New Seattle Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 15 December 1915
• Docket Number: 13197.
• Citation: 153 P. 351,88 Wash. 620
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW SEATTLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

153 P. 351

88 Wash. 620

NEW SEATTLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

No. 13197.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 15, 1915

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; R. B. Albertson, Judge.

Action by the New Seattle Chamber of Commerce against the City of Seattle and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Jas. E Bradford, Ralph S. Pierce, and William B. Allison, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Hughes McMicken, Dovell & Ramsey, of Seattle, for respondent.

MORRIS C.J.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the city of Seattle can initiate a tax levy by resolution of the city council without the intervention of the mayor, or must such levy be made by ordinance, and thus be subject to the veto power of the mayor?

An engaging and interesting argument is made both in the briefs and in the oral presentation here, as to the status of cities of the first class under our Constitution, and the powers delegated under the Constitution, enabling act and various subsequent legislative acts. The conclusion reached by the majority of the court, however, does not call for a discussion of these questions, and we confidently rest our decision upon one point which to our minds is decisive of the appeal.

We may assume, as held in various decisions of this court, that cities of the first class are, by virtue of the Constitution permitted to frame a charter and exercise their own government, except in so far as such attempted exercise is in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the state. We are to determine, then, does the provision of section 18, art. 4 of the charter of the city of Seattle, providing that 'the city council shall have power by ordinance and not otherwise * * * to provide for the assessing, levying and collecting taxes on real and personal property,' conflict with any constitutional or statutory provision of this state. It is not contended that any conflict is found in the Constitution, so a review of its provisions may be eliminated.

In 1893 the Legislature passed an act (section 9281, Rem. & Bal. Code) providing, among other things, that:

'The city council of each city of the first class * * * shall by ordinance in each year fix the rate of taxes to be levied and levy the taxes upon all taxable property, both real and personal, in such city.'

In 1909 the Legislature passed the so-called 'budget law,' which provided that on or before the first Monday in September in each year the city council shall make an itemized estimate of the amount required to meet municipal expenses for the ensuing year, to publish such estimate, and on the first Monday in October, after public hearing, determine the amount of taxes to be levied. This act was amended in 1915 by dividing the different municipal corporations of the state into taxing districts and providing that the 'governing officials' of such taxing district shall prepare and adopt a budget for the respective taxing districts for the ensuing year. The act defines 'governing officials' as 'city or town councils.'

It will be noted, from an examination of these various statutory provisions, that, in so far as the power to levy a tax is delegated to city councils, it is a mere naked delegation of power. None of these legislative acts, nor any other known to our law, provide how or in what manner this power shall be exercised. None of them, nor any other legislative provision goes farther than a designation of the body in which the power is to rest. How then, or in what manner, is this power to be exercised? Manifestly, finding no direction in any statutory provision, there can be but one answer to the question, and that is the...