New York Cent. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission

• Citation: 7 N.E.2d 957,212 Ind. 329
• Decision Date: 28 April 1937
• Docket Number: 26743.
• Parties: NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

7 N.E.2d 957

212 Ind. 329

NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.

No. 26743.

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 28, 1937

Appeal from Vigo Circuit Court; John W. Gerdink Judge.

S W. Baxter and T. A. McCormack, both of Cincinnati, Ohio Forest Chenoweth, of Indianapolis, and H. N. Quigley, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., Urban C. Stover, First Dep. Atty Gen., and Paul R. Shafer, of Terre Haute, for appellees.

TREMAIN Chief Justice.

This was an action by the appellant to enjoin the enforcement of an order by the Public Service Commission of Indiana denying the application of appellant for authority to change the station at Fontanet, Ind., from an agency station to a nonagency and prepay station.

The complaint alleges the organization and extent of appellant as a steam railroad company; that the Public Service Commission is the governmental agency of the state of Indiana, possessed of the power and authority, conferred by statute, to order the discontinuance of agency stations of railroads operating in this state; that appellant's railroad line extends across the state and through the town of Fontanet where an agent had been maintained for many years; that since the first day of January, 1931, the business transactions at that place had fallen off in volume to such extent that the maintenance and expense of an agent are so large in proportion to the revenue received as to amount to an unreasonable and unnecessary burden, and amount to a taking of its property without due process of law; that during the years 1931, 1932, and 1933, the revenue received from freight and passenger business totaled $7,804.20, or $2,600.70 per year; that during the same period the expense of maintaining the agent and station was $2,332.75 per year, not including maintenance of property, taxes, and interest on investment; that public necessity and convenience do not require the maintenance of the agency station.

It is further alleged that in March, 1934, the appellant filed with the Public Service Commission a petition for permission to discontinue the agency station; that the petition was denied. Embodied in the complaint is a copy of the petition before the commission and its order denying same.

Appellant prays that the order of the commission be set aside and declared to be of no force and effect; that the court enter judgment discontinuing the agency station at Fontanet, and restrain the commission from enforcing its order; and that it be directed to enter an order changing the station to a nonagency station. The issue was closed by an answer in general denial; trial by court; finding and judgment for appellees. A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the decision was contrary to law and not sustained by sufficient evidence, was overruled.

On appeal, the appellant asserts that there was no evidence produced at the trial of the cause in the Vigo circuit court showing that said order 'was rendered and given by authority and according to law, and is not unreasonable and that there is substantial and lawful evidence to support' said findings and order; that there was no evidence produced at the trial to support the court's decision that the appellant's petition should be denied; that the evidence shows without conflict that the proposed change would 'afford reasonable and proper facilities' for the 'receiving, forwarding and delivering of passengers and property' at said station. The foregoing fairly states the substance of appellant's proposition that the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence.

The burden of proof was not on the appellees, but was upon the appellant. The order of the Public Service Commission is presumed to be valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The burden is on appellant to establish its invalidity.

At the outset this court is confronted with the question as to whether or not the order of the Public Service Commission is reasonable, or is one within its power to make under the circumstances here presented. Its jurisdiction is not questioned. If there is any substantial evidence to support the order of the commission, or if the appellant has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts establishing the necessity of changing the station from an agency to a prepay station, neither the Vigo circuit court nor this court can substitute its judgment for that of the commission. 'The presumption of good faith and valid orders by the commission must obtain until the contrary is made clearly to appear.' In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. (1930) 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65.

In Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, etc. (1907) 40 Ind.App. 168, 81 N.E. 524, 526, the following language is used:

'Recognizing appellant's right to a judicial hearing of his cause, the burden rests upon it to affirmatively show by the averment of facts set forth in its petition that the order of the railroad commission with reference to the installation of the interlocking switch at the crossing of the two roads mentioned and described in the petition does it an injustice, or is in some manner unwarranted by law.

'The case does not come before this court on appeal. It is here as an attack upon the fairness or validity of the order of the railroad commission; the presumption being that the order is valid, fair, and just to all the parties.'

See New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Singleton (1934) 207 Ind. 449, 190 N.E. 761; New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm. (Ind.Sup.) 199 N.E. 573.

It is said by the Supreme Court of the United States in State of Florida v. United States (1934) 292 U.S. 1, 12, 54 S.Ct. 603, 608, 78 L.Ed. 1077:

'The question of the weight of the evidence was for the Commission and not for the court. * * * The purpose for which the Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which, from its special character, would be best fitted to determine, among other things, whether upon the facts in a given case there is an unjust discrimination against interstate commerce.'

The power and authority of the Public Service Commission, the sufficiency of the evidence heard by the commission to sustain its findings, and an order made by the commission upon evidence insufficient under rules applicable to judicial proceedings are discussed in Public Service Commission v. City of LaPorte (1935) 207 Ind. 462, 193 N.E. 668. At bottom of page 467 of 207 Ind., 193 N.E. 668, 670, the court said:

'We do not feel that the fact that the order was made without evidence is sufficient to condemn it if, in fact, it is a reasonable order in view of the facts existing at the time.'

The validity of an order made by the county board of health was before this court in Blue v. Beach (1900) 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89, 50 L.R.A. 64, 80 Am.St.Rep. 195. The court held that it would not overrule the board on matters within its jurisdiction.

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