New Haven Trust Co. v. Camp

• Decision Date: 22 January 1909
• Citation: 71 A. 788,81 Conn. 539
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW HAVEN TRUST CO. v. CAMP et al.

71 A. 788

81 Conn. 539

NEW HAVEN TRUST CO.

v. CAMP et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 22, 1909.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Milton A. Shumway, Judge.

Action of interpleader by the New Haven Trust Company against Theodore C. Camp, executor, and others. From the judgment, Caroline W. Baldwin's executors appeal. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Henry Stoddard and George M. Gunn, for appellant.

Henry C. White and Leonard M. Daggett, for appellee.

BALDWIN, C. J. In 1855, at the request of Caroline W. Suydam, wife of Ferdinand Suydam of New York, and one of several children of Stephen Whitney of New York, her father, who was then 78 years of age, bought a country place named "Ivy Nook," situated partly in Hamden and partly in New Haven, Conn., for and as a present or gift to her. He paid $11,000 for it, and had the deed, which was dated May 19, 1855, made to himself. Her husband was at this time insolvent, and, to secure the property against him and his creditors, her father did not convey it to her till 1857, when he and his wife, described as parties of the first part, executed a conveyance of it, in which Mrs. Suydam was described as the party of the second part. This he gave to her, or to an agent, who received it in her behalf. The deed was dated August 4, 1857, and executed in New York. The consideration stated in it was "natural love and affection" and $1. The operative words of grant were "do grant, bargain, sell, alien, remise, release, convey and confirm, unto the said party of the second part, to her sole and separate use during her natural life and free and clear from the debts or control of her present or any future husband," and embraced "all the estate, right, title, interest, dower, right of dower, property, possession, claim and demand whatsoever, as well in law as in equity, of the said parties of the first part, of, in, or to" Ivy Nook; habendum "unto the said party of the second part, to her sole and separate use during her natural life and free and clear from the debts or control of her present or any future husband; giving and granting to the said Caroline full power to convey or dispose of the said premises in fee simple by deed, will, or otherwise." This conveyance was recorded in the Hamden and New Haven land records in May, 1860, after Mr. Whitney's death, which occurred in the preceding February. Mr. Suydam applied for a discharge in insolvency in December, 1857, but did not receive it until after Mr. Whitney's death.

There was but a single attesting witness to the deed, namely the magistrate, before whom it was acknowledged in New York city; and the attestation clause stated that it was sealed and delivered in his presence. There were two certificates of acknowledgment, made in New York two days after the date of the deed. One followed the New York form, and was signed by him as a commissioner of deeds of New York; the other followed the Connecticut form, and was signed by him as a commissioner to take the acknowledgment of deeds appointed by this state. Having but a single witness, the deed was, at the date of its delivery, ineffective to convey any interest in land in Connecticut. Comp. St. 1854, tit. 29, c. 1, p. 631, § 8. Farrell Foundry v. Dart 26 Conn. 376, 381. An act entitled "An act to confirm certain deeds" took effect on June 16, 1858, providing that all deeds of Connecticut real estate, which had been executed in any other state according to its law, with only one attesting witness, but were in all other respects executed according to our laws, should be valid as against the grantor and all persons subsequently acquiring an interest under him with notice. Pub. Acts 1858, p. 46, c. 64. A later statute, passed in 1894; made all deeds of Connecticut lands which had been, or should be, executed and acknowledged in any other state, in conformity with its laws relative to lands therein situated, "valid to all intents and purposes," with a saving in favor of any title previously "acquired in good faith by any creditor of or purchaser from the grantor in any deed or conveyance, defectively executed, or from his heirs or devisees." Pub. Acts 1864, p. 19, c. 4. On May 19, 1855, Mr. Whitney gave Mrs. Suydam, and she took, exclusive possession and occupation of Ivy Nook as her own, and soon afterwards, and prior to August 4, 1857, she commenced to make improvements and changes in the house and grounds. This exclusive possession she held till her death in November, 1905, when it passed to the executors and trustees under her will. They sold the place for over $50, 000, and the fund was deposited, by agreement of all parties in interest, with the plaintiff, to be disposed of as a proper court might order. She survived Mr. Suydam for many years, and at her death was the widow of one Nathan A. Baldwin.

The attestation clause was prima facie proof that the deed of August 4, 1857, was delivered in New York, and there was no evidence to the contrary. At that time dower could only be claimed under Connecticut law in lands of which the husband died possessed in his own right. In view of the execution and delivery, under such circumstances, of such a conveyance in the state of New York, where a deed with a single witness was sufficient to convey lands therein situated, a presumption arises ut res magis valeat quam pereat; that the parties, at the time, had in mind the law of New York as that which would govern the meaning and effect of the instrument in question. They could hardly have supposed that they were executing on the one side, and accepting on the other, a conveyance which conveyed nothing. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 137, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104.

Nothing is expressly stated in the instrument itself as to what should be the governing law. It must therefore be determined under the established principles of private international law. By these the proper law of every contract under such circumstances, so far as the contractual obligations of the parties to each other are concerned, is that by which they may justly be presumed to have meant to bind themselves. The question, prima facie at least, is not what they did...