New York Life Insurance Co. v. Kansas City Bank of Kansas City
| Decision Date | 05 November 1906 |
| Parties | NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. KANSAS CITY BANK of Kansas City, Mo., et al., Interpleaders and Appellants; ALBERT YOUNG, Administrator, et al., Interpleaders and Respondents; HARRIET L. CHITTENDEN et al., Interpleaders |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
October 1, 1906;
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. W. B. Teasdale, Judge.
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT DIRECTED.
Gage Ladd & Small for appellants.
(1) The policies were assignable. Insurance Co. v. Flack, 3 Md. 341; Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591; Bank v. Abernathy, 32 Mo.App. 211. (2) The execution of the assignment and note and ownership of the policies by the bank were abundantly proved. Davis v. Wood, 161 Mo. 17; Shaw v. Persing, 57 Mo. 416; Greenleaf on Evidence (16 Ed.), p. 170; Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga 201; Bill v. McCaulley, 29 Ga. 355; Gardner v Grannis, 57 Ga. 539; Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N.Y. 478. (3) The burden was upon the respondents to show the amount of the debt for which the policies were held as collateral, if there could be any doubt about that, for the reason that the assignment expresses on its face to be absolute and for value received. (4) Possession by bank was prima facie evidence of ownership of policies. Conway v. Caswell, 48 S.E. 956. (5) The statute of limitations has not run against appellants. Conway v. Casswell (Ga.), 48 S.E. 956; Jones on Pledges, sec. 582, and cases cited; Handcock v. Ins. Co., 114 Mass. 155; 19 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 177, and many cases cited. (6) The corporate existence of the Kansas City National Bank has not expired. Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54; Cogswell v. Bank, 56 A. 574; S. C., 76 Conn. 252. (7) If the bank could not maintain the suit, then the judgment ought to be in favor of the interpleader, McCoun or Chick for himself and the other stockholders, or Chick surviving director and trustee of the bank. Conway v. Casswell (Ga.), 48 S.E. 956.
Frank Titus and T. B. Wallace for respondent.
(1) The laws of New York are to be considered as parts of these policies in determining who are the beneficiaries meant by the term "legal representatives." Griswold v. Sawyer, 125 N.Y. 411; Ruppert v. Ins. Co., 7 Roberts (N. Y.) 155. (2) The laws of the State of Indiana, introduced in evidence, as well as the following decisions of that State, demonstrate that the words "legal representatives" there means the heirs of the insured, and not persons in the attitude of the adverse claimants herein. Hutson v. Merefield, 51 Ind. 24; Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247; Wilburn v. Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55. And to like effect is the law in Missouri as well as in other States. In re Riesenberg Estate, 90 S.W. 1170; Loos v. Ins. Co., 41 Mo. 538; Elstroth v. Young, 83 Mo.App. 258; Pietri v. Sequenot, 96 Mo.App. 266; Ewing v. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 194; Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 305; Bick v. Tanzy, 181 Mo. 515; Hubbard v. Turner, 93 Ga. 752; Rose v. Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505; Gaugh v. St. Louis Co., 88 Ill. 251; In re Conrad, 89 Iowa 396; Miller v. Metcalf, 77 Conn. 176; Staples v. Lewis, 71 Conn. 288; Knights Templar v. Greene, 79 F. 461. (3) That the law of the State of New York, in which the policies in question were issued, and the law of the State of Indiana, in which the policies were delivered, enter into and become a part of the contract, and are to be considered in construing the meaning of any clause or provision therein, is declared by the following Missouri authorities: Johnson v. Gattry, 11 Mo.App. 330, 83 Mo. 339; Pietri v. Seguenot, 96 Mo.App. 258; Cravens v. Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 604, 178 U.S. 389; Daggs v. Ins. Co., 136 Mo. 398. The above case affirmed in 172 U.S. 557; Christian v. Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 465; Ins. Co. v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226; Hicks v. Ins. Co., 60 F. 690; Supreme Lodge v. Meyer, 198 U.S. 508. (4) The alleged assignment, even if proved to have been executed by the insured Horace N. Chittenden in his lifetime, which facts is unproved, would be insufficient under the law of the States of New York and of Indiana entering into these policies to pass the title or annul the rights of the wife and child, the widow and heir of Mr. Chittenden, to the fund created by said policies; the interest and rights of said beneficiaries having accrued forthwith upon the delivery of said policies in Indiana. The law of Missouri is in accord with that of New York and Indiana. Anderson v. Goldsmidt, 103 N.Y. 617; Barry v. Assurance Society, 59 N.Y. 587; Ruppert v. Ins. Co., 7 Robertson (N. Y.) 155; Sherman v. Atchison, 77 A.D. 49. This case was affirmed in Court of Appeals, 177 N.Y. 574, 1131; Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N.Y. 68; Butler v. Ins. Co., 55 Hun (N. Y.) 301; Garner v. Life Ins. Co., 110 N.Y. 266; Barnett v. Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.S. 842; Griswold v. Sawyer, 125 N.Y. 411; Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; Hutson v. Merefield, 51 Ind. 24; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345; Wilburn v. Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55; Assurance Fund v. Allen, 106 Ind. 595; Harley v. Heist, 86 Ind. 201; Wanschaff v. Mut. Soc., 41 Mo.App. 206; U.S. Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 315; Reed v. Painter, 129 Mo. 681; Packard v. Mut. Co., 9 Mo.App. 469; Goslin v. Caldwell, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 454; Glenn v. Burns, 100 Tenn. 295; Bank v. Hugh, 128 U.S. 195; Wornock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775; Love v. Clune, 24 Colo. 237; Bank v. Williams, 77 Miss. 398; Bliss on Life Insurance (2 Ed.), secs. 337, 345; May on Insurance (4 Ed.), 391. (5) Under the evidence the judgment of the trial court adverse to the contentions of the claimants under the bank, and the bank itself is clearly correct. Stanton v. Gibbons, 103 Mo.App. 264; McCoan v. Mueller, 176 Mo. 196; Meyer v. Christopher, 176 Mo. 596; Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Stoker v. Coquall, 25 How. Pr. 267; Carr v. Dings, 54 Mo. 95; Williams v. Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300; Trust Co. v. McMillan, 188 Mo. 547. (6) Under the law neither the Kansas City National Bank in whose name claim is now made nor any claimant under it, has shown any title to the fund in court. Pearce v. Railroad, 21 How. 441; Bank v. Kenedy, 167 U.S. 362; Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U.S. 364; Burrows v. Niblack, 84 F. 111; Schofield v. Goodrich, 98 F. 271; Transportation Co. v. Palace Co., 139 U.S. 48; McCormick v. Bank, 165 U.S. 549; Bank v. Smith, 77 F. 129; Bank v. Pirie, 82 F. 799; Wylie v. Bank, 15 F. 428; Dresser v. Bank, 165 Mass. 120; Bowen v. Bank, 94 F. 925; Bank v. Bank, 173 Mo. 158; Bank v. Mathews, 98 U.S. 621; Thompson v. Bank, 146 U.S. 240; Rostern v. Land Co., 160 Mo. 141; Thornton v. Bank of Summerville, 153 Mo. 13.
--This is a proceeding in equity to settle the conflicting claims of the defendants to a certain fund amounting to $ 4,197.72 in the hands of the plaintiff, a life insurance company. The facts are that, on June 8, 1868, the plaintiff company issued two policies, each for the sum of $ 2,500, on the life of Horace N. Chittenden, numbered respectively 4881 and 4882. The insured died February 14, 1903. The respondent Albert Young as the administrator of Chittenden's estate filed his interplea claiming that he was entitled to the proceeds of said policy which had been paid into court by the company. The defendants Harriet and Anna B. Chittenden based their claim upon the ground that by the terms of the policy they were its beneficiaries.
The bank, the trust company, Chick and McCoun all base their claims, arising out of the following state of facts, viz.:--In the year 1874, the claimant Joseph S. Chick, according to his testimony, became cashier of the Kansas City National Bank, at which time said bank had in its possession the two policies in controversy together with what purported to be a written assignment of the same as collateral security for a note purporting to have been executed by Chittenden in favor of the bank. The note was dated in 1873, was for the sum of $ 3,000, bore interest and was past due in 1874. Chick testified that he was cashier and director of the bank from 1874, until it went into voluntary liquidation under the National Bank Act and paid its debts; that he and the other directors afterwards had possession of all the assets of the bank, including said note, policies of insurance and assignment thereof, as trustees of the bank; that all the other officers and directors of the bank were dead; that McCoun moved out of the State many years ago; and that for a number of years before this controversy he was the sole surviving officer, director and trustee of the bank, had possession of all its assets and was engaged in collecting them. He testified that the note of Chittenden was lost in 1894, and that the policies and assignment thereof, was at all time in the possession of the bank or its officers or directors. He states that no part of the debt had been paid. He could not testify that the signature to the note was that of Chittenden, but that the handwriting was the same as that of the signature of Chittenden to the assignment. His testimony was that the bank paid the premiums while the policies were in its possession, and that he as trustee paid $ 15 as premium after the bank went into liquidation.
The interpleading bank claims that it is the owner of said fund the proceeds of said policies assigned to it as collateral security for the payment of the said note of Chittenden for $ 3,000 with interest. McCoun claims an interest in the fund proportionate to the shares of stock he owned of said bank. The interpleader Chick claims an interest in the fund also as a shareholder of the bank's stock, and the entire fund as the surviving officer and trustee thereof. The trust company claims the fund because the policies had been transferred to it by Chick in consideration of an indebtedness of the latter to the trust company.
The court found for the administrator Albert...
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