New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger

• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Citation: 51 N.E. 629,175 Ill. 383
• Parties: NEW HAVEN CLOCK CO. v. KOCHERSPERGER, Treasurer, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

175 Ill. 383

51 N.E. 629

NEW HAVEN CLOCK CO.

v.KOCHERSPERGER, Treasurer, et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Error to superior court, Cook county; Farlin Q. Ball, Judge.

Bill by the New Haven Clock Company against D. H. Kochersperger, treasurer and ex officio collector of Cook county, and others, to restrain collection of a tax. From a judgment of dismissal, complainant brings error. Affirmed.

Magruder, J., dissenting.Edgar Bronson Tolman and Harvey Mitchell Harper, for plaintiff in error.

Frank L. Shepard, Asst. Co. Atty. (Robert S. Iles, Co. Atty., of counsel), for defendants in error Kochersperger and Knopf.

J. T. Kretzinger and J. J. Rooney, for defendant in error Ernst.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Plaintiff in error filed its bill in the superior court of Cook county against defendants in error, as county treasurer and county clerk of Cook county and town collector of the town of South Chicago, in that county, praying for an injunction restraining the collection of the excess of taxes extended against it above the sum of $22.13, which would be the amount of its taxes on an assessment of $200. Demurrers to the original bill were sustained. The bill was amended, and demurrers to the amended bill were overruled, and the defendants were ruled to plead or answer. Thereupon the defendant the collector of the town of South Chicago filed his plea that there was no money due from complainant for taxes, and that he had not in his hands any warrant for the collection of a tax from it. The defendants the county clerk and county collector filed similar pleas. The abstract does not show any action on these pleas, but complainant, by leave of court, filed a supplemental bill reciting the previous proceedings, and alleging that afterwards, while the case was pending in court, the town collector, armed with his warrant, by means of threats to levy on and take possession of complainant's property, which he was about to execute, made a compulsory collection of the entire tax, $553.20, which complainant paid under protest, and that this compulsory payment was the sole defense alleged by the pleas. The demurrers previously filed were ordered to stand to this supplemental bill, and the court sustained them. Complainant elected to stand by its bills, and the amended and supplemental bills were dismissed for want of equity.

The facts appearing by the amended and supplemental bills, to which the demurrers were sustained, and which were thereby admitted, were in substance as follows: The entire personal credits and effects, including cash on hand or money in bank, owned by complainant on May 1, 1897, were of the fair cash value of $2,000. After the fourth Monday of June, and during the month of July, of that year complainant received a notice from Richard C. Gunning, the assessor of the town of South Chicago, that its property had been assessed at $20,000, whereupon it made and filed with the assessor a schedule of its taxable property and assets in the town. The schedule showed a total value of $2,000, and was received and accepted by the assessor. Other personal property in the town was assessed at not to exceed 10 per cent. of its fair cash value, and, at the rate at which such other property was assessed, complainant's assessment would have been $200. Upon receipt of the schedule the assessor promised to assess the property at 10 per cent. of the fair cash value therein stated; but without notice to the complainant, and disregarding his agreement, he assessed the property at $5,000. This assessment was willfully made, as a part of a general plan to assess complainant, and other selected persons, firms, and corporations, at a disproportionate and excessive rate, to extort money as a bribe for a reduction to the uniform rate applied to property in general; and persons who represented themselves to be emissaries of the assessor, and were charged to have been his representatives, offered to reduce the assessment to a satisfactory amount upon payment of money therefor. On July 12, 1897, complainant filed with the county board an application for the revision of the assessment, and afterwards filed an amended application, and appeared before the board and introduced evidence in its support, which was heard by the county board, and the application taken under advisement. The county board neither granted nor denied the application. It was referred to the finance committee, and that committee reported, as to this and other applications, that they had decided to make no recommendation, except that the complaints be placed on file, without prejudice to complainants' appeal to the courts. This report was adopted by the board. Again, on September 27, 1897, the finance committee made another report to the board on the subject of equalizing valuations between the towns of Cook county; reciting, among other things, the existence of unfair assessments, and inequality and injustice between individuals, which it was impossible for the board to go into further than had been done, and containing a resolution that the assessments as returned by the assessor, with certain reductions made by the county board, should be declared to be the assessments for the year 1897. This report was also adopted by the board, and by this action the county board refused to act upon the application of complainant, and to decide the question of complainant's grievance submitted to it under the statute. Complainant's application was then placed on file under this order that it should be without prejudice to its appeal to the courts. Taxes were assessed upon this fraudulent assessment to the amount of $553.20.

This case has been argued with five others (51 N. E. 648), and counsel say that the six cases present substantially the same questions. We find, however, that there is an important difference between this case and the others, which renders a considerable part of the argument entirely inapplicable. This difference is that in the other cases the property was assessed at less than its fair cash value, and as to them it is urged that the only real complaint is that the complainants therein were assessed at a higher rate than others. The argument that there is no just cause of complaint where the assessment does not exceed the fair cash value, although others are assessed at a less rate, cannot be applied to this case, since the fair cash value is $2,000, and the assessment $5,000. The question in this case is whether complainant could have relief against an excessive assessment which was made with full knowledge of the facts, and from a wrongful and fraudulent motive. The law provides for a valuation of property by the assessor. The statute has also provided a board of review, and a further revision by the county board, for the protection of a taxpayer who may consider himself aggrieved by the opinion or judgment of the assessor. Value is largely a matter of opinion, and the opinions of these officers, when honestly exercised and applied upon a basis authorized by the law, cannot be reviewed or revised by the courts. The provisions of the statute are intended to be sufficient to reach the ends of justice between the taxpayers, and there is no appeal to the courts in mere matters of judgment. The assessor and boards for review are invested with the only power to fix valuations, and their decisions can only be questioned for fraud or want of jurisdiction. Railroad Co. v. Frary, 22 Ill. 34;Spencer v. People, 68 Ill. 510;Insurance Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292; Railway Co. v. Hodges, 113 Ill. 323;East St. Louis C. R. Co. v. People, 119 Ill. 182, 10 N. E. 397;Coal Co. v. Stookey, 122 Ill. 358, 13 N. E. 516;Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 157 Ill. 543, 41 N. E. 874;Keokuk Bridge Co. v. People, 161 Ill. 514, 44 N. E. 206. But while it is not the duty of courts, nor within the power of equity, to supervise the honest judgments of statutory officers as to valuations, equity will interfere if the valuations are fixed from improper motives and in disregard of duty. The law authorized the assessor to exercise his judgment as to the value of property, but not to enter upon a system of pillage and plunder, and to make use of his office to carry it out. Courts of equity have always relieved against fraud, and even the most solemn judgments are vitiated by it. If an assessor, under cover of his office, with intent to defeat the justice and uniformity required by the law, or for the corrupt motive of obtaining a bribe, steps aside from his duty to accomplish such a purpose, the wrong inflicted may be redressed in equity, and the assessment will be vitiated by the fraud. Cooley, Tax'n, 157, [175 Ill. 391]526, 547; Porter v. Railway Co., 76 Ill. 561;Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602; Railroad Co. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591; Railway Co. v. Hodges, supra; Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, supra. It is the rule that an excessive valuation, merely, does not establish fraud, but the attending circumstances may be such as to lead to the conclusion that it was fraudulently and...