Newby v. Board of Ed., Lake Zurich Community Unit School Dist., No. 95

• Decision Date: 24 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-385,76-385
• Citation: 368 N.E.2d 1306,11 Ill.Dec. 560,53 Ill.App.3d 835
• Parties: , 11 Ill.Dec. 560 Lorraine NEWBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, LAKE ZURICH COMM. UNIT SCH. DIST., NO. 95, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1306

368 N.E.2d 1306

53 Ill.App.3d 835, 11 Ill.Dec. 560

Lorraine NEWBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, LAKE ZURICH COMM. UNIT SCH. DIST., NO 95, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 76-385.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Oct. 24, 1977.

Smythe & Lee, Waukegan, for plaintiff-appellant.

Franke & Miller, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

RECHENMACHER, Presiding Justice.

Lorraine Newby brought this action against the Board of Education of Lake Zurich Community Unit School District No. 95 (hereafter the "Board"), alleging that the Board deprived her of due process of law when it transferred her from a position as a guidance counselor to an assignment as a second grade teacher. She sought money damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunctive order requiring the Board to employ her as a guidance counselor for the upcoming school year. The trial court granted the Board's motion to dismiss Newby's complaint and she appeals. As we view the case, the issue on appeal is whether the well pleaded allegations of Newby's complaint demonstrate that she had a property interest in her continued assignment to a position as a guidance counselor.

The complaint states that Newby was employed by the Board as a kindergarten teacher for three school years, from September, 1965, to June, 1968. Newby received a guidance certificate from the Illinois State Teachers' Certification Board, effective August 9, 1968. From September, 1968, to June, 1971, she was assigned by the Board to a position as an elementary guidance counselor. On August 4, 1971, Newby was informed that she was being reassigned to a position as a second grade teacher, due to the financial position of the District. She instituted a grievance procedure, but the procedure did not result in her reassignment as a guidance counselor. The Board has hired a number of persons to work as guidance counselors since the date of Newby's reassignment. Newby alleges that the "profession of guidance counseling" is "substantially different" than the profession of teaching and that "based upon the conditions of her employment from September, 1968 to June, 1971" and upon "actions and representations of officials" of the Board, she "had a legitimate claim of entitlement to her continued employment * * * as a guidance counselor." She further asserts that the notice of reassignment, and the Board's grievance procedure, did not comport with the requirements of due process of law.

In passing upon a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all facts properly pleaded and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be taken as true. (E. g., Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 551, 554, 340 N.E.2d 47.) However, the pleading of conclusions alone will not suffice to supply the essential factual allegations upon which a cause of action must be based. Haas v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 993, 998, 343 N.E.2d 36.

In this case, in order to plead a cause of action for deprivation of a "property" interest within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, it was necessary for Newby to set forth facts showing that she had more than a mere unilateral expectation, or abstract need or desire, to continue in her position as a guidance counselor; rather, it was her burden to show a ...