New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Jersey City

• Decision Date: 22 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. A--51,A--51
• Citation: 177 A.2d 539,36 N.J. 332
• Parties: NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 332

36 N.J. 332

177 A.2d 539

NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERSEY CITY, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A--51.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Dec. 4, 1961.

Decided Jan. 22, 1962.

Meyer Pesin, Jersey City, for appellant (Ezra L. Nolan, Corp. Counsel, Jersey City, attorney).

Grover C. Richman, Jr., Newark, for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JACOBS, J.

On November 14, 1958 the plaintiff, New Jersey Turnpike Authority, instituted an action in condemnation pursuant to R.R. 4:92. It alleged that it was authorized by N.J.S.A. 27:23--5(j) to exercise the power of eminent domain; it sought to condemn 21 parcels of land owned by the defendant City of Jersey City and located within its borders along a route selected by the Turnpike Authority; and it demanded judgment appointing three commissioners in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 20:1--1 et seq., N.J.S.A. to fix the compensation for the taking of the land 'including the damage, if any, resulting from the taking, to any remaining property, and to make separate awards for each parcel of land.' An order to show cause was issued, an answer joining in the demand for the appointment of commissioners was filed, and on February 16, 1959 an amended order appointing commissioners was entered. The amended order directed that the commissioners examine and appraise the land and fix the compensation for the taking of the land 'including the damage, if any, resulting from the taking to any remaining parcel as of the date of taking and to make separate awards for each of said parcels of land.'

The report of the commissioners was filed on April 29, 1960. It first set forth that hearings were held on many days from May 12, 1959 through February 16, 1960, that these hearings were attended by representatives of the parties, that the land was examined on three separate occasions, and that valuation evidence was submitted and duly considered along with the arguments and briefs submitted on behalf of the parties. It then certified that the commissioners had made a just and equitable appraisement of the land 'including the damage, if any, resulting from the taking, to any remaining property, as of the date of the commencement of this action' and that they had determined 'that the sum of $523,715 represents a just and equitable value' of all of the lands and property in question 'including consequential damages.' The concluding paragraph of the report read as follows: 'We do award and report that the New Jersey Turnpike Authority pay to the owners-defendants, the City of Jersey City, for the land and premises to be taken for public use the sum of $523,715 as the value of said land and premises and damages thereto.'

On May 10, 1960 the Turnpike Authority, through its counsel Mr. Richman, filed a petition praying that the report of the commissioners be declared null and void, that three substituted commissioners be appointed and that the Turnpike Authority's time for appeal be extended. The petition alleged that the report of the commissioners was defective in the following respects: (1) the report stated that the valuation was as of the date of the commencement of the condemnation action in 1958 whereas the actual taking of the land by the Turnpike Authority was in December 1954 and the parties had stipulated that the valuation would be as of the date of the taking; (2) the report referred to 'consequential damages' which 'may include damages which are not compensable and should not have been considered'; and (3) the report made an award of a single lump sum rather than a separate award for each of the 21 parcels. Upon the filing of the petition, an order to show cause was issued and the time for appeal from the award of the commissioners was extended. On May 20, 1960 the commissioners addressed a letter to the court with respect to the three objections raised by the Turnpike Authority. The letter contained the following statements and offered to support them by affidavits or testimony if the court so desired:

'Mr. Richman makes three points. First, that from the Report itself he concludes the valuations fixed by the Commission were arrived at as to the value of the lands on the date of the starting of the suit which was November 14, 1958. In our judgment, affirmative action was started by the Turnpike as of the date it took possession of the lands in 1954. In this case at our hearings it was stipulated that the values to be arrived at were values as of the time of the taking, that is, December 24, 1954 and no testimony was received as to valuations except as to those that obtained in 1954, nor was any other valuation date considered by us.

The second point that Mr. Richman makes is that of these 21 parcels, it was the duty of the Commissioners to appraise each parcel separately. We did appraise them separately but did not make them part of our report. In our report we fixed the total of the value of the lands separately appraised by us. If the Court wishes to have that separate appraisal, we will be glad to send it to the Court and all counsel.

The next point Mr. Richman makes is that there is no way to distinguish the item of consequential damage from the item fixing the value of the land taken. We followed the ordinary rule, basing our value of land taken on the evidence before us and where there was damage to the remainder, the item of such consequential damage was included in the award for that particular parcel. All witnesses where there was a matter of consequential damage, both for the State and for the Authority, testified to such consequential damage.'

So far as the record before us indicates, there was never any reply to the letter from the commissioners. On October 10, 1960 counsel for the parties appeared before the Law Division of the Superior Court which then granted the Turnpike Authority's petition. The Law Division expressly rejected the position of counsel for Jersey City that the commissioners should have the right 'to remold and conform' their report to accord with their actual determinations as clarified by their letter of May 20. On December 2, 1960 the Law Division entered a formal order setting aside the commissioners' report and appointing substituted commissioners to examine and appraise the land. On December 14 Jersey City appealed from this order to the Appellate Division (cf. R.R. 2:2--3) and while its appeal was pending there we certified it on our own motion. See R.R. 1:10--1(a).

It is clear that the report of the commissioners should have contained an award for each of the 21 parcels. N.J.S.A. 27:23--5(j) provides that the Authority may join any number of parcels to be condemned, 'provided, however, that separate awards be made for each tract or parcel of land or property.' Jersey City contends that the quoted clause should be restricted to cases where the parcels are owned by separate owners. The statutory language is not so confined and we find no reason for so construing it. In any event, the order appointing the commissioners contained an explicit directive for separate awards, and the Turnpike Authority was entitled to full compliance so that it could fairly decide for itself which of the separate awards it would appeal from and which awards it would not resist. See N.J.S.A. 20:1--16; R.R. 4:92--6. Jersey City urges that, assuming all of the foregoing, the proper course was not to have new condemnation commissioners but to permit the old commissioners to remold their report so as to incorporate the 21 separate awards which they in fact made but neglected to set forth in the report. It points out that the cost 'in the preparation of its case, including the cost of experts, was over $15,000' and that if the appointment of new commissioners by the Law Division is sustained, the city will unjustifiably be burdened with great additional expense and delay.

The course urged by the city is patently the sensible one and should be followed unless precluded by some fixed legal barrier. It must be borne in mind that the Turnpike Authority does not question the competence and conscientiousness of the commissioners, that no revaluations or reconsiderations are suggested or involved, and that the Law Division may readily verify the statements of the commissioners by taking testimony and examining the pertinent work records. If the commissioners appraised the parcels separately and then simply totaled the individual appraisals, their failure to include the separate appraisals along with the total should, as a matter of good sense, be viewed as an inadvertent formal omission which the commissioners may now be permitted to supply. This would fairly and justly avoid the additional expense and delay which would result from nullification of the report. In other jurisdictions, courts have not hesitated to remit condemnation awards to commissioners for comparable corrective action, and indeed for much more far reaching action. See New York, W. & B. Ry. Co. v. Siebrecht, 73 Misc. 219, 130 N.Y.S. 1005 (Sup.Ct.1911); United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, etc., 61 F.Supp. 251 (E.D.N.Y.1955); cf. Andrews v. Cox, 127 Conn. 455, 17 A.2d 507 (Sup.Ct.Err.1941); Brackett v. Commonwealth, 223 Mass. 119, 111 N.E. 1036, 1039 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1916); In re Bainbridge-Unadilla Part 1, State Highway, 168 Misc. 407, 5 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Cty.Ct.1938); In re Luzerne-Lake George County Highway No. 804, 145 Misc. 736, 261 N.Y.S. 894 (Cty.Ct.1932); 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 26.531, pp. 231--232 (3d ed. 1953).

It is true that in the states where the afore-cited cases arose, the local statutory provisions relating to condemnation proceedings may have differed somewhat from those in our statutes. See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 38 N.J.Super. 132, 136, 118 A.2d 64 (App.Div.1955). And it may also be acknowledged, as our courts have often pointed out, that the sovereign power of eminent...