New York Higher Education Assistance Corp. v. Siegel

• Decision Date: 06 April 1979
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: NEW YORK HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel M. SIEGEL, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 42679.

Page 200

154 Cal.Rptr. 200

91 Cal.App.3d 684

NEW YORK HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel M. SIEGEL, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 42679.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 6, 1979.

Thomas D. Oakley, Jr., Cupertino, for plaintiff and appellant.

Siegel, Taub, Siegel & Friedman, Edward L. Taub, Michael Friedman, Oakland, for defendant and respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff New York Higher Education Assistance Corporation appeals from an order of the superior court vacating a judgment to enforce a "sister state judgment," which had previously been entered by the court in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1710.10-1710.65.

The record before the superior court at the time of entry of the criticized order disclosed the following.

Plaintiff was and is a publicly funded corporation which guarantees unsecured loans made to students by private lending agencies of the State of New York. In 1963 and 1964, defendant Siegel borrowed $1,800 from a New York savings and loan association, the repayment of which was so guaranteed by plaintiff. Siegel thereafter completed his education and is now a practicing attorney in Oakland, California. The loan going unpaid, plaintiff fulfilled the guarantee to its maker, and took an assignment of the obligation which was evidenced by a promissory note. Thereafter plaintiff commenced a New York action against Siegel for the amount owed by him on the note. After proper service of process upon him, Siegel appeared in the action by his verified answer, alleging (1) the obligation to be "void because at the time said alleged obligation arose defendant was a minor," and (2) that any suit thereon "is barred by the statute of limitations." Thereafter plaintiff, in the New York action, filed a notice of motion for summary judgment. An affidavit of service recited that the affiant had timely served the notice of motion on Siegel "by mailing a true copy of the notice of motion for summary judgment dated March 20, 1975 and of the affidavit of Willard S. Gates, verified March 19, 1975, upon which it is based, to the said Daniel Mark Siegel, by mailing a true copy thereof in a post-paid envelope, addressed to Daniel Mark Siegel at 2839 Forest Avenue, Berkeley, California, 94705." (The mailing was correctly addressed.) Siegel made no response to, or appearance on, the motion, and on May 16, 1975, summary judgment for the amount due on the promissory note was entered against him. Five days later, May 21, 1975, Siegel received notice that the summary judgment had been entered. The summary judgment thereafter became final.

On December 10, 1975, plaintiff, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.15, applied to the Alameda County Superior Court for "entry of" a judgment "based on (the New York summary) judgment," and such a judgment was thereupon entered. Siegel thereafter, as permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.40, timely moved in the superior court to vacate the superior court's judgment. His single stated ground was that the New York summary judgment "was obtained through extrinsic fraud." In support of his motion, and as relevant, Siegel declared under penalty of perjury:

"At no time after the filing of my answer did I receive any notice or communication of any kind from the plaintiffs or the court in New York in regard to any hearing, motion, or other proceeding in regard to this case. If, in fact, a motion, hearing, or other proceeding did take place, I had no knowledge of it and thus was unable to appear for it, either personally or through counsel. Had I been aware of such a proceeding, I would have appeared therein to contest any action taken by the plaintiffs."

"I was never informed that such a hearing was taking place, and I still do not know the grounds upon which the summary judgment was entered.

"At all times from January 1975 through May 21, 1975, I resided at 2839 Forest Avenue, Berkeley, California and frequently received mail at that address. On no occasion did it ever come to my attention that mail sent to me at that address was mislaid or lost in any way."

" . . . At the time I signed the papers for this loan, I asked the loan officer at Nassau Savings and Loan why I had to sign these papers, and why my parents had to sign the papers. The loan officer informed me that I was required to sign the papers to acknowledge that I was receiving the money, and that I had a moral obligation to repay the money. I was never informed that I had a legal obligation, i. e., that I had signed a contract legally binding me to repay the loan.

" . . . Subsequently, I had occasion to speak with the loan officer at Nassau Savings and Loan regarding the 'loan'. I was never informed that the 'loan' was a legal obligation. It was always my understanding that the 'loan' was a moral obligation."

The promissory note signed by Siegel contained a prominently positioned recital: "By reason of the provisions of Article 14 of the Education Law of New York, I understand that I am legally obligated to pay this note even though I may be under twenty-one (21) years of age." (Emphasis added.)

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