New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Henagan, 5511.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1959
• Docket Number: No. 5511.,5511.
• Citation: 272 F.2d 153
• Parties: NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant, v. Mary L. Donnelly HENAGAN, Plaintiff, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

272 F.2d 153 (1959)

NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, Appellant, v. Mary L. Donnelly HENAGAN, Plaintiff, Appellee.

No. 5511.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard October 6, 1959.

Decided November 27, 1959.

Noel W. Deering, Boston, Mass., with whom David W. Walsh, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.

James W. Kelleher, Boston, Mass., with whom James R. DeGiacomo, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellee.

Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.

WOODBURY, Chief Judge.

On October 11, 1954, the plaintiff-appellee was employed by the defendant-appellant as a grill-car waitress on its regularly scheduled passenger train which left Boston at 7 A.M. bound for New York. As the train, proceeding at 12 to 15 miles per hour, entered the Providence, Rhode Island, railroad station about an hour later, the engineer made an emergency application of the brakes in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid running over a woman who stepped from the station platform onto the tracks in front of the locomotive, obviously and concededly for the purpose of committing suicide.

At the time the brakes were applied the plaintiff was standing at the service counter at the forward end of the grill-car waiting for food from the kitchen. She was thrown against the counter by the sudden stop of the train but she did not fall, although some of her fellow employees in the car lost their footing, and silverware, dishes and kitchen utensils in the car were thrown to the floor. The plaintiff immediately gave evidence of pain, principally in her shoulders and neck, and became hysterical. She was removed from the train at Providence and, with another grill-car employee who was injured, sent back to Boston and there hospitalized. No serious physical injury has ever been found by the medical men who have examined her. There is no doubt, however, that since the event of October 11, 1954, she has suffered more or less acutely from paranoid psychosis, described by her medical expert at the trial as "* * * a mental disease characterized by suspiciousness, by the presence of ideas of guilt and reference to one's self of events not connected with one's self." To quote from the same source, her belief since 1954 or 1955 has been "* * * that she herself was personally responsible for the death of the woman who fell or jumped in front of the train on which she worked in 1954, just as though she were herself a murderer," and that "* * * there was going to be a murder trial at which she herself was to be the defendant." There is ample evidence, and indeed it appears to be conceded, that because of her mental condition the plaintiff has been unable to work or care for her family since the accident and that the prospects of her eventual recovery are not very bright.

In due course the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the court below under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,¹ and a trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on which the court immediately entered judgment. The defendant within the time limited by the rules moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and also for a new trial. Hearing was held on these motions at the conclusion of which the court announced:

"I am denying both motions. On the defendant\'s Motion for Directed Verdict I have endorsed this: `This motion was presented to the Court before the case went to the jury. The Judge waved aside the motion and said it was "denied" but the denial is not meant to be final but merely meant the Judge refused to act upon it until after the jury returned its verdict. The jury having returned its verdict this Judge would grant the motion were he free to do so. But obedient to what he understands to be the views of a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States and solely in response to such command this Court denies the motion. Wyzanski, J., January 13, 1959.\'

"On the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial, I have endorsed this as follows: `This Motion would be granted by this Court were it free to do so, but this Court construes the opinions and judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States as giving him no option but to deny the motion. Wyzanski, J., January 13, 1959.\'"

The court then said in elaborating its views:

"In my opinion there was no evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the engineer. I cannot read the record as a whole in a way to find any evidence of negligence. But I know that my method of reading the record is different from that of a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States as exhibited in past cases, and I hope I am a lawful judge, and I recognize the limits of my authority, whether appellate judges do or not."

Furthermore, the court indicated that in its opinion the plaintiff had failed to establish causation. It said:

"With respect to the aspect of causation I also believe that the plaintiff failed to bear the burden of proof. I do not believe that the condition which the plaintiff had even on the plaintiff\'s medical testimony can legitimately be said to have resulted in whole or in part from the incident which occurred at the Providence Station on the 11th of October, 1954.

* * * * * *

"There is no sensible medical explanation which I have ever heard that makes the onset of insanity or mental incompetence legally the result of a situation such as existed in the Providence Station, and I regard the jury as having reached a preposterous conclusion."

The defendant below did not appeal from the denial of its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. It did, however, seasonably appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict prior to the filing of its motions. Having moved at the appropriate time for a directed verdict, it can here challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to take the plaintiff's case to the jury. And, having moved within the time fixed in the Rules for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it can properly ask this court for remand to the court below for the entry of judgment in its favor, not merely for a new trial. Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co., 1947, 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849; Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 1952, 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77, and cases cited.

In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 506, 507, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 the Court said with reference to the Federal Employers' Liability Act: "Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." And then the Court said: "Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death."

The test is simply and easily stated. The trouble comes in applying it, for what may be entirely reasonable to one...