New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Fascio

• Decision Date: 24 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 626-M,626-M
• Citation: 254 A.2d 758,105 R.I. 711
• Parties: NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. Albert FASCIO et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 758

254 A.2d 758

105 R.I. 711

NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. Albert FASCIO et al.

No. 626-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 24, 1969.

Tillinghast, Collins & Tanner, Edwin H. Hastings, Peter J. McGinn, Providence, for petitioner

Irving J. Bilgor, Providence, for Board of Review, Department of Employment Security.

Abedon, Michaelson, Stanzler & Biener, Julius C. Michaelson, Providence, for Helen Rugg and Certain other employees of New England Telephone and Telegraph, Co., and New England Federation of Telephone Traffic Workers.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This petition for certiorari was brought to review a judgment of the superior court dismissing the petition of the petitioner here for a review of a decision of the board of review of the department of employment security granting unemployment compensation benefits to certain of the petitioner's employees. We granted the writ, and pursuant thereto the pertinent record has been certified to this court.

It appears therefrom that in April 1968 petitioner was involved in a labor dispute with certain of its employees who were members of the International Brotherhood of Telephone Workers, which dispute had resulted in a work stoppage. On April 26, 1968, a number of telephone operators who were employed by petitioner became unemployed by reason of their refusal to cross a picket line maintained by the members of the International Brotherhood. It is conceded that the operators were members of another union that at the time was not involved in the labor dispute. When the operators applied for unemployment benefits, the acting director of the department of employment security, finding them disqualified by reason of the provisions of G.L. 1956, § 28-44-16, denied their application for benefits. Section 28-44-16 establishes a limitation on the right of employees who become unemployed by reason of a strike or other industrial controversy to recover benefits absent a showing '* * * that the claimant is not a member of the organization or group responsible for the stoppage of work, and is not participating in or financing or in any way directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work.'

From that decision the employees appealed to the board of review of the department of employment security and, after hearing, that body reversed the decision of the acting director. Thereafter, on August 8, 1968, petitioner, acting pursuant to the provisions of § 58-44-52, ¹ filed in the superior court a petition for judicial review of the decision of the board of review of the department. After hearing, the superior court dismissed petitioner's petition for review on the ground that it was not an 'aggrieved' person within the meaning of § 42-35-15(a). ²

The record discloses reference by the trial justice to an 'extensive discussion in chambers.' While no summary of that discussion appears in the record, it is to be reasonably assumed that it concerned the question of whether § 42-35-15(a) of the administrative procedures act had, in effect, repealed the provisions contained in § 28-44-52 providing for a superior court review of decisions of the board of review of the department of employment security. The record further discloses that after the noon recess, counsel for the unemployed workers moved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that petitioner was not an aggrieved person within the meaning of § 42-35-15(a). This motion was subsequently granted by the court specifically on the ground that petitioner was without such an interest as would enable it to appeal under the provisions of § 42-35-15(a).

The record does not disclose that there was any substantial dispute as to the right of petitioner here to have prosecuted an appeal from the decision of the board of review under § 28-44-52 prior to the enactment of § 42-35-15(a). The respondent board appears to have contended that the provisions of § 42-35-15(a) provided an exclusive procedure for obtaining a review of such a decision in the superior court and that its enactment had repealed the provisions of § 28-44-52 by implication. In this court the case continues in that posture, petitioner urging, first, that the pertinent provisions of § 42-35-15(a) did not repeal the provisions of § 28-44-52 and, second, that if § 42-35-15(a) provides the only appeal in these cases, it is an aggrieved person within the contemplation of that statute.

Prior to the adoption of the administrative procedures act, standing to petition for judicial review of decisions of the board of review of the department of employment security was regulated solely by the provisions of chap. 44 of title 28. Specifically, § 28-44-52 provided that the findings and conclusions of the board of review were conclusive unless any 'party in interest' petitions the superior court for a review. It is made clear by an examination of the provisions of §§ 28-44-53 and 28-44-39(D) that an employer was a 'party in interest' within the meaning of said § 28-44-52 and, therefore, had standing to seek judicial review of a decision of the board of review. It becomes pertinent then to determine whether the adoption of the administrative procedures act implicitly repealed those provisions of chap. 44 of title 28 securing to an employer standing to appeal an agency determination.

It is common knowledge that the purpose of the administrative procedures act was to provide a uniform and consistent approach to the problems created by the increasing number and expanding jurisdiction of state administrative agencies. Implicit within this theory of providing a uniform standard for interagency procedures as well as judicial review is the idea that certain existing statutes relating to the subject matter covered by the administrative procedures act of necessity would have to be repealed if uniformity in this area was to be achieved. The legislature, cognizant of this necessity, adopted § 42-35-18 of the administrative procedures act, which, in pertinent part, provides that '* * * all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith shall stand repealed * * *.' The issue then to be determined in the instant circumstances is whether the legislative definition of standing as being a person 'aggrieved' is 'inconsistent' with the former standing requirement that one be a 'party in interest' as specified in § 28-44-52.

There is, in our opinion, such inconsistency between the requirements for standing specified in § 28-44-52 and an aggrieved person...