New England Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Rogers

• Citation: 7 P.2d 638,154 Okla. 285,1931 OK 692
• Decision Date: 10 November 1931
• Docket Number: 19998.
• Parties: NEW ENGLAND OIL & PIPE LINE CO. v. ROGERS et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

7 P.2d 638

154 Okla. 285, 1931 OK 692

NEW ENGLAND OIL & PIPE LINE CO. v. ROGERS et al.

No. 19998.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

November 10, 1931

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1932.

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action for damages for slander of title, if plaintiff can show that the publication relied upon was made, and was false in any material respect, and can also show special damage to himself, malice will be presumed.

An oil and gas mining lease, providing that, if no well be commenced on the land within one year from the date of the lease, the lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless certain rentals be paid within said time, is automatically terminated at the end of such year upon failure either to commence a well or to pay the rental. In such case the lessee does not forfeit his lease, but is deemed to have exercised the privilege given him to allow the lease to terminate by not commencing a well or paying the rental within the time specified.

A corporation is liable in an action for libel published by its officers, servants, or agents whenever such publication is made in the performance, or within the scope of the general duties of such officers, servants, or agents. German-American Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 62 Okl. 39, 161 P. 815.

In an action for damages for slander of title by setting up false claim of title to property owned by plaintiff, the statute of limitation does not commence to run until defendant ceases to set up his adverse claim.

In an action for damages for slander of title, malice may be presumed by publication of false claim of title by defendant but, where there is evidence tending to show good faith and thus rebut such malice, and the evidence is in conflict, on the question of good faith, it is error to refuse to submit the question of good faith or want thereof on the part of defendant to the jury.

Appeal from District Court, Hughes County; George C. Crump, Judge.

Action by B. H. Rogers and others against the New England Oil & Pipe Line Company. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded, with directions.

CLARK V. C.J., dissenting.

Anglin & Stevenson, of Holdenville, and Silverman & Rosenstein, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Chas. L. Orr and A. M. Woodford, both of Holdenville, for defendants in error.

RILEY J.

This is an action brought by defendants in error, herein referred to as plaintiffs, against plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to recover damages. The action is one in the nature of slander of title for an oil and gas lease based upon the filing of an affidavit in the office of the county clerk, and causing the same to be recorded, which was in the nature of a notice to the public that defendant claimed an oil and gas lease on the same premises, prior and superior to that of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege that on April 21, 1923, they purchased from C. M. and Leean Johnson, husband and wife, an undivided one-half interest in an oil and gas lease covering 197 acres of land in Hughes county (describing it); that defendant, with knowledge of plaintiffs' ownership of said lease, and with a purpose of oppressing, harassing, and annoying and damaging plaintiffs, and with malice and for the purpose of clouding the plaintiffs' title, on April 27, 1923, filed in the office of the county clerk of Hughes county a verified notice to the public signed by one John J. Moran, as follows:

"Notice to the Public.

I, John J. Moran, state that I am the President of the New England Oil & Pipe Line Company, that on the 11th day of April, 1922, C. M. Johnson and Leean Johnson, his wife, duly made, executed and delivered to me an oil and gas lease covering the following described lands in Hughes County, Oklahoma.

The North Half of Southwest Quarter & Southeast Quarter of Southwest Quarter & West Half of Southeast Quarter (less 2.99 acres as right of way) of Section 8. * * * That said lease was duly filed for record, on May 20, 1922, in the office of the County Clerk of said County and is therein duly recorded in Book 22, p. 626.

I further give notice that all the conditions of said lease have been duly complied with and that all rentals accruing thereunder have been duly paid or deposited as required by the terms and provisions of said lease and that said lease is now a valid, legal and subsisting lease; and all persons are hereby notified and warned not to cloud the title of the said New England Oil & Pipe Line Company to its said lease by taking any oil and gas lease on said lands or on any part thereof from the said C. M. Johnson and wife, their heirs or assigns.

John J. Moran."

That said notice was filed for record and recorded in Book 42, p. 359 (the land described in the notice included that covered by plaintiff's lease).

It was further alleged that defendant had no interest in the land covered by plaintiffs' lease, and, in so far as the statements made in said notice affected that land, such statements were wholly false and known to be so by defendant at the time said affidavit was made and filed.

It was then alleged that the value of plaintiffs' lease was $2,500; that plaintiff had a bona fide offer of said sum for the said lease, but, because of the notice mentioned being of record, the purchaser refused the title, and plaintiffs were thereafter and thereby prevented from making the sale, until, because of failure of developments for oil in that vicinity, the lease became worthless; that by reason thereof plaintiffs alleged they were damaged in the sum of $2,500, for which they prayed judgment. They also asked for $499, punitive damages.

Defendant, besides a general denial, pleaded the statute of limitation, asserting that the one-year limitation applied, and further alleged that it held an oil and gas lease covering the same land together with other lands; that it was required to pay certain annual rentals, and did pay the same when due, but through mistake of its bookkeeper it remitted the full amount of annual rental to the original owner of the land, overlooking the fact that a part thereof had been sold, and that before it had discovered its mistake plaintiffs had acquired their lease and had so notified defendant; that, when this was learned, Moran, in order to make the facts clear on the record, and after consulting counsel, made and filed the affidavit; that in doing so he laid all the facts before counsel, and was advised by counsel to make and file the affidavit for the purpose of giving notice of its claim. It denies that it acted in bad faith or maliciously, and that whatever was done by Moran was done on his own initiative and without corporate action on its part.

Plaintiffs replied by general denial of all the allegations contained in the answer which in anywise controverted the allegations of their petition.

The cause was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $2,462.50, upon which verdict, after a motion for new trial was overruled, judgment was entered, and defendant appeals.

There are eight assignments of error presented under four general propositions.

It is first asserted that under the rule announced by this court in Ward et al. v. Mid-West & Gulf Co., 97 Okl. 252, 223 P. 170, in order for plaintiff to recover in an action of this nature, he must prove five things: First, the publication of the words; second, that they were false; third, that the publication was malicious; fourth, that he sustained special damages on account thereof; and. fifth, that he owned or possessed an interest in the property slandered.

It is contended that there is no evidence to sustain the second, third, and fifth of these prerequisites. First defendant asserts that no malice was shown.

It seems well settled that, in an action of this nature, which is usually denominated "an action for damages for slander of title, by a sort of figure of speech, in which the title is personified and made subject to many of the rules applicable to personal slander," the five prerequisites to the right of action mentioned and contended for by defendant are recognized. The general rule is stated in 25 Cyc. 559, and at page 560, it is said: "Malice is a necessary ingredient to entitle plaintiff to recover. Indeed it is said that malice is the gist of the action."

But it is not necessary to show ill will, hatred, etc., toward the owner of the land in order to establish a prima facie case of malice. The word "malice" seems to have a varied definition or description depending largely upon the connection in which it is used and the nature of the litigation in which it is sought to be established, the subject to which it is applied, etc. A number of particular kinds of malice seem to be recognized in law, such as "actual malice," "express malice," "implied malice," "malice in fact," "malice in law," and others.

The general rule is that, if plaintiff can show the publication was false in any material respect, and can also show special damages to himself, malice will be presumed, and a prima facie case of malice will be made. Malice will be implied or inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case as they are ascertained to exist. Dalzell v. Dean Hotel Co., 193 Mo.App. 379, 186 S.W. 41.

The evidence discloses that, at the time the affidavit was executed and filed, all the conditions of the lease of defendant therein referred to had not been duly complied with, and all rentals accruing thereunder had not been duly paid or deposited, as required by the terms and provisions of the lease. The affidavit in this respect was not true, in that on the 11th day of April, 1923, there became due and payable under the terms and conditions of said lease the sum of $197, as a condition for the...