Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hatten

• Decision Date: 21 February 1927
• Docket Number: No. 7515.,7515.
• Citation: 17 F.2d 889
• Parties: MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HATTEN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

17 F.2d 889 (1927)

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HATTEN.

No. 7515.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 21, 1927.

R. L. Read, of Des Moines, Iowa (J. G. Gamble, of Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

W. E. Mitchell, of Council Bluffs, Iowa, and A. V. Thornell, of Sidney, Iowa (Thornell, Thornell & Adams, of Sidney, Iowa, and Tinley, Mitchell, Ross & Mitchell, of Council Bluffs, Iowa, on the brief), for defendant in error.

Before LEWIS and KENYON, Circuit Judges, and TRIEBER, District Judge.

KENYON, Circuit Judge.

Defendant in error was plaintiff in the trial court, and plaintiff in error was defendant. For convenience the parties will here be designated as in that court. Plaintiff was beneficiary in a certain insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of Charles M. Hatten, her husband, of Sidney, Iowa. Said policy provided for payment of $10,000 to the beneficiary in case of Hatten's death, and $10,000 additional if such death "resulted directly from bodily injury, received after the date of issue of this policy, independently and exclusively of all other causes, and that such bodily injury was effected solely through external, violent (annual premium $287.50), and accidental means, and that such death occurred within 60 days after the date of such bodily injury."

Charles M. Hatten was killed January 22, 1923, by a shot from a revolver held at the time in his own hand. Defendant has paid $10,000, the face value of the policy, and declines to pay the additional $10,000 for which this suit is brought, claiming that the death of assured did not result from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means. The case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff for the $10,000. From judgment entered thereon, this writ is prosecuted.

At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for an instructed verdict on a number of grounds which are all embraced in the one general claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain any finding that the death of decedent was brought about by accidental means. The one issue therefore before us for determination is: Did the court err in denying the motion for an instructed verdict for defendant, and in submitting the case to the jury?

That decedent shot himself, and that his death was the result of such external, violent means, is conceded; that he did so accidentally is plaintiff's theory; that he did so intentionally is defendant's theory. It is obvious that this is a question of fact. Ordinarily such question is for the jury. Does the record here bring this case under any exception to that general rule?

The legal principles applicable to the situation presented are well established.

Under the terms of the policy, in order to recover the additional $10,000 as provided therein, the burden was on plaintiff to show that decedent shot himself accidentally. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 S. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum (C. C. A.) 270 F. 946; National Masonic Acc. Ass'n of Des Moines v. Shryock (C. C. A.) 73 F. 774; Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 7 A. L. R. 1213; Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83, 201 S. W. 1128. This does not mean that plaintiff must show the fact by direct evidence. It may be proved by proper inferences and presumptions from the facts.

Plaintiff, in carrying this burden of proof, is aided by the well-established presumption that death was not the result of suicide. Jones v. Accident Ass'n, 92 Iowa, 652, 61 N. W. 485; Stephenson v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 108 Iowa, 637, 79 N. W. 459; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 S. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum (C. C. A.) 270 F. 946; Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S. W. 45, 7 A. L. R. 1213; Jenkin v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 131 Cal. 121, 63 P. 180.

In Michalek v. Modern B. of A., 179 Iowa, 33, 41, 161 N. W. 125, 129 (L. R. A. 1917E, 1060) the court, in referring to this presumption, said: "Even where, as in this case, there is direct evidence that the death was caused by a weapon in the hands of the deceased himself, the presumption still prevails; because, if nothing more than that is shown, there is still room for the hypothesis that his act in that regard may have been involuntary or accidental." See, also, Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 21 N. D. 235, 130 N. W. 231.

Where the evidence shows that insured was killed by external and violent means, there is a presumption also, when the evidence is doubtful as to whether the death was due to an accident or to suicide, that it was caused by accident. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 S. Ct. 1360, 32 L. Ed. 308; Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Melick (C. C. A.) 65 F. 178, 27 L. R. A. 629; Van Norman v. Modern Brotherhood, 143 Iowa, 536, 121 N. W. 1080; Wood v. Woodmen, 166 Iowa, 391, 147 N. W. 888; Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa, 32, 182 N. W. 808; Kornig v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 102 Minn. 31, 112 N. W. 1039.

The presumption against suicide is a rebuttable one, and is to be weighed with all other facts and circumstances in evidence, Howes v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n (D. C.) 241 F. 278, and, of course, cannot prevail where such facts and circumstances show a deliberate act of self-destruction. A sane person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act, and, if the evidence in a case shows that a party intentionally killed himself, then, of course, the presumption against suicide vanishes. If the circumstances, however, are consistent with any other reasonable hypothesis, that of suicide is excluded.

As said by Judge Faris (now an honored federal District Judge) when on the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 173, 213 S. W. 45, 50: "Obviously, the presumption against suicide cannot continue to exist in the face of evidence showing suicide, for such a view would be utterly subversive of the well-settled doctrine, figuratively but strikingly announced by Lamm, J., substantially, to wit, that presumptions are the bats of the law, which the light of evidence frightens and causes to fly away." Neasham v. New York Life Ins. Co. (D. C.) 244 F. 556; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw (C. C. A.) 2 F. (2d) 457; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Weaver (C. C. A.) 8 F.(2d) 680; Von Crome v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. (C. C. A.) 11 F.(2d) 350; Bridget Gavin v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 149 Iowa, 152, 126 N. W. 906.

Whether a deceased person committed suicide is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Supreme Lodge, K. of P., v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49, 21 S. Ct. 532, 45 L. Ed. 741; Parrish v. Order of United Commercial Travelers (C. C. A.) 232 F. 425; Connell v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 139 Iowa, 444, 116 N. W. 820; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Egbert (C. C. A.) 84 F. 410. There is little to be gained by a review of the numerous cases; no two being alike.

Counsel for defendant in his brief states: "It is of the greatest importance that it be clearly recognized that, in the last analysis, this case presents primarily a question of the weight of evidence." With this statement we are in accord.

The case is reduced to the question of whether the trial court as a matter of law should have held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain any reasonable hypothesis of death by accidental means, and therefore should have directed a verdict for defendant. A determination of this question requires some review of the evidence. Decedent, Hatten, was 36 years old at the time of death. He was employed as manager and bookkeeper in the garage of one Esden in the city of Sidney, Iowa. Esden and he had been friends from boyhood. A discrepancy of approximately $7,000 developed in the books. Shortly prior to the day he shot himself, a new bookkeeper had been employed; Hatten remaining in a different capacity than he had formerly occupied. The new bookkeeper took over the books the morning of the day Hatten died. Hatten had offered to give Esden a note for $3,000 and a surety bond if Esden would continue him in the same position. Esden had experienced the same kind of discrepancy in the books of his place of business at Hamburg, a town not far distant from Sidney, and with which business Hatten had nothing whatever to do. Early in the morning of the day of Hatten's death, his wife gave birth to a child, apparently strong and healthy. His wife's mother was at the home all day, which home was owned by Hatten subject to some incumbrance. Hatten busied himself about the house, remaining away from his work all day, helping to make his wife comfortable, and doing odd work about the place, but being constantly where he could assist in caring for his wife. He was cheerful and apparently happy over the new addition to his family. His mother-in-law cooked his supper, of which he ate heartily. He helped in removing the dishes from the table. After supper he waited on his wife, smoothed the pillows, gave her a drink of water; then evidently went upstairs and laid down for rest on the bed in the room where he was afterwards found dead. His mother-in-law, Mrs. Holloway, went upstairs to put woolen blankets on the bed and found him resting there. He helped her arrange the blankets. She saw no revolver in the room. There was nothing unusual about his appearance, except that he had his coat off. She told him she was ready to go home, and he said he would be down in a few moments to take her home. Shortly after Mrs. Holloway had returned to the downstairs, Mrs. Hatten asked her if she had brought down the cold cream. Mrs. Holloway then called upstairs to Hatten and told him the cold cream was in the bathroom and to bring it down, and he said he would. About 20 minutes thereafter Mrs. Holloway went...