New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County

• Decision Date: 04 December 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-2342-W.
• Citation: 623 F. Supp. 1435
• Parties: NEW YORK AIRLINES, INC., Plaintiff, v. DUKES COUNTY, Martha's Vineyard Airport Commission, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

623 F. Supp. 1435

NEW YORK AIRLINES, INC., Plaintiff, v. DUKES COUNTY, Martha's Vineyard Airport Commission, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-2342-W.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 4, 1985.

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Thayer Fremont-Smith, Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., Ronald Stern, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Robert Tolins, Holtz & Gilman, P.C., Boston, Mass., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

Plaintiff in this action is New York Airlines, Inc. ("New York Air"). Defendants are Dukes County, the Martha's Vineyard Airport Commission (the "Commission") and the individual members of the Commission. New York Air seeks damages and injunctive relief for the refusal by the Commission to grant it access to the Martha's Vineyard Airport (the "Airport"). The matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is in part granted and in part denied. More specifically, defendants' motion is granted as to New York Air's claims under 49 U.S.C. §§ 1305(a) and 1349(a) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent they are based on those provisions of the federal aviation statutes. The motion is denied as to New York Air's claims under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2; the commerce clause, U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent they are based upon 49 U.S.C. § 2210(a); and the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

The alleged facts, as stated in the amended complaint, are as follows. On April 9, 1985, New York Air filed a formal request for permission to operate at the Airport beginning on June 1, 1985. The request was considered at a meeting of the Commission held on April 24, 1985, at which the Commission refused New York Air permission to use the terminal and ramp facilities at the Airport. This, in effect, denied New York Air access to Martha's Vineyard. According to statements made at the April 24 meeting by members of the Commission, the refusal was based in part on factors that relate to New York Air's proposed routes and services, including concern over the competition that would result with Provincetown-Boston Airways ("PBA"), a carrier which now services the Airport, and the opinion of some members that the proposed service was unnecessary since other carriers, including PBA and Brockway Air, already provided adequate service. Commission members also stated that the Airport's facilities were inadequate to accommodate New York Air's DC 9-30 aircraft. The decision to deny New York Air access to the Airport was confirmed on May 8, 1985. The amended complaint further alleges that defendants' actions constitute an attempt to regulate the routes and services of an air carrier seeking to use the Airport and that, even if the denial of access was based on purported facilities limitations at the Airport, the denial was improper because the facilities are adequate to accommodate the proposed operations.

New York Air's claims for relief are based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2; the commerce clause of the Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3; the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and various provisions of the federal aviation laws, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1305(a), 1349(a) and 2210(a).¹ New York Air also alleges that defendants conspired with PBA to protect PBA from competition in violation of the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the material allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848, 23 L.Ed.2d 404, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 35, 24 L.Ed.2d 123 (1969); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 545 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom. O'Brien v. Jordan, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977); see Robinson v. Stanley Home Products Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1959). The complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. at 421, 89 S.Ct. at 1848; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Dismissal is inappropriate "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102.

I. The Constitutional Claims

A. The Supremacy Clause

The supremacy clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that "interfere with or are contrary to" federal law. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Congress may prempt state law by an express provision. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2201, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977). In addition, an intent to preempt state law may be inferred where Congress has enacted a sufficiently comprehensive scheme of federal regulation or where the federal interest is dominant so as to preclude state legislation in the same area. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Where Congress has not acted to supersede completely regulation by the states, state law is nullified to the extent that it conflicts with federal law. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1216-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 858, 83 S.Ct. 1861, 10 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1963). See generally Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). New York Air claims that the Commission's action is prohibited under the supremacy clause by the express preemption provision contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) and by inference from the extensive federal regulatory scheme governing interstate air transportation and the federal policies underlying that scheme.

Section 105(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a), provides that:

No State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under title IV of this Act to provide air transportation.

The provision was enacted as part of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (1978) (amended 1984), by which Congress sought to place "maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and potential competition," consistent with the public safety and other objectives of the Act, for the provision of a national air transportation system. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4). Section 105(a) addressed the absence under existing law of any specific provision governing federal and state jurisdiction and was intended to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations" affecting airlines providing both intrastate and interstate service. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1211, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3737, 3752. Section 105(a) expressly preempts state regulation of interstate carriers operating pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1371 et seq. See, e.g., San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1310 n. 8, (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Department of Transportation v. San Diego Unified Port District, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982); see also Midway Airlines, Inc. v. County of Westchester, N.Y., 584 F.Supp. 436, 440 n. 18 (S.D. N.Y.1984). New York Air's amended complaint therefore states a claim under the supremacy clause to the extent that the Commission's action is alleged to constitute a "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision" affecting its "rates, routes, or services." See 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a).

In addition, courts have recognized the predominance of federal interests in the regulation of aviation. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625, 633-34, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 1855, 1859-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973) (federal regulation of aircraft noise); United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.1979); British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 564 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir.1977) ("Concorde II"). The amended complaint thus states a claim under the supremacy clause insofar as the Commission's action would interfere with the federal scheme of regulation or stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. at 404.

Challenges to the actions of airport operators based on the supremacy clause, including private actions against refusals by local airport proprietors to grant access to interstate carriers, have been recognized by the courts. Concorde II; United States v. State of New York, 552 F.Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 708 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 1907, 80 L.Ed.2d 456 (1984); see Midway Airlines, 584 F.Supp. at 438; see also Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, reh'g denied, 720 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1983) (suit brought by airport operator under supremacy clause); San Diego Unified Port District, 651 F.2d 1306 (suit by local port district).²

Defendants' contention that the refusal of access to New York Air was temporary and that it was based on legitimate proprietary interests excluded from preemption under section 105(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(b), cannot properly be considered on the motion to dismiss.³ These issues will necessarily involve factual determinations and no evidence has...