New York Life Insurance Company v. Dandridge
Decision Date | 31 March 1941 |
Docket Number | 4-6272 |
Citation | 149 S.W.2d 45,202 Ark. 112 |
Parties | NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. DANDRIDGE |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Logan Chancery Court, Northern District; J. E. Chambers Chancellor; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Louis H. Cooke and Rose, Loughborough, Dobyns & House, for appellant.
Arnett & Shaw, for appellee.
Appellees, Mrs. Dandridge and the First National Bank of Paris, Arkansas, brought this action against appellant to compel it to perform specifically a contract of life insurance issued by it to her on October 18, 1927. The bank was made a party plaintiff because the policy had been pledged to it to secure an indebtedness. The complaint alleged that appellant had wrongfully lapsed the policy on its records and had continued it as extended term insurance which would expire February 22, 1948.
Appellant defended on the ground that the policy lapsed for failure to pay the quarterly premium due July 18, 1939, within the grace period; that application for reinstatement was made by insured on September 18, 1939, in which she stated she was in the same condition of health as when the policy was issued; and that within the preceding two years she had had no illness, disease or bodily injury, nor had she consulted or been examined by a physician. Appellant alleged that these statements were known by her to be false, in that she had consulted physicians at a Ft. Smith hospital and had been operated upon for a tumor of the breast within two years prior to her application for reinstatement, and had also consulted physicians within said period for other serious ailments. The policy was reinstated and it was alleged that in doing so it relied upon these false representations, and would not have reinstated same if she had stated the true facts regarding her condition of health and her consultations with and treatments by physicians. The answer further alleged that on May 10, 1940, insured notified it she desired to make a claim for disability benefits under the policy, and its investigation on this matter developed the fact that its approval of her application for reinstatement had been procured by said misrepresentations. It accordingly elected to rescind the reinstatement and tendered back all payments made, with interest, since reinstatement. The net value of the policy was thereupon applied to purchase extended insurance.
Appellees demurred to this answer which was sustained, and upon appellant's refusal to plead further, a decree was entered reinstating the policy and directing appellant to perform all its obligations as originally issued. This appeal followed.
The answer pleads and the demurrer concedes that the insured's policy was reinstated through fraudulent misrepresentation. The policy contained the following clauses, here material:
The question here presented for decision is exactly the same as was presented in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 191 Ark. 54, 83 S.W.2d 542, and that is, as stated by appellant: "Where the holder of a life insurance policy has allowed it to lapse and has obtained reinstatement by misrepresenting the condition of his health, does the incontestable clause in the policy operate immediately to preclude the insurer from attacking the reinstatement?" This question was answered in the affirmative in that case, and we are now asked to reconsider and overrule it. It is conceded that unless we overrule that case, this must be affirmed. We agree that this concession is well taken, and are of the opinion that we would have to overrule also, in principle, all the cases cited therein, and particularly, the case of Ill. Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Hamilton, 188 Ark. 887, 67 S.W.2d 741, 94 A. L. R. 1194. Also, the decision in the Campbell case has been cited and quoted from with approval in the recent case of Union Life Ins. Co. v. Bolin, 201 Ark. 555, 145 S.W.2d 734, where this language is used:
The cases cited in New York Life Ins. Co. v Campbell, supra, in addition to the Hamilton case, are New York Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 151 Ark. 123, 235 S.W. 412; Security Life Ins. Co. v. Leeper, 171 Ark. 77, 284 S.W. 12; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. King, 178 Ark. 293, 10 S.W.2d 891; and Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. McCray, 187 Ark. 49, 58 S.W.2d 199. It is asserted that these cases are not in point and do not support the Campbell case. With this we cannot agree. One effect of all these cases is, as stated in the Adams case, that "the reinstatement was not granted as a gratuity on the part of the company, but as a part of the contract expressed in the policy itself to the effect that a reinstatement could be obtained, as a matter of right, at any time within five years after default 'upon presentation at the home office of evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company'." In that case, as also in the King case, the application for reinstatement provided that the statements by the insured as to his health, etc., contained therein should be deemed to be warranties, the exact language being "I warrant them to be full, complete and true." This court said: "The company had no right to enlarge the terms upon which reinstatement could be obtained, and the requirement of a warranty of the truth of the answers was a distinct enlargement of the contract." In the Leeper case, supra, that holding was reaffirmed by holding that an application for reinstatement which contained an agreement that "in the event of self-destruction, whether sane or insane, within one year from the date of approval by the company...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Spencer v. Kemper Investors Life Ins. Co.
...cannot be contested if the time limits contained in the original incontestability clause have expired. See New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dandridge, 202 Ark. 112, 149 S.W.2d 45 (1941); Dorval v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., 308 Ill.App. 323, 31 N.E.2d 385 (1941); Chavis v. Southern L......
-
Chavis v. Southern Life Ins. Co.
...or out of the application for reinstatement. See, e.g., Munn v. Robinson, 92 F.Supp. 60 (W.D.Ark.1950); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dandridge, 202 Ark. 112, 149 S.W.2d 45 (1941); Burnham v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970). These cases reason that the re......
-
Butler v. MFA Life Ins. Co.
...and it must act on the insured's application for conversion in a reasonable and timely fashion. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dandbridge, 202 Ark. 112, 149 S.W.2d 45, 47-48, 134 A.L.R. 1519 (1941); Union Life Ins. Co. v. Bolin, supra, 145 S.W.2d at 735. See Volis v. Puritan Life Ins. Co., 548 F......
-
Ambrose v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co
...was reserved in the policy are: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 191 Ark. 54, 83 S.W.2d 542; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dandridge, 202 Ark. 112, 149 S.W.2d 45, 134 A.L.R. 1519; Wamboldt v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 191 N.C. 32, 131 S.E. 395, 45 A.L.R. 1360; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Love ......