New England Home for Deaf Mutes v. Leader Filling Stations Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1931
• Parties: NEW ENGLAND HOME FOR DEAF MUTES v. LEADER FILLING STATIONS CORPORATION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

276 Mass. 153

177 N.E. 97

NEW ENGLAND HOME FOR DEAF MUTES

v.LEADER FILLING STATIONS CORPORATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

June 26, 1931.

Exceptions from Land Court, Essex County; C. T. Davis, Judge.

Petition for registration of title to land by the New England Home for Deaf Mutes against the Leader Filling Stations Corporation. On defendant's exceptions to an adverse decision.

Exceptions overruled.

Harry E. Jackson, of Salem, and Edward P. Shaw, of Boston, for petitioner.

Samuel H. Hollis and Taylor B. Yeakley, both of Lynn, for respondent.

RUGG. C. J.

This is a petition for registration of title to land. The respondent asserts easements to a landing place on tidewater and a right of way thereto appurtenant to land owned by it by virtue of an indenture made in 1796 and duly recorded, between the predecessors in title of the parties to this petition. In June, 1928, the petitioner filed in the land court a petition against the respondent alleging that it was the owner of the premises described in the present petition, and praying that the validity of the respondent's claim to a landing place and right of way thereto over said premises under the indenture of 1796 be determined and that, if such incumbrances be found to exist, their nature and extent be defined, as authorized by G. L. c. 240, § 11. Pursuant to that petition a decision was rendered whereby it was ruled that the court was strictly limited to construing the indenture of 1796 as of its date, without regard to subsequent acts which might in other actions be found to constitute extinguishment of any easement thereby created, and then found (1) that the petitioner had good record title to the premises described in its petition and was in possession, (2) that easement of landing place and right of way thereto on land of the petitioner, appurtenant to land of the respondent, was created by the indenture, and (3) that the nature and extent of such easement, not having been theretofore specified, were set out and defined. There was included in that decision a statement that, for the purpose of avoiding a second trial on the facts, provided the views of the trial judge be found on appeal to be erroneous and because the parties had tried the case on the theory that events subsequent to the date of the indenture might be considered, a finding was made that the easement in question had not been lost by complete interruption and obstruction on the part of the petitioner and its predecessors in title as owners of the servient estate. It was added that this ‘finding however, is strictly limited to the purposes of this case, when and if it should ever become material and is not to be considered as res judicata in any other event.’ The decree entered on that petition contained a recital that after a hearing of the parties in interest and a determination of all questions involved as set forth in a decision, the easement created by the indenture of 1796 is established ‘as of the date of said indenture (but without regard to matters in pais which have occurred since that date),’ and defined its nature and extent, but made no other reference to the finding as to extinguishment of the easement or the limitation sought to be attached to that finding and they are not embodied in the decree. No appeal was taken by any one from that decree.

The first issue in the case at bar is whether the question of extinguishment of the easement appurtenant to the land of the respondent under the indenture of 1796 has been tried in the earlier proceeding between these parties, decided adversely to the petitioner and becomes res judicata. The decision of this issue depends in turn upon the subject matter brought before the court in the earlier proceeding and the scope of the issues there presented for decision and the precise extent of the decision made. That earlier proceeding was a petition under G. L. c. 240, § 11. So far as here material its words are: ‘If the title to land appears of record to be affected by a possible condition, restriction, reservation, stipulation or agreement * * * a person having a freehold estate * * * in said land * * * may file a petition * * * in the land court to determine the validity, or define the nature and extent, of such possible condition or other encumbrance. * * *’ Concerning the purpose of these statutory words and the nature of the issues open under them, it was said, with respect to a contention that there might be inquiry into prescription as affecting the terms of a deed, in Crocker v. Cotting, 181 Mass. 146, at page 153, 63 N. E. 402, 405: ‘Titles affected by prescriptive rights are excluded by the words of the statute, and are not, we think, included within its intent; the idea being, it seems to us, to enable parties to obtain the construction of the court in regard to questions arising under written instruments, and not to determine matters in pais.’ This sentence was quoted with approval in McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 374, 109 N. E. 162;Welch v. Austin, 187 Mass. 256, 72 N. E. 972,68 L. R. A. 189;Cotting v. Boston, 201 Mass. 97, 102, 87 N. E. 205. There is nothing inconsistent with this view in Boston Baptist Social Union v. Boston University, 183 Mass. 202, 66 N. E. 714, or American Unitarian Association v. Minot, 185 Mass. 589, 71 N. E. 551. There is nothing in Chase v. Walker, 167 Mass. 293, 45 N. E. 916, to support a contrary interpretation. As a concession to urgent argument, it there was remarked that, if the ground of extinguishment or abandonment were open, there was no evidence adequate to support it. That was far from holding that the ground was open; it amounted only to an assumption in favor of the party making the...