Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 17856.,17856.
• Citation: 292 Conn. 86,971 A.2d 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph SORACCO et al. v. WILLIAMS SCOTSMAN, INC., et al.

971 A.2d 1

292 Conn. 86

Joseph SORACCO et al. v. WILLIAMS SCOTSMAN, INC., et al.

No. 17856.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 14, 2008.

Decided June 9, 2009.

Ellen M. Aspell, Glastonbury, for the appellant (intervening plaintiff Manafort Brothers, Inc.).

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was David McCarry, New Haven, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

This is an appeal by the intervening plaintiff, Manafort Brothers, Inc. (Manafort), from the trial court's order regarding the allocation of proceeds of a settlement reached in the underlying negligence action brought by the plaintiffs, Joseph Soracco and his spouse, Cheryl Soracco,¹ against the named defendant, Williams Scotsman, Inc., and the defendant E&F/ Walsh Building Company, LLC.² On appeal, Manafort claims that the trial court (1) improperly considered facts not in evidence in determining that the equal apportionment of the settlement proceeds between the plaintiffs was reasonable,³ and (2) improperly allowed the plaintiffs and the defendant to settle the matter without Manafort's consent. The plaintiffs oppose Manafort's claims on several grounds, including that the record is inadequate to determine whether the trial court considered facts not in evidence and that the court was acting with the consent of all parties when it approved the settlement allocation. We need not address the merits of these claims, however, because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the allocation of settlement proceeds was reasonable.

The following uncontested facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant seeking to recover for injuries that Joseph Soracco (Soracco) had sustained on October 16, 2001, as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendant's agents. Soracco sustained his injuries when he fell from a construction trailer after an employee of the defendant allegedly removed the stairs leading from the trailer door to the ground without ensuring that the trailer was unoccupied. Soracco was an employee of Manafort at the time of the accident and was injured in the course of his employment. Manafort became obligated to and did pay Soracco workers' compensation benefits as a result of his injuries. Soracco's claim for damages was brought pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293 and his spouse's claim for loss of consortium was derivative of his claim.⁴

Manafort intervened in the plaintiffs' action, pursuant to § 31-293(a), seeking to recover the workers' compensation benefits that it had paid and become obligated to pay to Soracco. Manafort also asserted a workers' compensation lien in this action in the amount of $542,411.69. The amount of Manafort's lien proved to be the main source of contention during the preliminary phase of the litigation.

The primary basis for the dispute regarding the amount of the lien and the defendant's liability was a prior, work-related accident that had occurred on May 7, 1999, in which Soracco had suffered several severe injuries when a steel girder fell across his chest. At the time of the 2001 accident, Soracco only recently had returned to work for Manafort in a "light duty" capacity after missing nearly two and one-half years due to the injuries that he had sustained in the 1999 incident.

On October 16, 2006, with the assistance of the court, Holzberg, J., the parties attempted to mediate the various claims. It was the defendant's position during mediation that the far greater portion of Manafort's workers' compensation lien was attributable to the 1999 injury rather than the 2001 injury. In fact, the defendant asserted that only approximately $30,000 of Manafort's total lien of $542,411.69 was related to the 2001 injury. The parties were unable to reach a settlement during the mediation, and the controversy regarding the legitimate amount of Manafort's lien never was settled or adjudicated.

On October 23, 2006, following the unsuccessful mediation attempt, the plaintiffs and the defendant reported to Judge Holzberg that they had reached a settlement agreement. The plaintiffs' counsel also informed the court that he had provided the defendant with a withdrawal and a formal release from liability.⁵ The substance of the settlement agreement was that, in exchange for the withdrawal and release, the defendant would pay the plaintiffs a total sum of $750,000. The plaintiffs' attorney indicated that each plaintiff would receive one half of that amount in satisfaction of their individual claims. Unsatisfied with this intended apportionment, Manafort requested a hearing to allow the court to determine whether the equal division of the settlement proceeds was reasonable. Apparently seeking the court's imprimatur for their settlement, the plaintiffs acquiesced to this procedure.

Judge Holzberg agreed to make a finding regarding whether an equal division of the proceeds between the plaintiffs was reasonable. After considering testimony from Soracco's spouse as well as arguments from the plaintiffs and Manafort⁶ regarding the reasonableness of the settlement allocation, Judge Holzberg upheld the equal apportionment of the settlement proceeds between the plaintiffs.⁷ Manafort thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We begin our analysis with a brief statement of the relevant principles of standing, followed by an examination of § 31-293(a), in order ultimately to determine whether Manafort had standing to contest the allocation of the settlement proceeds. The question of standing implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 63, 946 A.2d 862 (2008). "[A] court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought by persons who do not have standing...." (Citation omitted.) Orsi v. Senatore, 230 Conn. 459, 470, 645 A.2d 986 (1994); see also Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 595, 473 A.2d 787 (1984) ("[t]he issue of ... standing must be addressed before we reach the substantive merits of the [parties'] claim, because standing has jurisdictional implications"), overruled in part on other grounds by Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 545, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002). Moreover, concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction implicate the court's fundamental authority and may properly be raised and decided by the court sua sponte.⁸ See, e.g., Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005) ("[I]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.... Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction...." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Furthermore, there is no question that this court has jurisdiction to consider, on its own initiative, the jurisdiction of the trial court. See, e.g., Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 703, 894 A.2d 259 (2006); Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 275 Conn. 383, 385, 880 A.2d 865 (2005).

It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction. "If a party is found to lack [aggrievement], the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008); see also Stauton v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 271 Conn. 152, 157, 856 A.2d 400 (2004) ("[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff's appeal.... A possible absence of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features. "Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156, 953 A.2d 1 (2008).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to a detailed examination of § 31-293(a), the statute at issue in this case. A review of the statute and its operation demonstrates that Manafort lacked standing to contest the allocation of the settlement proceeds, and, thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order. Section 31-293 is a detailed scheme governing the parties' rights in third party workers' compensation scenarios. Its primary effect is to provide a mechanism for an injured employee to assert a claim against the party allegedly liable for his injury, notwithstanding the employee's statutory claim for workers' compensation.⁹ The statute also allows an employer who is obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits either to intervene in the employee's action or, in the event that the employee fails to prosecute his claim, to bring an independent action against the alleged tortfeasor.¹⁰ In either case, the rights of each party with respect to the other are set forth clearly, as is the proper disposition of any damages awarded in an action governed by § 31-293.¹¹ If the employer chooses not to intervene in an action brought by the employee, it still may recover a...