New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Stein

• Decision Date: 14 July 1972
• Citation: 70 Misc.2d 944,335 N.Y.S.2d 461
• Parties: NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION and Edward A. Stolzenberg, Associate Director, Bellevue Hospital, Petitioners, v. Paula STEIN, a patient, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 461

335 N.Y.S.2d 461

70 Misc.2d 944

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION and Edward A.

Stolzenberg, Associate Director, Bellevue

Hospital, Petitioners, v. Paula STEIN, a patient, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, Part I.

July 14, 1972.

George A. Kalkines, Jerrold Shenkman, New York City, and Marc Kleiman, New York City, for petitioners.

Simon Rosenzweig, Ronald N. Gottlieb, Michael A. Ambrosio, Harvey Belkin, Clifford S. Karr, Vivian A. Schreter, and Gloria Zeche, New York City, for respondent.

ABRAHAM J. GELLINOFF, Justice:

This is an application by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the Associate Director of Bellevue Hospital, for an order authorizing the psychiatric staff of Bellevue Hospital to administer electroshock therapy to a patient Paula Stein, the respondent herein. Mrs. Stein has objected to this treatment, and refuses to give her consent to it.

This Court, on July 11, 1972, after a hearing conducted at Bellevue Hospital, concluded that respondent was mentally ill; accordingly this Court issued an order authorizing the retention of the patient for care and treatment (Mental Hygiene Law, § 72). Therefore, the psychiatric staff at Bellevue Hospital, and any other hospital to which the patient may be transferred, is now free to carry out whatever course of treatment they deem advisable, including electroshock therapy, regardless of the patient's consent and without the necessity of prior judicial approval.

However, petitioners have commendably chosen to proceed in accordance with the spirit of the new recodification of the Mental Hygiene Law, Section 15.03, effective January 1, 1973, which provides that, 'subject to the regulations of the commissioner (of the department of mental hygiene), the director of a facility shall require * * * consent for * * * shock treatment.' Although the statute is silent as to whose consent is required, and no regulations by the Commissioner in this regard have been brought to the Court's attention, the new statute presumably requires the consent of the patient himself, provided he possesses the mental capacity to knowingly consent or withhold his consent, or, in the absence of such mental capacity, the consent of the closest relative, or guardian of the person, if there be any, or, where necessary, of the Court (see, Anonymous v. State, 17 A.D.2d 495, 236 N.Y.S.2d 88 (3rd Dept. 1963)). In this case, the patient's mother has given her consent, for, seeking only the health of her daughter, she has consented to the doctors doing whatever they believe might help her. The patient herself, however, continues in her refusal to consent.

Petitioners are reluctant to proceed with the electroshock therapy on the consent of the mother only, and assert that consent of the patient herself should be dispensed with herein, on the ground that she is incompetent to make a reasoned decision, and that the Court should authorize petitioners to administer such electroshock therapy despite the patient's non-consent.

Electroshock therapy is a technique by which a current of from 70 to 130 volts of electricity is permitted to flow through the patient's brain, causing a convulsion equivalent to an epileptic seizure. This form of treatment is the subject of great controversy within the psychiatric profession, both as to its efficacy, and as to its dangers. It has been known to aid significantly in the cure of the mentally ill, as well as to cause such other ailments as pulmonary edema, bone fractures, and, in exceedingly rare instances, even death.

In a case such as this, where the determination may be critical to the future health and life of a patient suffering from mental disorder, a court, not blessed with omniscience, must tread cautiously. It must consider both the benefits to be derived if its decision is...