Newbold v. J.M. Bradstreet & Son

• Citation: 57 Md. 38
• Parties: JAMES F. NEWBOLD, and others, trading as NEWBOLD & SONS v. THE J. M. BRADSTREET & SON, a body corporate.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1881
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

57 Md. 38

JAMES F. NEWBOLD, and others, trading as NEWBOLD & SONS v. THE J. M. BRADSTREET & SON, a body corporate.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 30, 1881

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

The special damage laid in the declaration was as follows:

And the plaintiffs say: That they had business dealings with certain merchants in New York, doing business under the style of Burgess & Goddard, and the plaintiffs enjoyed good credit with them, and were indebted to them in a large sum of money and the plaintiffs had sent them their promissory notes for the amount of said indebtedness, payable to the order of said Burgess & Goddard, as had been usual with the plaintiffs in their dealings with them; and the said Burgess & Goddard, in consequence of the aforesaid libel, suspecting the credit of the plaintiffs, and distrusting their ability to pay their debts, caused the aforesaid notes of the plaintiffs to be offered for sale in the City of Baltimore, after they were endorsed by the said Burgess & Goddard, "without recourse," whereby the said plaintiffs were greatly injured in their credit and reputation as solvent merchants.

And the plaintiffs say: That they had business dealings with certain merchants doing business in New York, under the style of Mayer Brothers, and had good credit with them, and the said Mayer Brothers, in consequence of the aforesaid libel refused to sell to plaintiffs goods upon credit, as they had been accustomed to do, and required payment in cash.

And the plaintiffs say: That they had dealings with the Plume & Atwood Manufacturing Company, of New York, and had good credit with said company, and that said Plume & Atwood Manufacturing Company, of New York, in consequence of said libel, drew a draft on plaintiffs for the immediate payment of a large sum of money which the plaintiffs were compelled to make immediate payment thereof, instead of having a period of credit for the payment of the same, according to what had theretofore been usual in the dealings between them and said company.

And the plaintiffs say: That they had business dealings with certain merchants in Pittsburg, in the State of Pennsylvania, doing business under the style of Duncan & Son, and had good credit with them, and said Duncan & Son, in consequence of said libel, refused to sell goods to plaintiffs on credit, as they had theretofore been used to do, and demanded immediate payment of a sum of money which the plaintiffs owed them.

And the plaintiffs say: That they had business dealings with the Rochester Tumbler Company, and had good credit with it, and the said Rochester Tumbler Company in consequence of the said libel, refused to sell them goods upon the usual terms of credit, which had been accustomed between it and the plaintiffs.

First Exception.--At the trial the plaintiffs, to maintain the issues on their part, called David M. Newbold one of the plaintiffs, who testified to the facts set forth in the opinion of the Court, as to the business and credit of the firm and the mercantile agency of the defendant to which they were subscribers, and offered in evidence Bradstreets' Daily Sheet of Changes of the 15th January 1878, in which, under the head of "Chattels," were the words: "Newbold & Sons to J. R. Burns." He further testified, that on his complaint of the erroneous and injurious statement to an agent of the defendant, the words following appeared in the Daily Sheet of the 17th January, 1878, which the witness produced:

Note.--"Newbold & Sons to J. R. Burns," appearing on Daily Sheet of January 15th, 1878, under the head of Chattels, was simply a release of a lien upon chattels previously given by J. R. Burns to Mess. Newbold & Sons.

The witness further testified to the refusal of the defendant to correct the first statement, by an advertisement in the daily papers.

The plaintiffs' counsel then asked the following question of witness: Can you state whether there is any usage with the J. M. Bradstreet and Son Company, which gives a meaning to the words in the paper offered in evidence, which are as follows: "Chattels, Newbold & Sons to J. R. Burns?" and the witness said, there was such an usage. The plaintiffs' counsel then asked the question: ""State what is that meaning?" The defendant's counsel objected to the question. Thereupon, the Court (BROWN, J.) ruled that the witness could not answer the question, unless he stated how he knew the meaning of the words. The witness stated, that his firm had been and was a subscriber to the Bradstreet Agency, as he had already stated; that he had been in the habit of reading this paper, which was at the time of the publication issued daily; that he knew some persons who had given chattel mortgages, and all of these chattel mortgages were published under that head; that there were from five hundred to a thousand subscribers to the paper in the City of Baltimore, that he knew personally from fifteen to twenty of them, and that he in this way had acquired a knowledge of the meaning of the words. The Court ruled that the knowledge of the witness was not sufficient to entitle him to answer the question, and overruled the question, and refused to permit the witness to answer the same. The plaintiffs excepted.

Second Exception.--The plaintiffs, by their counsel, then asked the witness the following question: "What did Mr. Cole, the agent of the defendant, say in reference to your complaint, in which you stated, that the paper had stated you had given a chattel mortgage; state particularly, whether he said anything about the meaning of these words?" Witness said, "I asked him what he meant by publishing that Newbold & Sons had given a chattel mortgage, and said, that Newbold & Sons had given a release to a chattel mortgage; and he said that he would send to the Record Office and see if it was properly reported; he said that the report had come to the office, as he had published, and he would send and see whether plaintiffs had given a chattel mortgage." Plaintiffs' counsel then asked this question; "Look at the words in the paper offered in evidence, which are as follows: 'Chattels, Newbold & Sons to J. R. Burns,' and state whether you know of any usage which fixes a definite meaning to these words?" And the witness said: "That there was such a usage." The plaintiffs' counsel then asked this question; "To whom does this usage extend?" The defendant objected to the question. The Court decided to hear the answer of the witness, before ruling upon it. Thereupon, the witness stated: "The paper conveys information to the subscribers; we have been receiving the paper and seeing the chattel mortgages put under that head; we had been receiving the paper about two years prior to 1878." The Court thereupon ruled out the answer of the witness, and refused to permit it to go in evidence to the jury. The plaintiffs excepted.

Third Exception.--The plaintiffs' counsel then asked the witness the following question: "State whether you know the general and usual and ordinary meaning which those words had among persons who were the subscribers to the Bradstreets' Agency?" The defendant objected to the question, and the Court refused to permit the witness to answer it. The plaintiffs excepted.

Fourth Exception.--The plaintiffs then asked the witness the following question: "State whether you know the meaning of the said words, 'Chattels-- Newbold & Sons, to J. R. Burns,' as used in the paper offered in evidence?" The defendant objected to the question, and the Court ruled as follows: "If the witness has any knowledge on the subject which he has not already stated, he is at liberty to state it fully, but he is not at liberty in his reply to give any evidence which has been ruled by the Court to be inadmissible." The witness thereupon said, "Of course I know the meaning; one of the reasons is, that the instrument referred to in the publication, is a chattel mortgage, and it is under the head of chattels; as to another reason for knowing the meaning, I do not know that I could define it any other way than this; we have always accepted it, and acted upon it in our business as having that meaning; I think I have stated about all I can base my conclusions upon." The Court then ruled out the said answer of the witness, and refused to permit it to go in evidence to the jury. The plaintiffs excepted.

Fifth Exception.--The plaintiffs' counsel then asked the witness the following question: "State what is the meaning of the said words?" Defendant objected, and the Court refused to permit the witness to answer it. The plaintiffs excepted.

Sixth Exception.--The plaintiffs' counsel then asked the witness the following question: "State whether the publication in Bradstreets' Daily Sheet of Changes, which has been offered in evidence, had any effect on your business?" Defendant objected to the question, and the Court sustained the objection, and refused to permit the witness to answer it. The plaintiffs excepted.

Seventh Exception.--The plaintiffs then proposed to offer in evidence the following letter, which had been written by them to the defendant, and which defendant produced on notice to that effect from the plaintiffs:

BALTIMORE, Jan. 17, 1878.

Mess. J. M. Bradstreet Son & Co.,

Gentlemen:--We question very much whether a correction of your blunder in reporting us as giving a chattel instead of a release, will undo the damage done; it is due us that you make the correction through the public press, and let it appear in the morning, and look to it that the error is not repeated through your weekly report; a failure to rectify the error as suggested, and a repetition of mistake by to-morrow, we will institute suit at once for damages. The...