New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890 of International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers

• Decision Date: 25 September 1953
• Docket Number: No. 5626,5626
• Citation: 57 N.M. 617,261 P.2d 648,1953 NMSC 87
• Parties: NEW JERSEY ZINC CO. v. LOCAL 890 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL & SMELTER WORKERS et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 648

261 P.2d 648

57 N.M. 617

NEW JERSEY ZINC CO. v. LOCAL 890 OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL & SMELTER WORKERS et al.

No. 5626.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 25, 1953.

Edison C. Serna, Silver City, Hannett & Hannett, W. S. Lindamood, Albuquerque, for appellants.

Garland, Sanders & Cooney, Las Cruces, for appellee.

SEYMOUR, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the district court of Grant County, adjudging the defendants, appellants, in contempt of court for violating a permanent injunction issued by the court on July 9, 1951. These civil contempt proceedings arose out of an injunction suit filed in the district court by plaintiff, appellee, wherein it sought a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction enjoining appellants from trespassing on appellee's property and from blocking roads and other entrances to the property of appellee in such a manner as to restrain or coerce employees of appellee from returning to work. On July 9, 1951, the district court granted a permanent injunction, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:

'1. That defendants and each of them, and their wives, mothers, sisters and children as their agents, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from trespassing upon plaintiff's property and blocking the roads and other entrances to the property of plaintiff in such manner as to restrain, coerce or prevent the employees of plaintiff from returning to work, or from illegally attempting to keep said employees from continuing in their employment with plaintiff.'

On December 18, 1951, appellee filed its motion for order to show cause seeking to have appellants held in contempt for violation of the permanent injunction, the alleged violations occurring December 6 through December 18, inclusive, 1951. Hearing was had February 28 and 29, 1952. Decision of the trial court was rendered March 10, 1952 finding appellants guilty of contempt and levying specific fines in varying amounts, totalling $5,720, in part against the unions and in part against the individual appellants, to be paid to the clerk of the court for the use and benefit of appellee as compensation for its losses and damages by reason of the violation of the permanent injunction.

The matter is now here on appeal from the contempt decree growing out of the order to show cause; for a better understanding of the position of this case in the many litigated matters arising out of a single strike, reference is made to the opinion this day filed by this Court in the case of Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. ----, 261 P.2d 655.

The first matter requiring disposition is the motion to dismiss appeal filed by attorneys for appellee in this Court on April 30, 1953, ruling thereon having been reserved until this time. The grounds of this motion are four in number, the first three asserting the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to extend the time of filing of transcript and bill of exceptions after the original return date therefor. A subsidiary point briefed in support of the motion was the failure of appellants to give notice to appellee of appellants' motion for extension, such notice being provided for in the last sentence of Rule 13(7) of the Rules of this Court reading as follows:

'A second or subsequent extension of time for filing transcript may be granted only after notice to the appellee.'

The fourth ground for the motion asserts a failure on the part of appellants to include in their brief a 'Statement of facts' as required by Rule 15(14)(3) Supreme Court Rules.

The motion on the first three grounds and on the matter of notice is overruled on the basis of National Mut. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. McGhee, 1934, 38 N.M. 442, 34 P.2d 1093, in which there is an exhaustive discussion of related matters. Justice Sadler's opinion deals specifically with the matter of extension, and his reasoning and conclusion adequately cover the failure of notice as required by the above cited Supreme Court Rule. This case has been carried forward with approval in City of Raton v. Seaberg, 1935, 39 N.M. 544, 51 P.2d 606, and Harnish v. Urbanoski, 1941, 45 N.M. 108, 111 P.2d 859.

As to the fourth ground of the motion, addressed to appellants' Statement of Facts in their brief, we find no merit. The questions raised by this appeal are almost exclusively legal ones unrelated to the testimony reported at length in the transcript. The statement in appellants' brief denominated 'Statement of Facts' serves the necessary purpose of placing before this Court those facts upon which decision must be made. A detail of the testimony would serve little purpose in the particular case. Under these circumstances, appellants' statement of facts is deemed sufficient.

Turning to the merits of the controversy, Point I of the appellants' brief comprehends assignments of error numbered 1, 2 and 3, and raises the controlling question in this case. Point I reads as follows:

'The court was without jurisdiction to proceed with the civil contempt proceedings herein for the reason that, pending trial of such contempt proceedings, the strike, which was the basis of the original complaint, was settled and the dispute between the parties terminated.'

The permanent injunction of the trial court was filed July 9, 1951. Paragraph 5 of appellee's original complaint alleged:

'That on the 17th day of October, 1950, the operations of plaintiff were discontinued due to a strike instituted by defendants.'

The acts complained of and against which appellee sought relief were the allegedly unlawful acts of appellants in their picketing. After lengthy hearing, the trial court found the facts to be as alleged in the complaint and issued the permanent injunction. There was no appeal taken and the permanent injunction remains today as it was July 9, 1951.

This contempt action, stemming from the original equity case, commenced December 18, 1951, and was heard on the merits February 28 and 29, 1952; the decree from which this appeal is taken was entered March 10, 1952.

It is undisputed that the strike mentioned in paragraph 5 of the equity complaint was settled in late January of 1952 and that the picket line was withdrawn and ceased to exist.

The question for determination is whether or not the settlement of the strike and the withdrawal of the picket line terminated the jurisdiction of the lower court to continue the trial of and make disposition of the civil contempt proceedings commenced a month before such settlement and withdrawal.

A leading case in this country on the subject of contempt is Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 502, 55 L.Ed. 797. In that case, the defendants, Samuel Gompers and others, were found guilty of contempt of court in making certain publications prohibited by injunction. They were sentenced to imprisonment for twelve, nine and six months respectively. Much of the opinion of the Supreme Court was devoted to the problem of whether or not these sentences for a fixed period of imprisonment were proper in a civil contempt proceedings. Without making a decision on that question, the opinion of the Court concluded as follows:

'* * * it is both unnecessary and improper to make any decree in this contempt proceeding.

'For, on the hearing of the appeal and cross appeal in the original cause in which the injunction was issued, it appeared from the statement of counsel in open court that there had been a complete settlement of all matters involved in the case of Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. American Federation of Labor. This court therefore declined to further consider the case, which had become moot, and those two appeals were dismissed. 219 U.S. 581, 31 S.Ct. 472, 55 L.Ed. 345. When the main case was settled, every proceeding which was dependent on it, or a part of it, was also necessarily settled,--of course, without prejudice to the power and right of the court to punish for contempt by proper proceedings. Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 27, 7 S.Ct. 814, 30 L.Ed. , 858. If this had been a separate and independent proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to vindicate the authority of the court, with the public on one side and the defendants on the other, it could not, in any way, have been affected by any settlement which the parties to the equity cause made in their private litigation.

'But, as we have shown, this was a proceeding in equity for civil contempt, where the only remedial relief possible was a fine, payable to the complainant. The company prayed 'for such relief as the nature of its case may require,' and when the main cause was terminated by a settlement of all differences between the parties, the complainant did not require, and was not entitled to, any compensation or relief of any other character. The present proceeding necessarily ended with the settlement of the main cause of which it is a part. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey, Co., 194 U.S. 328, 333, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. , 1002, 1004; Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. , 27, 7 S.Ct. 814, 30 L.Ed. 858; State v. Nathans, 49 S.C. 207, 27 S.E. 52. The criminal sentences imposed in the civil case, therefore, should be set aside.'

There is no question that, in the Gompers case, there was a complete dismissal of the original equity suit out of which grew the contempt action. The language of Mr. Justice Lamar in this regard is:

'* * * a complete settlement of all matters involved in the case * * *'

and

'when the main case was settled, * * *'

and

'* * * the settlement of the main cause of which it is a part.'

It is the contention of appellee that the Gompers case is distinguishable and not controlling because, in the case before this Court, the permanent injunction was issued and remains in existence on the records to this day.

Many cases bearing upon the question are cited by both parties. It is the conclusion of this Court that the principle of Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., supra, is applicable to and...