New York City Housing Authority v. Shephard

• Decision Date: 28 May 1982
• Citation: 452 N.Y.S.2d 785,114 Misc.2d 873
• Parties: NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Henry SHEPHARD, Respondent.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 785

452 N.Y.S.2d 785

114 Misc.2d 873

NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Henry SHEPHARD, Respondent.

Civil Court of the City of New York Kings County.

May 28, 1982.

Michael M. Cohen, New York City, for petitioner New York City Housing Authority; Joan Pannell, Staten Island, of counsel.

Morton B. Dicker, Legal Aid Society, New York City, for respondent Henry Shephard; Kenneth G. Rothstein, Old Westbury, of counsel.

DECISION and ORDER

JOHN R. CANNIZZARO, Judge.

Petitioner New York City Housing Authority ("Authority") commenced a hold over summary proceeding against the present occupant of one of its apartment units, the respondent Henry Shephard. It was alleged that the subject premises were leased by one Hattie Peale, now deceased, and Shephard became an occupant of the apartment as a licensee of the tenant, and since she is now deceased, the license has terminated.

The Authority is a government agency formed to provide housing to low income persons. In order to carry out this function, it may set income and other standards for persons who are or may become tenants in its facilities. The Authority has set regulations requiring approval of all new members of the household, and it requires periodic reporting by the tenants of household members and income in order to ascertain if standards are met. Such regulations requiring approval and other reporting requirements are legitimate. See N. Y. C. H. A. v. Lawson, N.Y.L.J. 4/4/80 p. 5 col. 1.

Pursuant to such authority, petitioner required Ms. Peale to complete an application sometime in 1970 or 1971. She listed herself as the only occupant on subsequent annual affidavits of income, she continued to list herself as the only occupant of the subject apartment, and listed this respondent as the "nearest relative or friend in the New York City area who can be contacted in an emergency", and gave an address in the Bronx for Mr. Shephard.

Petitioner has moved for summary judgment in its favor asserting that respondent's only color of right to possession is a license from the lawful tenant and that license terminated upon her death.

Respondent in opposition, urges that there are questions of fact concerning petitioner's knowledge of respondent's occupancy since and before the death of the prime tenant, through agents of the Authority. As a matter of law, this contention is without merit, for a proper showing of the apparent authority of such agents to bind the principal, there must be a showing that respondent relied on a representation by the principal that the agent was authorized to act as it did. Greene v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197, 433 N.Y.S.2d 75, 412 N.E.2d 1301 (1980); Ford v. Unity Hospital, 32 N.Y.2d 464, 472-3, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 299 N.E.2d 659 (1973). Respondent acted at his own peril in verifying that an agent of a public body acts within his authority. Coates v. City of New York, 76 Misc.2d 769, 351 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1974).

Even with the knowledge of Authority employees, an occupant of an apartment who resides there for a time after the death of the prime tenant is not entitled to the status of tenant via estoppel principles. "The failure of public officials to enforce possible rights whether for a long period or a short one may not be the basis of an admission or estoppel resulting in possible loss to the public of its rights ..." New York City Housing Authority v. Rodriguez, N.Y.L.J. 7/30/76.

Hence, even if certain employees of the Authority had knowledge of respondent's occupancy, this fact would not bar petitioner's right to proceed to evict respondent as a licensee whose rights terminated on the death of Ms. Peale.

Respondent also asserts that by reason of the acceptance of monies from respondent, a landlord-tenant relationship was established by conduct of the parties. Again, as a matter of law, this argument is not controlling since the Authority is empowered to set standards and regulations as to who may become tenants or occupants of its apartments. Public Housing Law §§ 30, 37, 156. See also N. Y. C. H. A. v. Nesmith, 100 Misc.2d 414, 419 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1979). To permit the respondent to continue to live in the apartment under such circumstances would give him an unfair advantage over those needy families now seeking accommodations in the Authority's facilities, and would result in a circumvention by respondent of the stated purpose of the Legislature in providing safe and sanitary housing accommodations to low income families. Public Housing Law...