Rose v. Wortham

• Decision Date: 02 November 1895
• Citation: 32 S.W. 458,95 Tenn. 505
• Parties: ROSE v. WORTHAM et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

32 S.W. 458

95 Tenn. 505

ROSE v. WORTHAM et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 2, 1895

Appeal from chancery court, Campbell county; Henry R. Gibson Chancellor.

Suit by Sallie Wortham and others against J. L. Rose, as administrator, to recover the proceeds of a policy of insurance. A decree for plaintiffs was affirmed by the court of chancery appeals, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Williams Henderson & Davis and Reid & Powers, for appellant.

Henderson & Jourolman, for appellees.

WILKES J.

The question involved in this case is to whom the proceeds of a policy on the life of Sidney Wortham for $5,000 shall be paid,-whether to his widow and child or to his creditors. The chancellor held that the widow and child were entitled to the proceeds, after deducting certain expenses of collection, and the administrator and creditors appealed to this court, and assigned as error this holding of the chancellor. The cause has been heard by the court of chancery appeals, and they have affirmed the decree of the chancellor, and the administrator and creditors have appealed from that decision to this court.

The facts as found by the court of chancery appeals are that Sidney Wortham, on 1st January, 1889, being an unmarried man became engaged to and contracted to marry the defendant Sallie, now his widow. The marriage was not consummated however, till October 29, 1890. In the meantime, and on the 8th day of January, 1889, he took out a policy of insurance upon his life in the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company of Newark, N. J., for $5,000, directing it, in answer to a question propounded, to be made payable to "himself or his estate." On the 18th of January, 1889, the policy was issued payable to the "legal representatives of the assured." The premium was to be $75.55, payable semiannually. Sidney Wortham, the insured, died November 25, 1892, leaving his widow and one child, and his estate is totally insolvent. Both before and after his marriage he paid the premiums on his policy as they fell due. He frequently stated to his wife that he intended she and their child should have the proceeds of the policy, and be the beneficiaries thereunder. This evidence was not objected to. The proceeds of the policy were paid after his death to his administrator, who holds the same subject to the decision of this controversy as to ownership of such proceeds. The decision of this question involves the construction of the statutes brought forward in the compilation of Milliken & Vertrees as sections 3135 and 3335, and which are as follows:

"Sec. 3135. A life insurance effected by a husband on his own life shall inure to the benefit of the widow and next of kin, to be distributed as personal property free from the claims of his creditors."

"Sec. 3335. Any life insurance effected by a husband on his own life shall in case of his death, inure to the benefit of his widow and children and the money thence arising shall be divided between them according to the law of distribution, without being in any manner subject to the debts of the husband, whether by attachment, execution, or otherwise."

It is insisted for the creditors that it is only such life insurance as is effected by the husband as husband, during the existence of the marital relation, that is thus referred to and regulated, and that an insurance effected before the marriage relation begins is not contemplated by these statutes, and does not fall within their provisions. In Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction it is said in substance, that the presumption is that the lawmakers have a definite purpose in every enactment, and that purpose is an implied limitation on general terms, and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms used in the statute. The cardinal purpose of the act must control, and words and phrases must be read in such sense as will harmonize with the subject-matter and general purpose of the statute. Mr. Kent, on the same subject, says, in substance: In the exposition of a statute the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms, and its reasons and intention will prevail over the strict letter. Not only may the meaning of words be restricted by the subject-matter of an act, but, for like reason, they may be expanded. The intention of the act will prevail over the literal sense of its terms. The particular inquiry is not, what is the abstract force of the words used? but in what sense were they intended to be used as found in the act? This sense is to be collected from the context, and a narrower or more extended meaning is to be given, according to the intention thus indicated. Suth. St. Const. §§ 219, 240,...