New Castle County v. Chrysler Corp.

• Citation: 681 A.2d 1077
• Decision Date: 09 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 91A-02-007,91A-02-007
• Parties: NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Delaware, and Department of Finance of New Castle County, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of Delaware; Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County; and Richard M. Lagergren, Joseph Hickmott, Harold Ostdahl, and George B. Schreppler, Jr., Individually as Members of the Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County, Appellees. Civ. A. . Submitted:
• Court: Superior Court of Delaware

Page 1077

681 A.2d 1077

NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of

Delaware, and Department of Finance of New Castle

County, Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of

Delaware; Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County;

and Richard M. Lagergren, Joseph Hickmott, Harold Ostdahl,

and George B. Schreppler, Jr., Individually as Members of

the Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County, Appellees.

Civ. A. No. 91A-02-007.

Superior Court of Delaware,

New Castle County.

Submitted: June 9, 1995.

Decided: Aug. 25, 1995.

On Appeal From a Decision of the Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Dennis J. Siebold, Finance Legal Officer, New Castle County Department of Finance, Wilmington, for Appellants.

James F. Burnett, Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for Appellee Chrysler Corporation.

OPINION

COOCH, Judge.

Appellants, New Castle County, a political subdivision of the State of Delaware, and the Department of Finance of New Castle County (collectively "the County") appeal to this Court, pursuant to 9 Del.C. § 8312(c) and Super.Ct.Civ.R. 72, from two decisions of the Board of Assessment Review of New Castle County ("the Board") dated January 29, 1991 and March 27, 1992, which had assessed the Newark, Delaware automobile assembly plant owned by Appellee, Chrysler Corporation ("Chrysler"). The parties have thoroughly briefed numerous substantive issues arising from the Board's decisions. However, because this Court holds that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the County from a decision of the Board, the County's appeal must be DISMISSED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This long-going dispute between the parties arises from the County's 1985 general revaluation of all real property in New Castle County. The proceeding involves the County's assessment, for ad valorem tax purposes, of Chrysler's automobile assembly plant located in Newark, Delaware. The complete procedural history of this controversy between the parties is lengthy and complex; however, it is not set out in great detail here because it is not essential to this Court's decision dismissing the County's appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

In 1985, Chrysler appealed the County's initial $52,642,000 assessment of its automobile plant. On May 21, 1985, the first appeal hearing was held before a Referee who denied Chrysler's claim for a reduction of the County's assessment. On May 28, 1985, the Board of Assessment Review affirmed the decision of the Referee.

Chrysler appealed the decision of the Referee and the Board of Assessment Review to the Superior Court ("the 1985 appeal"). Chrysler Corp. v. New Castle County Bd. of Assessment Review, Del.Super., C.A. No. 85A-JN-24. Chrysler's appeal was filed pursuant to 9 Del.C. § 8312(c); however, due to technical difficulties with the operation of a tape recorder, significant portions of the record before the Referee were lost. Since the parties could not reconstruct the missing portions of the record, they agreed to have the action remanded to the Board of Assessment Review. On June 29, 1987, a stipulation to that effect was entered. Id.

Subsequent to the 1985 general revaluation, the County made several supplemental assessments on Chrysler's property to reflect additions, improvements, and other changes to the property. Chrysler filed separate appeals from each assessment with the Board.

The stipulated rehearing was held on January 8, 9, 10 and 29, 1991 before the Board ("the 1991 hearing"). Prior to the rehearing, the parties agreed to first consider the remanded appeal of Chrysler's property as it existed in 1985 and to consider the supplemental assessments at a later hearing. At the 1991 hearing, the Board reduced Chrysler's assessment from $52,642,000 (as valued by the County) to $34,402,000. On February 20, 1991, the County appealed to this Court from the Board's January 29, 1991 decision ("the 1991 appeal"), which was docketed as New Castle County et al. v. Chrysler Corp., Civil Action No. 91A-02-7.

The second set of hearings before the Board were held on February 27 and 28, 1992 ("the 1992 hearing"). Those hearings considered the supplemental assessments of Chrysler's property. At the 1992 hearings, the Board reduced the sum of the County's supplemental assessments from $9,566,900 (as valued by the County) to $6,689,700. On March 27, 1992, the County appealed to this Court from the Board's February 28, 1992 decision ("the 1992 appeal"), which was docketed as New Castle County et al. v. Chrysler Corp. Civil Action No. 92A-03-012. Chrysler filed a cross-appeal from the 1992 appeal on April 8, 1992.

Although the County filed the 1992 appeal in March of that year, it did not file the record of all proceedings below with this Court until more than two years later. On June 15, 1994, the County filed all of the transcripts and exhibits from both the 1991 and 1992 hearings before the Board under the caption of the 1991 appeal. However, this Court dismissed the County's 1992 appeal on July 26, 1994 after the Prothonotary issued to both parties a Super.Ct.Civ.R. 41(e) notice that the appeal would be dismissed if no action was taken within thirty days.

On August 31, 1994, an order was entered stating that the parties stipulated that the dismissal of the 1992 appeal should be rescinded and that the 1991 and 1992 appeals should be consolidated in the action currently before this Court. Briefing and oral argument were concluded on June 9, 1995.

New Castle County's Claims of Error Against Board of Assessment Review

The County raises numerous claims of error on the part of the Board and asserts that this Court should reverse the decision of the Board, pursuant to 9 Del.C. § 8312(c), because the Board acted "contrary to law, fraudulently, arbitrarily, and capriciously" in reaching its decisions in both the 1991 and 1992 hearings. More specifically, the County argues that the Board's decisions should be reversed because the Board deliberated, to some extent, outside of the presence of counsel at both hearings and because it did not render a legally sufficient statement of the reasons for its decisions. The County also maintains that any such decisions reached by the Board in private are contrary to law because the Board acted in violation of 29 Del.C. § 10002(e) (Freedom of Information Act). Additionally, the County argues that the Board acted improperly by apparently accepting testimony of Chrysler's experts. The County asserts that Chrysler's experts utilized an incorrect standard of property valuation under Delaware law. Finally, the County urges that the Board acted contrary to law by accepting testimony of Chrysler's experts in the 1992 hearing because Chrysler's experts failed to use the Board's assessment at the 1991 hearing as a base when evaluating the improvements to Chrysler's property.

Chrysler vigorously denies each of the above allegations and further asserts that the County does not have a right to appeal a decision of the Board. Additionally, Chrysler's cross-appeal alleges that, although the Board correctly ruled that Chrysler's property was substantially overvalued, the Board acted contrary to law, arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to reduce the assessment to a lower value contended by Chrysler. Because this Court determines that the County does not have a right of appeal, it need not reach any of the County's claims of error. Also, Chrysler has stated that if this Court concludes (as it does) that the County has no right of appeal, that it need not consider the merits of Chrysler's cross-appeal. Chrysler's cross-appeal is thus withdrawn.

II. DISCUSSION

The Superior Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Consider an Appeal

of New Castle County from an Adverse Decision of

the New Castle County Board of Assessment Review

A. 9 Del.C. § 8312(c)

Neither Explicitly Nor Implicitly Grants New

Castle County the Right of Appeal

The appellate jurisdiction of Delaware courts is limited by the Delaware Constitution and statutes. Capano Investments v. Levenberg, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1989) (citing Shoemaker v. State, Del.Supr., 375 A.2d 431, 435-36 (1977)). A party does not have a right of appeal from an administrative hearing "unless the statute governing the matter has conferred a right to do so." Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., Del.Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 900 (1994). See also 10 Del.C. § 541; ¹ Del Const. Art. IV, § 7. ²

The jurisdiction of this Court to hear appeals from the New Castle County Board of Assessment Review is contained in 9 Del.C. § 8312(c). Section 8312(c) grants a "person" a right to appeal from the Board. However, § 8312(c) does not confer on the County, explicitly or implicitly, a right of appeal. Section 8312(c) provides in pertinent part:

Any person who, after properly filing an appeal before any board of assessment or department of finance, feels aggrieved by the decision of such body may, within 30 days by postmark date after receiving notice of its decision, appeal therefrom to the Superior Court of the county in which such person resides. ... The Court may permit the appellant or each board of assessment or department of finance to present any new or different evidence pertinent to the matter. (Emphasis added).

As the language of § 8312(c) demonstrates, the General Assembly has granted unambiguously the right to appeal a decision of the Board of Assessment only to a "person" who has "properly fil[ed] an appeal before any board of assessment...." Additionally, § 8312(c) provides that an "appellant" or the "board of assessment or department of finance" may present new pertinent evidence on appeal to the court. The use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that the General Assembly did not intend the Board to be an "appellant" since there would otherwise be no reason to include the phrase "or each board of assessment or department of finance" i...