repetitive back movements, and a ten-minute break every two hours. Doc. 30 at 7. Dr. Szabo testified that she discounted Dr. Cordover's opinion because it appeared to her that Dr. Poczatek was Nevitt's treating physician, and that Dr. Cordover's note was the product of a one-time visit. Doc. 26–3 at 76. She also testified that she restricted Nevitt's lifting and movement because Dr. Poczatek's note indicated that twisting and bending aggravated Nevitt's pain, and that she simply tracked Dr. Poczatek in imposing the break restriction. Id. at 129–30.
The utility technician position at U.S. Steel is physically demanding, and requires the ability to regularly lift at least 50 pounds,3 and frequently bend, stoop, crawl, and shovel. Id. at 9. Additionally, because the duties include monitoring furnace temperatures during a short window of time, plant management testified that they could not accommodate a required ten-minute break every two hours. Id. at 8–9. Because Dr. Szabo's restrictions were incompatible with the requirements of the position, U.S. Steel withdrew Nevitt's contingent offer. Doc. 30 at 10.
Nevitt alleges that U.S. Steel withdrew its contingent job offer because it regarded him as disabled, and that it violated the medical examination and inquiry provisions of the ADA. Id. at 7. The court will address each allegation in turn.
The purpose of the ADA is to “eliminat[e] ... discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). “ ‘[I]n this Circuit, the burden-shifting analysis of Title VII employment discrimination claims is applicable to ADA claims.’ ” Dulaney v. Miami–Dade Cnty., 481 Fed.Appx. 486, 489 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir.2007) ). “Under this burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA by showing (1) he is disabled, (2) he is a qualified individual, and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability.” Id. (citing Holly, 492 F.3d at 1255–56 ).
The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment....” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as” disabled “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment....”4 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). However, an individual will not be “regarded as” disabled based on an actual or perceived impairment that is “transitory and minor.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). An impairment is “transitory” if its “actual or expected duration [is] 6 months or less.” Id.
The parties are at odds regarding the proper inquiry for determining whether the ‘transitory and minor’ defense is available to U.S. Steel. Nevitt argues that the analysis centers on whether U.S. Steel perceived Nevitt's impairment to be ‘transitory and minor.’ Doc. 35 at 8....
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