New England Prayer Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Easton
| Decision Date | 13 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CV106012793S. |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | NEW ENGLAND PRAYER CENTER, INC. v. PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF EASTON. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
John F. Fallon, Esq, Fairfield, for New England Prayer Center Inc.
GILARDI, J.T.R.
This is an appeal from the decision of the defendant Easton Planning & Zoning Commission (commission), granting, with conditions, the special permit of the plaintiff, the New England Prayer Center, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield. Neighboring property owners Christopher Michos, Amalia Michos and Colleen Adriani are intervening defendants (intervening defendants).
The court has carefully reviewed the record, listened to the trial of this matter held on May 10, 2012, and considered the briefs of the parties. For the following reasons, the appeal is sustained and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
The record reflects the following factual and procedural background. On May 18, 2010, the plaintiff submitted a special permit application to the commission, seeking to establish a place of worship on land that it leased from the town of Easton. (Return of Record [ROR], Exhibit [Exh.] 24.) At its meeting of August 23, 2010, the commission approved the plaintiff's special permit application subject to eleven special conditions, enunciated in a " Resolution of Approval." (ROR, Exh. 56.) The plaintiff now appeals the commission's decision, challenging five of the commission's special conditions.[1] The intervening defendants filed a motion to intervene on June 8, 2011, which was granted by the court on September 6, 2011.
On November 15, 2011, the plaintiff filed its appeal brief. The plaintiff argues that their application, as made, complies with the substantive requirements of the Easton zoning regulations (regulations), the special conditions appealed from were not required in order to bring the application into compliance, the regulations do not contain any provisions which form a proper basis for the imposition of the special conditions, the special conditions imposed are not consistent with the commission's past actions with regard to the approval of other Easton churches and places of worship and that numerous aspects of the special conditions appealed from are unduly vague and do not provide a specific enforcement standard. The plaintiff further argues that the application of zoning regulations to restrict religious uses raises concern over the possible infringement of its constitutional rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA).
The commission filed its trial brief on January 25, 2012. The commission argues that the conditions it imposed were lawful and the commission was duly authorized under General Statutes § 8-2[2] and regulations § 7.2.3 [3] to impose conditions of approval. Additionally, the commission posits that the conditions were in accordance with the plaintiff's proposed plans for the property and description of its proposed use. The commission asserts that § 7.2.1 FN4 of the regulations contains general conditions and standards which gave the commission discretion to impose the conditions and that each of the conditions added to the approval of the plaintiff's application was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. The commission proposes that the plaintiff's proper option is to return to the commission to seek a modification of any condition it deems burdensome.
The original return of record was filed on September 9, 2011. A supplemental return of record was filed on September 29 2011. The court held a trial on May 10, 2012. A second supplemental return of record was filed on August 23, 2012. Other facts and arguments are set forth herein as needed.
Appeals from decisions of a planning and zoning commission to the Superior Court are governed by General Statutes § 8-8 which provides in relevant part: " A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 78, 82, 557 A.2d 545 (1989).
" [P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal ... It is [therefore] fundamental that in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal a person must be aggrieved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 537-38, 833 A.2d 883 (2003). " Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it." Id., at 538-39. " Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory." Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156, 953 A.2d 1 (2008). " [E]ither type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features." Soracco v. Williams Scotman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 92, 971 A.2d 1 (2009).
" Classical aggrievement ... requires an analysis of the particular facts of the case in order to ascertain whether a party has been aggrieved and, therefore, has standing to appeal." Fleet National Bank's Appeal from Probate, 267 Conn. 229, 242 n .10, 837 A.2d 785 (2004). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 665, 899 A.2d 26 (2006).
Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 288 Conn. at 156. Thus, under § 8-8(a)(1), [5] " any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board" is statutorily aggrieved.
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that it has a lease of and is currently in possession of the subject property, and that this status demonstrates a specific personal and legal interest in the subject of the decision appealed from. It argues that it also has an option to purchase the property and that this status also establishes aggrievement. The plaintiff's president, Dan Blaze, testified at trial as to a lease and option agreement dated May 28, 2008, with extensions beyond its two-year term, and that the option remains in good force and effect. The defendants do not challenge the plaintiff's aggrievement. Therefore the court finds, as it has previously determined at the time of the trial, that the plaintiff is aggrieved and has standing to prosecute this appeal.
Section § 8-8(b) provides that " [an] appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (f) and (g) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes." Section § 8-8(f) states in relevant part: General Statutes § 52-57(b) provides in relevant part that " [p]rocess in civil actions against the following-described classes of defendants shall be served as follows ... (5) against a board, commission, department or agency of a town, city or borough, notwithstanding any provision of law, upon the clerk of the town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the board, commission, department or agency ..."
In the present case, the commission's decision was published in the Easton Courier on August 26, 2010. (ROR, Exh. 55.) The marshal's return attests that he served the Easton town clerk two copies of process on September 10, 2010, fifteen days later. Accordingly, the court finds this appeal to be timely and that service of process was proper.
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