New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Broome County

• Decision Date: 07 February 1977
• Citation: 89 Misc.2d 354,391 N.Y.S.2d 360
• Parties: NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF BROOME, and Carlton Hilsinger, as Commissioner of Finance of theCounty of Broome, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 360

391 N.Y.S.2d 360

89 Misc.2d 354

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF BROOME, and Carlton Hilsinger, as Commissioner of Finance of theCounty of Broome, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Broome County.

Feb. 7, 1977.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N.Y., Albany, William F. Sheehan, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, of counsel, for plaintiff.

John E. Murray, Broome County Atty., Binghamton, Theodore J. Mlynarski, Jr., Binghamton, of counsel, for defendants.

DECISION

PAUL J. YESAWICH, Jr., Justice.

Plaintiff, New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 or summary judgment to recover the cost of caring for Michael Hudak, a patient at the Binghamton Psychiatric Center, and others being held in state mental hygiene facilities by reason of orders of the Broome County criminal court.

The facts are undisputed. In 1973 Hudak was acquitted of the charges of murder and attempted murder by reason of mental disease or defect by a Broome County Court jury. Following the mandate of § 330.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the court ordered Hudak committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene who in turn placed him in the Binghamton Psychiatric Center where he still remains. Plaintiff has periodically billed defendants for the services rendered by it for Hudak's care and treatment. Save for an initial payment of $3,635.90 defendants have refused to honor plaintiff's payment demands. As of September 30, 1975 the outstanding balance was $32,742.30.

Plaintiff predicates defendants' liability on § 43.03(c) of the Mental Hygiene Law which provides:

'Patients receiving services while being held pursuant To order of a criminal court or for examination pursuant to an order of the family court shall not be liable to the department for such services. Fees due the department for such services shall be paid by the county in which such court is located.' (emphasis added).

While defendants readily concede liability for fees incurred for services rendered patients held by virtue of an order of a criminal court of their county they maintain the commitment order was not such an order. Thus, the issue presented is whether orders committing defendants who, like Hudak, have been acquitted by reason of insanity are orders of a criminal court within the meaning of § 43.03(c) of the Mental Hygiene Law.

Defendants assert at the time the verdict of acquittal was rendered the criminal action thereupon terminated so that when the commitment order was issued the court was acting solely in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction. They contend their thesis is supported by People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 224 N.E.2d 87, since it held a mentally ill defendant acquitted on the ground of insanity was entitled to Civil commitment and, beyond that, because such defendants are adverted to as having the status of civil patients. Matter of Lashway v. Hanes, 78 Misc.2d 979, 985, 357 N.Y.S.2d 747, 753; People v. McNelly, 83 Misc.2d 262, 269, 371 N.Y.S.2d 538, 545. And, inasmuch as the commitment is a civil one and Criminal Procedure Law § 10.10(7) states:

'. . . a court specified herein which possesses civil as well as criminal jurisdiction does not act as a criminal court when acting solely in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction, and an order or determination made by such a court in its civil capacity is not an order or determination of a criminal court even though it may terminate or otherwise control or affect a criminal action or proceeding.'

They conclude § 43.03(c) of the Mental Hygiene Law is inapplicable to them as it only imposes liability on account of services rendered those 'being held pursuant to order of a criminal court.'

Though eminently plausible, defendants' argument is inconclusive for it fails to take into account CPL § 330.20(1) which declares the committing court 'must' order an individual acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect to an appropriate institution and, pending designation of that institution, 'must' direct the sheriff to hold that defendant. Considering that it is the legislature which commanded commitment, obviously it did not intend to have a not guilty because of insanity verdict equated with an absolute discharge nor to immediately place the defendant beyond the reach of the criminal court. That being so the construction of the statute advanced by defendants is unacceptable. People v. Lally, supra, is consistent with this conclusion for not only did it sanction the concept that an application to vacate a commitment order constitutes the Beginning of a civil proceeding, but it also reiterated the finding in People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App.Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322, affd. 196 N.Y. 525, 89 N.E. 119, that:

'. . . the Legislature could and did limit the effect of such a 'not guilty because insane' verdict so that it would not be an absolute discharge but would result in the detention for such period as was necessary to determine whether insanity continued . . .' People v. Lally, supra, 19 N.Y.2d at p. 33, 277 N.Y.S.2d at p. 659, 224 N.E.2d at p. 91.

Moreover, legislative history sustains plaintiff's interpretation. From 1842, when the legislature organized the State Lunatic Asylum (L.1842, ch. 135) until 1965, the expense of maintaining an...