New York Life Ins. Co. v. King
| Decision Date | 24 May 1922 |
| Docket Number | 12892,12899. |
| Citation | 112 S.E. 383,28 Ga.App. 607 |
| Parties | NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. KING. KING v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
"There being no conflict in the evidence as to the physical facts connected with the death of the insured, and these facts with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom overcoming the presumption of law that he did not kill himseif, or that his death was accidental, and demanding a finding that he came to his death by his own hand and intentionally, and the life insurance contract sued upon containing the special provision that it should be void in the event of the death of the insured by his own intentional act, sane or insane, within two years from the date of its issue, and it affirmatively appearing that the contract was issued within two years of his death, a verdict was demanded for the defendant."
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
If there is no evidence as to the cause of death of insured, or when the circumstances of the death are such that it might have resulted from negligence, accident or suicide, the presumption is against death by suicide, and in favor of death by natural causes.
Death by accident rather than suicide cannot be established in an action on an insurance policy by conjecture, or presumption unless there is no evidence whatever as to the cause of death.
The presumption of death of insured by accident rather than suicide is prima facie only and is rebuttable and does not prevail when evidence is produced contrary to such presumption, or when the presumption is met by a conflicting presumption, though the fact upon which it rests may still remain as proper to be considered in arriving at a conclusion.
Error from City Court of Fort Gaines; Ben M. Turnipseed, Judge.
Action by A. T. King, administrator, against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error, and plaintiff brings a cross-bill of exceptions. Reversed on the main bill and affirmed on the cross-bill.
Bryant & Middlebrooks, of Atlanta, and Zach Arnold, of Fort Gaines, for plaintiff in error.
Glessner & Collins, of Blakely, and E. R. King, of Fort Gaines, for defendant in error.
This was an action by the administrator of the estate of Robert A. Coleman, deceased, against the New York Life Insurance Company upon a policy of life insurance for $2,000, issued by that company on the life of the decedent. The petition alleged that the policy was issued on November 27, 1917, and that Coleman died on November 11, 1919, less than two years after the issuance of the policy. It was further alleged that proofs of death had been furnished, and that the defendant had failed and refused to pay over to the plaintiff the proceeds of the policy. It was also alleged that the defendant had acted in bad faith in refusing to pay over the proceeds of the policy and was liable to the plaintiff for damages and attorney's fees. A copy of the policy was attached to the petition. It contained the following stipulation and condition:
"Self-destruction.--In event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have been paid to and received by the company and no more."
The defendant in its answer admitted the execution and delivery of the policy and the furnishing of proofs of death and the payment of the premiums, and set up as a defense the allegations that on November 11, 1919, within the first two insurance years of the policy, said Robert A. Coleman destroyed himself by shooting himself in the head with a pistol, and that the insurance under the policy is, as provided therein, the sum equal to the premiums paid thereon and received by the company, and no more. The defendant further alleged that it had tendered to the plaintiff the amount of the premiums received by it on the policy, and that the plaintiff had declined and refused to accept the same. The defendant, by an amendment to its original answer, admitted a prima facie right of the plaintiff to recover except as to damages and attorney's fees, and reiterated its defense of suicide within the first two policy years. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000 principal, $96 interest, and $150 attorney's fees. No damages were awarded. The defendant's motion for a new trial, as amended, was overruled, and the movant excepted.
The plaintiff filed a cross-bill of exceptions to the judgment overruling his motion to dismiss the defendant's special plea, on the ground that the plea disclosed no reason why the defendant should be relieved from the payment of the full amount of the policy, that no legal and valid defense is therein set forth, that the quoted clause in the policy did not warrant the construction placed thereon by the defendant in its pleadings, and that the statement therein that the company's liability was limited to the premiums paid and received was a mere conclusion of the pleader.
The view that this court entertains of the case on its merits makes it unnecessary to consider and decide the questions raised by certain special assignments of error, the decision on the merits being conclusive of the relative rights of the parties. Before considering the evidence on the merits of the case and illustrative of the defenses set up, there are several well-settled principles of law applicable to the facts and in the light of which the case will be determined. These principles are herein set out without discussion, and will be applied to the evidence in the record, by which it will be determined that a verdict, under the terms and conditions of the policy expressly set out, was demanded, and that the verdict for the plaintiff is not supported by any evidence either direct or circumstantial. In other words, the evidence shows that the insured, Robert A. Coleman, committed suicide within two years of the date of the policy; and, under the terms of the policy which are controlling on the question, the maximum amount legally recoverable is the amount of the premiums paid within the two years when the policy was in force, and no more can be legally recovered under the evidence and the law applicable thereto.
It is undisputed that the insured, Robert A. Coleman, died on November 11, 1919, during the first two insurance years of the policy, and that his death was caused from a pistol wound in his right temple. The manner in which the wound was inflicted is not stated in the petition, but the general allegation is made that the said Robert A. Coleman died intestate in Clay county, on November 11, 1919. The plaintiff offered no witness nor any evidence of any kind to show the cause of the death of Robert A. Coleman, or how the wound on him was inflicted, and it follows that the verdict rests solely upon the legal presumption against suicide, and in the present case the only support for this presumption is a mere conjecture which is unsupported by any evidence of any character. In the case of Jenkins v. National Union, 118 Ga. 587, 45 S.E. 449, the Supreme Court held:
"We think it indubitable that when a contract of insurance provides that the policy shall be void in the event the insured shall commit suicide within a certain time, 'whether at the time of committing suicide [the insured] shall be either sane or insane,' the meaning is that, regardless of his sanity or insanity, the voluntary self-destruction of the insured within the time set out shall void the policy."
The presumption against suicide was thus stated by the Supreme Court in Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 12 S.E. 18:
"Where the fact of death is established, and the evidence points equally or indifferently to accident or suicide as the cause of it, the theory of accident rather than of suicide is to be adopted."
And it is universally held that the defense that the insured committed suicide must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, but that the presumption against suicide easily yields to physical facts clearly inconsistent with it. Hodnett v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 17 Ga.App. 538, 87 S.E. 813. The case last cited is very much like the one at bar on its facts and the inferences therefrom.
Of course, if there is no evidence as to the cause of death, it will be presumed that the death is from natural causes. But the principle may be carried still further, and it may be regarded as a settled rule that, when the circumstances of the death are such that it might have resulted from negligence, accident, or suicide, the presumption is against death by suicide. This rule is stated by Mr. Cooley, in his Briefs on the Law of Insurance (vol. 4, p. 3255). But it is well established that the fact of death by accident is not to be established by conjecture or presumption, unless there is no evidence whatever as to the cause of the death. The presumption of death by accident is prima facie only and is rebuttable, and, as said by several of the decisions, easily rebuttable by physical facts in evidence, and this presumption prevails only when the cause of the death is unknown. It does not prevail where there are facts bearing upon the question whether the death was intentional or accidental. When evidence is produced which is contrary to such a presumption, or the presumption is met by a conflicting presumption, it disappears, although the fact upon which it rests may still remain proper to be considered in arriving at a conclusion. As was well expressed by the Court of Appeals of Missouri:
"Where the facts appear from which the issue of accident or suicide...
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