ISAIAH 61: 1, INC. v. City of Bridgeport
Decision Date | 13 July 2004 |
Docket Number | (SC 17036). |
Citation | 851 A.2d 277,270 Conn. 69 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | ISAIAH 61:1, INC. v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT. |
Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Russell D. Liskov, associate city attorney, for the appellant (defendant).
Margaret J. Slez, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether certain property owned by the plaintiff, Isaiah 61:1, Inc., qualifies for tax exempt status under General Statutes § 12-81 (7).1 We conclude that it does and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We briefly set forth the following relevant facts. In April, 1982, the plaintiff incorporated in the state of Connecticut as a nonprofit corporation, which the Internal Revenue Service recognizes as a tax exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3). The plaintiff's certificate of incorporation provides that the plaintiff's purposes are: The plaintiff's bylaws elaborate on these goals and set forth a mission statement declaring that
On June 28, 1995, the plaintiff acquired the subject property, which is located at 120 Clinton Avenue in Bridgeport, by special warranty deed. After substantial renovations to the building, the building opened in 1998 as a licensed rooming house capable of housing fourteen occupants.
The plaintiff entered into a two year contract with the state department of correction (department), commencing July 1, 1996, which the parties renewed in 1998 and again in 2000. In exchange for the exclusive use of the plaintiffs 120 Clinton Avenue facility to house, to rehabilitate and to counsel male inmates completing the final months of their sentences, the department agreed to pay the plaintiff on the basis of the level of occupancy. The payments constituted approximately 90 percent of the plaintiff's funding.
As part of the rehabilitation process, the plaintiff requires its inmate residents to seek employment, although their participation in the program is not contingent upon whether they actually are employed. Employed residents pay weekly "rent," the amount of which the plaintiff determines from a sliding scale based upon the individual's income. These weekly payments range from $10 to $80 and constitute approximately 9 percent of the plaintiff's funding.2 Residents who are unemployed remain in the program but are not required to pay weekly "rent." In previous years, the residents have contributed as much as $33,516 in "rent" annually.
The defendant city of Bridgeport (city) assessed taxes on the subject property in 1999, and the plaintiff appealed to the board of assessment appeals, which denied the appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which reversed the decision of the board of assessment appeals and determined that the property qualified for tax exempt status under § 12-81 (7). The city appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
It is well settled that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fanny J. Crosby Memorial, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 213, 219-20, 811 A.2d 1277 (2002). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it . . . or when although there is evidence in the record to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 23, 807 A.2d 955 (2002).
It is equally well established that "in taxation cases. . . provisions granting a tax exemption are to be construed strictly against the party claiming the exemption," who bears the burden of proving entitlement to it. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fanny J. Crosby Memorial, Inc. v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. 220. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "[I]t is also true, however, that such strict construction neither requires nor permits the contravention of the true intent and purpose of the statute as expressed in the language used." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375, 279 A.2d 561 (1971).
The city claims that the plaintiff's property does not qualify for tax exempt status under § 12-81 (7), and is not otherwise tax exempt under General Statutes § 12-88, because: (1) the premises are rented to department inmates; (2) the inmates occupying the premises pay "rent" to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff's bylaws and certificate of incorporation are silent with respect to the provision of housing;3 and (4) the inmates who reside at the facility are low income wage earners whose "rent" is subsidized by the department. The city thus claims that our decision in Fanny J. Crosby Memorial, Inc. v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. 213, controls the present case.
The plaintiff responds that its property qualifies for tax exempt status under §§ 12-81 (7) and 12-88. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that "the subject property is used exclusively for the charitable purpose set forth in its certificate of incorporation and that such property does not constitute state subsidized housing or housing for persons or families of low and moderate income as those exceptions are intended under . . . § 12-81 (7)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, the plaintiff contends that, under our holding in Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, supra, 160 Conn. 378, the plaintiff's receipt of "rent" from the resident inmates does not undermine the exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes. We agree with the plaintiff.
Section 12-81 sets forth a description of property that is deemed tax exempt if certain requirements are satisfied. General Statutes § 12-81 provides in relevant part: Subdivision (7) of § 12-81 provides, however, that, "[o]n and after July 1, 1967, housing subsidized, in whole or in part, by federal, state or local government and housing for persons or families of low and moderate income shall not constitute a charitable purpose under this section. . . ."6 General Statutes § 12-81 (7). In construing this statute, we have embraced a broad definition of the term "charitable purpose," which, includes, inter alia, (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Church of Christ v. West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 719, 539 A.2d 573 (1988).
Property otherwise exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7) also must satisfy the conditions set forth in General Statutes § 12-88, which provides in relevant part: ...
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