New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schaffer
| Decision Date | 21 January 1902 |
| Citation | 62 N.E. 1036,65 Ohio St. 414 |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
| Parties | NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO. v. SCHAFFER. |
Error to circuit court, Huron county.
Action by one Schaffer against the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
In the second cause of action the plaintiff, in substance, alleges that prior to the 1st day of January, 1895, he was in the employ of the defendant company, performing the work of a brakeman, at the rate of $60 per month, and that on or about the latter part of December, 1894, while in the employ of the defendant company, he applied for and was granted a leave of absence for about 30 days, and that when he reported for work again, on or about the 1st day of February, 1895, he was informed by the defendant company that he had been discharged; and he avers that he was discharged from the service of the defendant without any just cause whatever. He says that during the year 1894 there was on many of the railroads in the United States a strike, which is commonly known as the ‘ A. R. U. Strike,’ and that at the time of this strike (that is, in the summer of 1894) this plaintiff was working for the defendant company as a brakeman in the yards at Bellevue, and took no part in the strike that he continued to work for the defendant up to the latter part of December, 1894, when he was granted a leave of absence by the defendant. He says that prior to the 6th of August, 1894, the defendant entered into a conspiracy agreement, and understanding with certain other railroad companies having lines of road running into the city of Chicago, and also other railroad companies, the names of which are unknown to this plaintiff, that they would furnish to each other information as to all the employés who had committed offenses, or were charged with having committed offenses, or who had quit work during the said strike, and also as to all their employés who were members of the American Railway Union, and that said companies entered into the further conspiracy, agreement, and understanding that such employés of any and all of said companies would not be employed by any of the said companies without the release and consent from the railroad company by which the employéwas last employed, commonly called by railroad men a ‘ clearance.’ He avers that the object and purpose of such alleged conspiracy and agreement was to maliciously and willfully interfere with such employés who had previously terminated their employment with, or been discharged from the employment of, either of said companies. Plaintiff further says that he had worked for the defendant company prior to the time of his last employment as above stated, and that when he left that employment he was given a certificate or a statement of his service for the company. There are other allegations in the petition with regard to a custom of the defendant to grant such letters, but these are omitted for the reason that they are not material in the present contention. Plaintiff says that since the conspiracy aforesaid it is impossible for any one to secure employment unless he first presents the consent of the company for whom he last worked, or a clearance card showing that the applicant was in no way connected with the said strike; that he has repeatedly asked the officers of said company for such letters or clearance or consent, and that the company has failed and refused to furnish him therewith, and that, at the time he so requested the defendant, the defendant promised and agreed to send his record to any one employing or desiring to employ the defendant, but the plaintiff says that the defendant has failed and refused to furnish the record that since his discharge he has made application for employment to various railroad companies, which have refused to consider his application unless he would first bring the consent of the defendant, or a clearance, as above mentioned. He further says that the defendant willfully and maliciously and in pursuance of said conspiracy, agreement, and understanding, and with intent willfully and maliciously to prevent the plaintiff from securing employment, refused to give the plaintiff the said letters, consent, or clearance that would enable him to secure employment in the railroad business, and because thereof, and for no other cause, he has been denied the right to contract for or take employment of any of the companies of the United States, and been prevented from obtaining employment and supporting himself by his trade or occupation. For all of which he claims to have been damaged in the sum of $5,000, and asks judgment therefor. The first cause of action stated in the plaintiff's second amended petition was demurred to for the reason that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff, which demurrer was overruled. The defendant answered, specially denying the material allegations of the petition, except that during the summer of 1894 there was a strike on certain railroad lines and that the plaintiff was not engaged in the strike, and averring that the plaintiff was dismissed from the defendant's service for a just cause and after proper investigation. Plaintiff replied, denying that he was discharged for just cause and after investigation. On the trial the issues thus made up by the pleadings were modified by the court when the case was submitted to the jury, in this: First, that the first cause of action was withdrawn from the jury with the consent of the plaintiff's counsel; second, averments contained in the second amended petition, to the effect that it was customary for the defendant to grant letters giving a statement of services rendered, were taken from the consideration of the jury by the charge of the court, because there was not evidence to establish any such custom. It appears in the testimony that the plaintiff had been twice suspended while in the service of the defendant company, namely, in March and in May, 1894 for breach of duty as an employé, and that on the 26th day of December, 1894, and just prior to the time that the leave of absence was granted to the plaintiff, there had been a collision of the train on which the plaintiff was a brakeman in the switching yards at Bellevue, and which it was claimed was occasioned by the negligence of the plaintiff, Schaffer, and that on the following day (the 27th day of December) a passenger train ran through a misplaced switch in the Bellevue yards, for the condition of which the plaintiff was claimed to be responsible. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, on which judgment was entered by the trial court. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court, and this proceeding is prosecuted to reverse the judgments of the two lower courts.
A railroad company may lawfully refuse to continue in its employ a person who has engaged in a strike affecting its interests, or has shown himself to be negligent, incompetent, inefficient, or dishonest.
Syllabus by the Court
1. A master is under no legal obligation to give to his discharged servant a statement of his service, and whether or not it was satisfactory; and a discharged railroad employé cannot maintain an action for damages against the company which discharged him, for refusal to furnish him with a clearance or statement of the record of his service, although he may have been unable to obtain other employment in consequence of such refusal by the company.
2. It is the right of every person, natural or artificial, to employ or refuse to employ in his business whomsoever he may wish; and he cannot be called upon to answer for his judgment in that regard by the public or individuals, nor can the motives which prompt his action be considered. A railroad company may lawfully refuse to continue in its employ a person who has engaged in a strike affecting its interests, or who has shown himself to be negligent, incompetent, inefficient, or dishonest.
Williamson, Cushing & Clarke and C. P. & L. Wickham, for plaintiff in error.
Vickery & Vickery, for defendant in error.
DAVIS, J. (after stating the facts).
It is important to note in this case, as was stated by the trial judge in his charge to the jury, that...
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