New York Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 27 July 1933
• Docket Number: No. 9590.,9590.
• Parties: NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. ANDERSON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

66 F.2d 705 (1933)

NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. ANDERSON.

No. 9590.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 27, 1933.

M. J. Doherty, of St. Paul, Minn. (Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for appellant.

Charles A. Lyche, of Grand Forks, N. D. (N. F. Field, of Fergus Falls, Minn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before KENYON and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges, and DEWEY, District Judge.

DEWEY, District Judge.

The suit was brought to recover on a life insurance policy and the provisions therein for the payment of double indemnity where death results solely through accidental means; the defense, suicide.

The policy was issued to Arthur E. Anderson on April 6, 1931, and provided for payment to his wife, Stella Anderson, as beneficiary, in the sum of $2,000, and for double indemnity, or $4,000, in case death resulted from accident. The defendant relies upon a provision of the policy providing that "in the event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, * * * the insurance under this policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have been paid to and received by the company and no more."

The complaint alleges that on the 22d day of July, 1931, the said Arthur E. Anderson died from a gunshot wound as a result of an accident, as defined in said life insurance policy under the head "Double Indemnity." The answer admits and alleges that the said Arthur E. Anderson died on or about the 22d day of July, 1931, but that his death resulted from self-destruction. The answer alleges and the reply admits a tender to plaintiff of $29.52, the amount of the premium paid to and received by the insurance company. The trial court overruled a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant made at the close of all the evidence. The case was submitted to a jury, and a verdict returned for $2,000, and judgment entered thereon in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The latter, appellant here, has appealed to this court on assignments of error by the trial court, in substance, first, in refusing to admit in evidence the coroner's certificate of death of Arthur E. Anderson; second, in denying the motion made by the defendant at the close of the case for a directed verdict; third, in charging the jury that, "if the facts and circumstances established by the evidence in this case are just as consistent with the theory that Mr. Anderson was killed accidentally as they are with the theory that he killed himself, then Mrs. Anderson would be entitled to $2,000, or the face of the policy"; and, fourth, in charging the jury that "since normal men cling to life, there is the presumption that death is not the result of suicide."

The trial court was correct in refusing to admit in evidence the coroner's certificate. The statutes of Minnesota provide for the making and recording of such certificates, and provide that certified copies thereof "shall be prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated in all courts in this state." Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927, § 5366. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in construing this section, held that the word "fact" as used in the statute should be read "facts." In re Estate of Olson, 176 Minn. 360, 223 N. W. 677, 682. Notwithstanding this holding, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, in Backstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 Minn. 384, 236 N. W. 708, that such a certificate was not admissible to prove a death to be suicidal on the ground that whether death was suicidal was not a "fact" within the meaning of the statute. Appellant insists that this involved a construction not only of the statute but of the certificate itself. We think the decision is a binding construction of the statute. It is well settled that under the so-called Conformity Act of Congress of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 34 (28 USCA § 725), the competency of evidence in a civil case must be determined by the law of the state where the trial is had. Von Crome v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (C. C. A.) 11 F.(2d) 350.

As to the second assignment of error, the facts are not greatly in dispute and the law appears to be well settled governing the questions raised.

"The question for the reviewing court must be just the same as in any other kind of a lawsuit tried by a jury. Does the evidence, taken in the most favorable light for plaintiff, compel all reasonable men to accept the theory of suicide? If so, a verdict will be directed for defendant; otherwise not; and in this inquiry, as in every other case where the jury may rightfully refuse to accept that theory which is the natural and prima facie correct inference from all the facts, there must be some other theory fairly reconcilable with the admitted facts, and which is reasonably possible rather than merely fantastic. If all the facts indicate suicide, and there is nothing reasonably having a substantial tendency to show that the death might have occurred in any other way, the issue is one of law and not of fact." Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Gregg (C. C. A.) 32 F.(2d) 567, 568.

There is a well-established presumption of law that death is not the result of suicide.

"Where the cause of one's death is unexplained or undisclosed by evidence, or where evidence tending to prove self-destruction is contradicted or impeached, or some evidence adduced is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis that the death was not self-caused, the presumption against suicide or self-destruction may prevail. But such presumption cannot properly prevail where uncontroverted evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, shows how the death was caused and that it was self-inflicted, and not by accident or the act of another." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Weaver (C. C. A.) 8 F.(2d) 680, 682; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw (C. C. A.) 2 F.(2d) 457, 458; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hatten (C. C. A.) 17 F.(2d) 889, 890; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tooley (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 243, 244; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gregg, supra; Frankel v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A.) 51 F.(2d) 933, 935; Burkett v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A.) 56 F.(2d) 105, 107.

The question then on this assignment of error, as well as on the question of whether the trial court should have given the instruction with reference to the presumption of law, of which complaint is made in the fourth assignment of error, is whether the trial court as a matter of law should have held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain any reasonable hypothesis of death by accidental means.

The insured, Arthur E. Anderson, worked as a meat cutter for Joseph A. McGowan at East Grand Forks, Minn. Early on the morning of Wednesday, July 22, 1931, three employees at the store when they came to work found him at the farther end of a vegetable room in the basement of the store in a dying condition. There was a hole the size of a .22 bullet in his right temple about two inches above his right ear, and there were powder burns and his hair was singed around the wound about the size of a nickel. There was some blood on his clothing. He was lying on his back but a little on his right side with his head against the north wall of the room. His knees were bent just a trifle, not much, but he did not have any bend at the hips. A .22 repeating rifle was lying alongside of him on his right side and between his body and right arm. The stock of the gun was toward and about a foot from the shoulder, and the barrel pointed towards his feet. Mr. Anderson had on the regular trousers of his suit, his blue shirt, a white butcher jacket and his shoes and socks. His clothes were not ruffled or disturbed when found, and the doctor on examination did not find any other cuts or bruises on his body other than the wound in his temple. The left eye was congested and blackened, and a physician from this inferred that the bullet had taken a somewhat downward course and had lodged behind and against the left eye. Although the wound was probed, the bullet was never removed.

The gun was owned by Mr. Steen, an employee, who used it occasionally to kill hogs. It was kept on the first floor in a room back of the shop, which was called the sausage room, and was kept in a corner of the room back of a stationary kettle, where it was supported against the wall. The gun the night before was unloaded and in the place above described. The cartridges were kept on a shelf about eight feet above the floor of the room and were kept in a box in which they were purchased, and this box was kept in a cheese box on the shelf. The cartridges were known as .22 rifle long. On this morning the box of cartridges which had been kept on the shelf above was on the work bench open. A box of spices, used in making sausages, and also kept on the shelf, was on the work bench. A partly consumed bottle of milk and some crackers were found in a back room, and the keys to the store were found in the front room. Nothing about the store had been disturbed. The gun was about 40 to 42 inches in length, but there are no measurements suggested from the trigger to the muzzle of the gun. In the gun was found an exploded shell and four cartridges.

Mr. Anderson was right-handed, was strong physically, in good health, and a good worker. He weighed about 180 pounds, was about 5 feet 8 or 9 inches tall, and never worried. He had a rather high head above the ears, an extraordinary distance one physician testified. He received $30 a week for his services. He had no financial troubles, and his wife says that his home relations were happy, that he was kind and affectionate to her and his 4 year old son. He was a member of the United Lutheran Church of Grand Forks, and went to church with his wife regularly.

The vegetable room is about 20 feet long and 4 or 4½ feet wide. There was shelving on one side of the room, two shelves running the entire length of the vegetable cellar on one side and extending out from the wall about 1½ feet. This shelving was about 2 and 3...