Traynor v. Sielaff

Decision Date15 November 1895
Docket Number9355-(30)
PartiesJOHN TRAYNOR v. F. G. SIELAFF
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Scott county, Cadwell, J., denying a motion for a new trial. Affirmed.

The amendment to the complaint allowed by the court and referred to in the paragraph of the opinion numbered (1) was in substance an allegation that the name "Traguor John," in the list was intended for plaintiff and was so understood by all the members of the association who received and read the list and by other readers thereof. The four questions asked defendant and referred to in the paragraph of the opinion numbered (2) were as follows: (1) When you received your list from this association after sending that name in and seeing that name on the last line of page 6, did you understand it to refer to John Traynor, and refer to the name you sent in? (2) Didn't you then go and get your list and show Mr. Traynor his name upon that list, point it out upon that list? Now, under the terms of this association after you received this list with the names of debtors in it you were not to extend further credit, were you, to such names as appeared upon the list? (3) Now I will go a little further. After a party's name was placed upon that list and he paid up, then you extended further credit to him again, didn't you? (4) And as long as his name was on the list, none of the members of the association would credit him in any manner, would they, under the terms of the agreement?

Order affirmed.

Merrick & Merrick, for appellant.

The question whether the words were libelous upon their face or defamatory was for the court. Newell v. How, 31 Minn. 235, 17 N.W. 383. There was an absence of allegation of special damages, and an entire failure to prove either general or special damages. Townshend, Sland. & L. (4th Ed.) §§ 140, 148, 188; 2 Greenleaf, Ev. §§ 254, 256, 420; Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38. Not only must the special damages be alleged and proven as laid but it must appear that the special damage proved is the natural and approximate consequence of the publication. 2 Greenleaf, Ev. 420; Townshend, Sland. & L. (4th Ed.) § 197, and notes; Newbold v. Bradstreet, supra; Newell v. How, 31 Minn. 235, 17 N.W. 383; Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N.W. 862; Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N.W. 542. The communication, or rather publication, made to the association by the plaintiff, and by it to its members, is strictly privileged, and therefore damages cannot be recovered except on proof of actual malice. Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 F. 771; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet Co., 46 N.Y. 188; Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. 162, 9 N.W. 678. Under the pleadings and the evidence it was error to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury. Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570, 15 N.W. 760; and Templeton v. Graves, 59 Wis. 95, 17 N.W. 672.

F. C. Irwin, for respondent.

The communication was not privileged. Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123; Johnson v. Bradstreet, 77 Ga. 172, 4 Am. St. Rep. 77; Townshend, Sland. & L. (4th Ed.) 417; Masters v. Lee, 39 Neb. 574, 58 N.W. 222.

OPINION

START, C. J.

This is an action for a libel. Verdict for plaintiff for $ 50, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial the defendant appeals.

The complaint, as amended, alleges that the defendant was during the times therein mentioned a merchant and a member of an association known as the Retail Merchants' Protective Association of Minneapolis, which issued a written circular, known as its "Black List" or "Dead-Beat List," the heading of which was substantially as follows: "The Retail Merchants' Protective Association of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Incorporated under the laws of the state of Minnesota. Special reference list of unsettled claims in and for Scott, Carver, and McLeod counties;" that the defendant maliciously and with the intent to injure the credit and good name of the plaintiff, and knowing the same to be false, caused to be inserted and published of the plaintiff in such list and circular, under such caption or heading, these words, "Traguor, John, scmn., Belle Plaine, mdse. $ 4.00"; that the spelling of the name of the plaintiff was a mistake in the printing of the list, but it was the defendant's intention to insert therein the plaintiff's name, and the name "Traguor, John," in such list, was intended for the plaintiff, and was so understood by all the members of the association who received and read the list, and by other readers thereof. The complaint further charges that the purpose of the defendant in so publishing the name of the plaintiff was to brand him as a person who did not pay his debts, and to prevent him from obtaining credit, and to impute to him insolvency and dishonesty in his business dealings, and that the defendant then knew that the plaintiff was not indebted to him in any sum; that the list was circulated by the association and the defendant publicly among business men in the counties named, and in Belle Plaine, the plaintiff's residence.

The answer admits that the defendant is a merchant doing business at Belle Plaine, and a member of the association referred to in the complaint, but denies that it ever published any list or circular known as a "black" or "dead-beat" list, and puts in issue the other material allegations of the complaint. The answer admits that the defendant furnished to the association the information that John Traynor, residence Belle Plaine, was indebted to defendant in the sum of four dollars, and alleges that it was his duty as such member to do so, and that his act was privileged.

There are 19 assignments of error, but they may be grouped and disposed of under four general heads: (1) Those relating to the complaint, and the amendment thereof; (2) the exceptions to the rulings of the court as to the admissibility of evidence; (3) the exceptions to the charge and refusal to charge; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

1. The complaint, as amended, states a cause of action. While the words published of the plaintiff, standing alone, and unexplained, are not libelous on their face, yet they are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one, according to the occasion, connection, and circumstances of using them. The complaint alleges such extrinsic matters showing their application to the plaintiff the connection in which the words were used, their meaning, and how they were understood by the persons to whom the publication was sent. It was a question, then, for the jury whether the words were published of and concerning the plaintiff, and whether they were libelous. This question was properly submitted to the jury. Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17 N.W. 387; Zier v....

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