New Canaan Country School v. Town of New Canaan

• Decision Date: 20 November 1951
• Citation: 138 Conn. 347,84 A.2d 691
• Parties: NEW CANAAN COUNTRY SCHOOL, Inc. v. TOWN OF NEW CANAAN. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 691

84 A.2d 691

138 Conn. 347

NEW CANAAN COUNTRY SCHOOL, Inc. v. TOWN OF NEW CANAAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 20, 1951.

John C. Sturges, New Canaan, with whom, on the brief, was Ira E. Hicks, New Canaan, for appellant (defendant).

David G. Marvin, New Canaan, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The plaintiff runs a country day school in New Canaan. None of the pupils live at the school. It is entitled to a tax exemption on such of its property as is used exclusively for carrying out its purposes as an educational institution. The question to be decided is whether two houses owned by the plaintiff and used solely for living quarters for some of its teachers are exempt under General Statutes, § 1761(7). The board of assessors placed these houses in the plaintiff's list and the board of tax review refused relief. The facts are not in dispute.

The plaintiff employs forty-five teachers. This creates a serious housing problem even under normal conditions. In 1946 the housing shortage was such that it was difficult to hire teachers. Therefore, in 1947, the plaintiff purchased a house three miles from the school and used it for three of its teachers and their families. In the same year it built a house 200 yards from the school. This was used for one of its teachers and his family. The plaintiff furnishes light, heat and refuse removal and pays for the repairs, maintenance and carrying charges. Both properties are operated at a loss. They were acquired to enable the plaintiff to secure and retain teachers and for no other purpose. The occupancy of both houses is dependent upon the teachers' retaining employment in the school. The houses are necessary if the plaintiff is to secure and retain enough teachers to operate and to maintain its standards. The salaries of the faculty members residing in these two houses are adjusted to take into account the quarters furnished them. This adjustment amounts to about $80 per month for each teacher.

On these facts the court concluded that the two parcels in question are exclusively used for educational purposes as defined in the statute. The defendant claims, in effect, that the facts found do not support this conclusion.

As has been stated, it is admitted that the plaintiff is tax exempt as to facilities used exclusively in its educational program. The question then is whether the two houses are used exclusively in the plaintiff's educational program. As applied to this narrow question, the terms of General Statutes, § 1761(7), may be stated as follows: The real property of a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for educational purposes and used exclusively for carrying out such purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Both conditions must be met to secure exemption.

The issue on appeal has been the cause of much litigation. Probably all of the cases cannot be reconciled. They agree in this, that 'The conclusion in each of these decisions is necessarily governed by the specific facts in the individual case.' Knox College v. Board of Review, 308 Ill. 160, 165, 139 N.E. 56, 57, 35 A.L.R. 1041.

No Connecticut case has been cited or found on all fours with that at bar. St. Bridget Convent Corporation v. Town of Milford, 87 Conn. 474, 88 A. 881, has similar features. The property of a convent school used for school purposes was held exempt. Land used as a vegetable garden to produce food for the teachers and pupils and houses occupied by the maintenance staff were held not exempt because these facilities were not used for the specific purposes of the school. This case and Forman Schools, Inc., v. Town of Litchfield, 134 Conn. 1, 54 A.2d 710, review the history of the statute and the relevant Connecticut cases. In two cases the property used for religious retreats was held not exempt as not exclusively used for religious purposes. Town of Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 3 A.2d 232; Manresa Institute v. Town of Norwalk, 61 Conn. 228, 23 A. 1088; and see Town of Huntington v. Swedish Baptist Home of Rest, 90 Conn. 504, 97 A. 860. An early Connecticut case, in construing the meaning of the phrase 'used exclusively for farming purposes,' held that the actual use of the land rather than the purpose of the owner was the test. Gillette v. City of Hartford, 31 Conn. 351, 359; see Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 214, 215; Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. Glander, 146 Ohio St. 146, 180, 64 N.E.2d 813; St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. 442, 450.

The statutory requirement that the use shall be exclusively for educational purposes is emphasized by General Statutes, § 1763, which provides: 'The real property belonging to, or held in trust for, any such organization, not used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes [under which exemption is claimed] but leased, rented or otherwise used for other purposes, shall not be exempt.' Whether the property in question can be said to be 'rented' or not, it is apparent that it is used exclusively for 'other purposes' than the education of the pupils in the school, to wit, as residences for the teachers.

It is of some significance that in subsection (13) of § 1761 the legislature saw fit to exempt specifically 'dwelling houses * * * owned by * * * any religious organization and actually used by its officiating clergyman'. It is generally held that in the absence of such a specific provision the dwelling house of the clergyman is not exempt as being used exclusively for religious purposes. People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church, 232 Ill. 158, 164, 83 N.E. 536; Congregation Gedulath Mordecai v. City of New York, 135 Misc. 823, 826, 238 N.Y.S. 525; Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 425, 79 N.E.2d 233; Vail v. Beach, supra; see Matter of Finley, 58 Misc. 639, 641, 110 N.Y.S. 71. If the General Assembly had intended to exempt dwellings owned by the school and used by the teachers as residences, it would have been very simple to insert in the section relating to...