New York City Housing Authority v. Gantt

• Decision Date: 12 July 1967
• Parties: NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Mr. and Mrs. James GANTT, Respondents.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 759

292 N.Y.S.2d 759

57 Misc.2d 447

NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Mr. and Mrs. James GANTT, Respondents.

Civil Court of City of New York, Trial Term, New York County.

July 12, 1967.

Harry Levy, New York City, Aaron Kohn, New York City, of counsel, for petitioner.

Bernard Hanft, New York City, for respondents.

J. DANIEL FINK, Judge.

This is an application brought on by the tenant, James Gantt, in this holdover summary proceeding for an order vacating (a) a stipulation between the parties and (b) the final 'order' heretofore entered in favor of the landlord, and setting the matter down for a trial on the merits.

The tenant avers that he was not represented by an attorney in executing the stipulation, that he did not realize that he had a good defense to the action, and that he 'probably would have been successful upon a trial of the action.'

Although the order to show cause herein and the affidavit by the tenant, James, Gantt, both set forth that a stipulation was entered into between the tenants and the landlord, the record in the case shows that the final judgment was entered in favor of the landlord after trial before me on September 26, 1966, and that a stay of the issuance of the warrant was granted to the tenants up to and including March 31, 1967. There is no indication that a stipulation for the entry of final judgment was made between the parties herein. As a matter of law, it is immaterial to the questions presented on this motion whether the final judgment herein was entered upon a stipulation or after trial.

The landlord, a public housing authority existing pursuant to the Public Housing Law, is exempt from the provisions of the New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law (Local Law No. 20, Laws of 1962, as amended, sections Y51--3.0, subd. e, par. 2(f) and Y51--6.0, subd. e, New York City Administrative Code). The landlord's right to possession is based upon a monthly lease, which permits either party to terminate on one month's notice. Where service of an appropriate notice is duly made upon a public housing tenant, the tenancy is brought to an end. If the tenant remains in occupancy beyond the date specified in the notice served by the landlord which terminated the tenancy, the landlord is entitled to apply to the Civil Court for a final judgment of possession.

In its review of applicable authorities, the Court has considered the following:

Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 87 S.Ct. 1244, 18 L.Ed.2d 394, April 17, 1967; Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority, D.C., 266 F.Supp. 397, decided September, 1966 and the text of the address delivered by Associate Justice Fortas of the Supreme Court of the United States on March 29, 1967, in his James Madison Lecture at New York University School of Law, reported in 42 N.Y.U. Law Review 401, No. 3.

The thrust of the foregoing cases appears to be that a tenant in possession of an apartment in a low cost public housing project may not be given a notice of termination of his tenancy without being advised by the landlord of the reasons for the termination and the thrust of the text of Justice Fortas' address, supra, is that recipients of public assistance may not be considered as constitutional non-persons but that we need not go so far as to embrace the argument that the State has a constitutional duty to provide its indigent with low cost housing. However, if the State chooses to do so, 'it must proceed with careful regard to the rights of the recipients, for they, too, are persons within our constitutional scheme.' (42 N.Y.Univ.L.R. p. 414)

Nevertheless, there is a co-equal responsibility by the indigent and members of his family, directly or indirectly, to his co-tenant, neighbor and community, so that his or their conduct is not a detriment to the health, safety and morals of his neighbors or to the community or an adverse influence on sound family and community life, or a source of danger to the housing project or the peaceful occupation of other tenants.

Evictions for any such failure of responsibility 'will completely protect the viability of the housing project without making the tenant a serf who has a home at the pleasure of the manager of the project or the housing authority.' Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, supra, p. 680, 87 S.Ct. p. 1249.

The landlord-petitioner's procedure in this regard distinguishes the foregoing references and the applicable cases therein cited, and, in addition is consonant with such directive, in that the tenants here, following a hearing before the Tenant Review Board, were given an opportunity to make such explanation as they desired.

There is the further circumstance that, following a determination of undesirability, any aggrieved party is at liberty, if so advised, to proceed in...