New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 30 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 43743,43743 |
| Citation | 86 Wn.2d 44,541 P.2d 989 |
| Parties | . Donna L. JONES et al., Defendants. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Ferguson & Burdell, W. Wesselhoeft, James P. McGowan, Seattle, for plaintiff.
Kempton, Savage & Gossard, David W. Gossard, Seattle, for defendants.
As a result of the circumstances surrounding the death of Stanley Jones, his wife was charged with second-degree murder in an information filed by the King County prosecutor. The original information charged that Donna Jones
with a design to effect the death of one Stanley Foster Jones, a human being, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there shoot at, toward, and into the body of the said Stanley Foster Jones
with a firearm, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which caused the death of Stanley Jones. On the fifth day of the trial, an amended information was filed by the prosecutor's office. While the charge remained second-degree murder, the amended information eliminated the language which alleged a willful and unlawful shooting with a design to effect the death of the victim and substituted an allegation that the defendant 'while engaged in the commission of a felony, to-wit: assault in the second degree' caused the death of Stanley Jones.
Once the amended information had been filed by the prosecutor's office, Donna L. Jones pleaded guilty to the charge of second-degree murder.
Thereafter, the New York Life Insurance Company commenced this interpleader action and paid into court the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of Jones. Cross-claims were filed by Donna Jones, the primary beneficiary and by the secondary beneficiaries, a child and a stepchild of the insured, the latter acting through their guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem and the primary beneficiary each moved the court for summary judgment, claiming a right to such judgment upon the stipulated facts recited above.
Pursuant to RCW 2.60 the federal court certified the question to this court for resolution, since it requires an interpretation of Washington statutes.
RCW 11.84.100 1 reads as follows:
(1) Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the lefe of the decedent, or as the survivor of a joint life policy, shall be paid instead to the estate of the decedent, unless the policy or certificate designate(s) some person other than the slayer or his estate as secondary beneficiary to him and in which case such proceeds shall be paid to such secondary beneficiary in accordance with the applicable terms of the policy.
The question before the court is: Can it be said as a matter of law that a person is a slayer or is not a slayer within the definition of that term contained in RCW 11.84.010, if that person has pleaded guilty to a charge of second-degree felony murder, the felony being assault in the second degree?
If the primary beneficiary is a slayer within the meaning of RCW 11.84.010(1), she is not entitled to the proceeds of the policy. On the other hand, if her plea of guilty to the crime charged demonstrates conclusively that she is not a slayer within the meaning of the statute, she may receive the proceeds.
'Slayer' is defined in RCW 11.84.010(1) as follows:
(1) 'Slayer' shall mean any person who participates, either as a principal or an accessory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of any other person.
It will be seen that under the definition of slayer in the statute, before a beneficiary is disqualified from receiving the proceeds of a policy, it must be shown not only that he participated in the killing of the insured, but that the killing was done willfully and unlawfully.
It is obvious that the killing was done unlawfully and the sole question is: Do the facts stated in the information tell us whether it was done willfully?
Words of a statute not particularly defined are to be given their ordinary, everyday meaning. If the legislature uses a term well known to the common law, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to mean what it was understood to mean at common law. State v. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d 796, 479 P.2d 931 (1971); Fransen v. State Bd. of Natural Resources, 66 Wash.2d 672, 404 P.2d 432 (1965).
Willfully means intentionally and designedly. State v. Russell, 73 Wash.2d 903, 442 P.2d 988 (1968); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2617 (1968). See 45 Words and Phrases 313--28 (perm. ed. 1970). The authorities collected there show that this meaning attaches to the word, whether it is used in civil or criminal statutes.
The primary beneficiary was first charged with the intentional murder of her husband. Had she pleaded guilty to that charge, there would be no question but that she was precluded from taking any benefits under the policy. However, when the charge was amended to allege a violation of the second rather than the first paragraph of the second-degree murder statute, the prosecutor was no longer required to prove that the killing was done intentionally.
RCW 9.48.040 reads, in part:
The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the second degree when--
(1) Committed with a design to effect the death of the person killed or of another, but without premeditation; or
(2) When...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Multicare Medical Center v. State, Dept. of Social and Health Services
... ... Everett, at 855, 631 P.2d 366; American States Ins. Co. v. Breesnee, 49 Wash.App. 642, 646, 745 P.2d 518 (1987) ... Department of Rev., 106 Wash.2d 391, 401, 722 P.2d 787 (1986); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 Wash.2d 44, 47, 541 P.2d 989 (1975) ... 17 ... ...
-
City of Seattle v. Buchanan
... ... that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due process clause of the ... York case, People v. Gilbert, 72 Misc.2d 795, 339 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y.City ... ' " State v. Jones, 2 Conn.Cir. 698, 700, 205 A.2d 507, 509 (1964); Martin v. State, 534 P.2d ... New York Life Ins. v. Jones, 86 Wash.2d 44, 47, 541 P.2d 989 (1975). The broad meaning ... ...
-
Stastny v. Board of Trustees of Central Washington University
... ... Tacoma Sch. Dist. 10, 88 Wash.2d 286, 291, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 Wash.2d 44, 47, 541 P.2d 989 (1975). In ... ...
-
Mendez-Bellido v. BD. OF TR. OF DIV. 1181, ATU
... ... BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF DIVISION 1181, A.T.U. NEW YORK EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND AND PLAN and Edith Abreu Mendez, Defendants ... The Second Circuit in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.1989), however, has recently ... v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 563, 433 S.W.2d 151 (1968); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v ... 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 Wash.2d 44, 541 P.2d 989 (1975); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, ... ...