New York Biscuit Co. v. City of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 17 May 1894
• Parties: NEW YORK BISCUIT CO. v. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

161 Mass. 326

37 N.E. 438

NEW YORK BISCUIT CO.

v.CITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 17, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Middlesex county.

Petition by the New York Biscuit Company against the city of Cambridge for the recovery of taxes paid under protest. By the agreed facts, judgment was to be entered for the petitioner for $1,426 and interest, if the amount of debts due to it were not taxable; otherwise, judgment to be entered for defendant. Judgment for petitioner.

Dudley A. Dorr, for appellant.

G.A.A. Pevey, for appellee.

MORTON, J.

The question in this case is whether the debts due to the plaintiff, in connection with its business at Cambridge, from various persons, firms, and corporations, are taxable there, as goods, wares, merchandise, or stock in trade, under Pub.St. c. 11, § 20, cl. 1. Debts due to a person are certainly not goods, wares, or merchandise. The latter words occur in the statute of frauds, and though it is held in this state that shares in corporations are goods, wares, and merchandise, within the meaning of that statute, it is said that “the words of that statute have never been *** extended *** beyond securities which are subjects of common barter and sale, and which have a visible and palpable form.” Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 285. There is no reason why a wider meaning should be given to them when applied to taxable property. It is said in Boston Investment Co. v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 463, 33 N.E. 580, that “it is not contended, and it could not successfully be contended, that money in bank is ‘goods, wares, merchandise,’ or ‘stock in trade,’ within the meaning of the first clause of section 20 of chapter 11 of the Public Statutes.” If money in bank does not constitute stock in trade, clearly debts due one do not. The language of the statute is, “all goods, wares, merchandise, and other stock in trade,” etc.; and we think it apparent, from the connection, and the rest of the clauses, that by “stock in trade” is meant the visible and tangible property with which the trade or business of the owner is carried on, and to which it relates. See Hittinger v. Inhabitants of Westford, 135 Mass. 260.

According to the agreed facts, judgment should be entered for the petitioner for $1,426, and interest from October 10, 1891, and it is so ordered.