Newell v. Dart

Decision Date05 August 1881
Citation9 N.W. 732,28 Minn. 243
PartiesNEWELL v DART AND OTHERS.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from judgment of district court, Blue Earth county.

Waite & Freeman, for appellant.

D. Buck, Pfau & Torrey, and P. O. Foster, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This is an action in the nature of a creditor's bill, brought by plaintiff, as judgment creditor of defendant Odolphus Dart, to reach a judgment held by the judgment debtor against defendants Lewis and Shaubut,and to have it applied in satisfaction of his own judgment. Charles B. Frazer, L. S. Dart, and Daniel Buck are made defendants, for the purpose of having interests which they claimed to have in the judgment held by Odolphus Dart determined and postponed to the claim of the plaintiff.

The judgment held by plaintiff against Odolphus Dart was rendered and docketed June 23, 1870. Execution had been issued on it July 15, 1870, and returned unsatisfied September 19, 1870. An alias execution had been issued on it September 20, 1878, and levied the same day upon the judgment now sought to be reached to satisfy this execution. The principal relief sought by plaintiff is that this judgment held by his judgment debtor, Odolphus Dart, against Lewis and Shaubut, be appropriated to the payment of his own judgment against said Dart, and be for that purpose ordered sold under the alias execution issued thereon as aforesaid, and still in the hands of the sheriff.

The theory upon which plaintiff has brought this action is that this judgment cannot, under the circumstances, be sold on execution; for if he had ample remedy by proceeding to sell the judgment on execution, uninterfered with by any fraudulent transfers or encumbrances on the part of defendants, he would have no cause of action, and his complaint should be dismissed. Whether plaintiff's theory is or is not correct, it is not necessary to consider or determine, because, under our view of the law, the plaintiff, for another reason, must be necessarily defeated. It will be observed that plaintiff's judgment was recovered June 23, 1870. This action was commenced September 21, 1878. The trial of the action was closed, and the cause submitted to the court for its decision, July 11, 1880; and its decision filed August 11, 1880. The case was afterwards twice reopened,-once on application of defendants, and once on application of plaintiff,-and finally submitted, and additional findings filed, September 17, 1880, and final judgment entered thereon October 8, 1880.

The plaintiff's right to the relief sought depends entirely upon the existence of his judgment. This action is wholly ancillary to the judgment, and in aid of the execution issued thereon for the purpose of reaching a certain chose in action of the judgment debtor, and having it applied in satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment. Hence, if plaintiff's judgment be dead, his whole case falls to the ground. It is provided by statute “that a judgment shall survive and the lien thereof continue for the period of ten years, and no longer.” Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 77. In the present case this period expired June 23, 1880, and during the pendency of this action. Hence, before the final trial and decision of this case, and before judgment rendered therein, plaintiff's judgment had ceased to exist either as a cause of action or a lien, unless kept alive by the commencement and pendency of this action beyond the statutory period of ten years.

We do not think the pendency of this action had any such effect. It is not in any proper sense, as...

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34 cases
  • Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 27 Enero 2015
    ...this case did not have the effect of prolonging the lien of the judgment beyond the period limited by the statute”); Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 243, 9 N.W. 732, 733 (1881) (holding that a creditor's action during a judgment's life “neither creates a new lien nor extends the judgment lien”); R......
  • Good v. Kleinhammer
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 11 Diciembre 1926
    ... ... prevailing rule. (Davis v. Foley, 60 Okla. 87, 159 ... P. 646, L. R. A. 1917A, 187, and note.) Defendant quotes an ... excerpt from Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 248, 9 N.W ... 732, which holds that the commencement and pendency of an ... action in the nature of a creditor's bill within ... ...
  • All Finish Concrete, Inc. v. Erickson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • 3 Julio 2017
    ...41 S.Ct. 365, 366, 65 L.Ed. 697 (1921) ). In Minnesota, a creditor's suit is ancillary to the original judgment. Newell v. Dart , 28 Minn. 243, 249, 9 N.W. 732, 733 (1881). It is not "an action brought upon the judgment as a cause of action, in order to obtain a new judgment, but simply an ......
  • Dahlin v. Kroening, A09-1800.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • 6 Julio 2010
    ...debtor in the waning statutory period would be considered “a cause of action in order to obtain a new judgment.” Newell v. Dart, 28 Minn. 243, 249-50, 9 N.W. 732, 733 (1881). Applying this practice seven years later to an action in which a prior “judgment was still a valid obligation when [......
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