Newhall v. Newhall

• Decision Date: 24 February 1958
• Citation: 321 P.2d 818,157 Cal.App.2d 786
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Dorothy NEWHALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George A. NEWHALL, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 17387.

Page 818

321 P.2d 818

157 Cal.App.2d 786

Dorothy NEWHALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George A. NEWHALL, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 17387.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 24, 1958.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1958.

Hearing Denied April 23, 1958.

Charles F. Jonas, San Francisco, Dinkelspiel & Dinkelspiel, Richard C. Dinkelspiel, San Francisco, for appellant.

Young, Rabinowitz & Chouteau, San Francisco, for respondent.

FRED B. WOOD, Justice.

In 1951 plaintiff filed a suit for divorce. The interlocutory decree was rendered October 31, 1952, and the final decree November 3, 1953. Meanwhile, the parties negotiated and executed a property settlement agreement dated October 23, 1952. The interlocutory decree ordered and adjudged 'that the Property Settlement Agreement between plaintiff and defendant, executed by said parties on October 23, 1952, be and the same is hereby ratified, confirmed and approved, and each of the parties is hereby ordered to do and perform each and every obligation on his or her part required to be performed under said agreement.' The final decree ratified, confirmed and approved the agreement in identical terms.

Each decree 'further ordered, adjudged and decreed that, pursuant to said Property Settlement Agreement, defendant be and he is hereby ordered and directed as follows:

'(1) To pay to plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000) Dollars annually, in twelve (12) equal installments, as his share of the support and maintenance of each of said minor children until his or her majority.

'(2) To pay according to its terms, the present indebtedness evidenced by a certain promissory note in favor of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, having a present principal balance of Eleven Thousand Four Hundred Fifty ($11,450.00) Dollars, ¹ and secured by a deed of trust covering the property owned by the plaintiff and commonly known and designated as 2438 Filbert Street, San Francisco, California.

'(3) To pay to plaintiff, for her support and maintenance the sum of Twenty-two Thousand ($22,000.00) Dollars annually in twelve (12) equal istallments, provided that said payments shall cease in the event of the death of plaintiff or of defendant, or in the event of the remarriage of plaintiff; provided, further, that if defendant dies within ten (10) years from October 23, 1952, plaintiff shall continue to receive said payments until October 23, 1962, unless she dies or remarries prior thereto.'

Later, the defendant moved for an order modifying the final decree in the following respects: (1) to reduce the annual payment for the support of each child from $5,000 to $1,800 annually; (2) to reduce the payment for the support of the plaintiff from $22,000 to $9,000 annually. He predicated his motion upon allegedly changed conditions. ²

The trial court, after a hearing, denied this motion by an order which recited that the court had 'no authority to modify the property settlement agreement and interlocutory and final judgments of divorce.' The order of denial further recited that the court so acted 'without passing upon the merits of the motion * * * for modification' and awarded plaintiff costs and attorney fees. Defendant has appealed.

The agreement in question bears all the earmarks of an integrated, inseverable property settlement agreement. The parties expressly declared that they mutually desired 'that a full and final adjustment of all their property rights be had' and agreed that except as therein specified each party is released from all obligations and liabilities resulting from future acts of the other; each released the other from all liabilities or obligations thereafter incurred by the other and from all claims of either upon the other for support as wife or husband or otherwise 'it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle the rights of the parties hereto in all respects'; all property hereafter acquired by either shall be his or her sole and separate property; each has an immediate right to dispose of or bequeath his or her interest in all property belonging to him or her; each waives all right to the estate of the other at death, including the right of administration, family allowance and inheritance under any will; the wife accepts the provisions hereof 'in full satisfaction of her right to the community property * * * and in full satisfaction of her right to alimony, support and maintenance.' They agreed there 'is no community property' but that the wife is entitled to the household furniture and furnishings belonging to either of them (except certain items described in a certain list), a Cadillac and a jeep, certain moneys for her attorney fees and costs and for the services of an accountant employed by her. Certain real properties are characterized as belonging to the wife. He agrees to pay the encumbrance on one of these properties as it becomes due. He agrees to pay all the community debts listed in a certain schedule. She agrees to quitclaim to him any interest she may have as joint tenant or tenant in common with him in any real property.

In the 13th paragraph of this instrument he agrees to pay to her 'for her support and maintenance the sum of * * * $22,000.00 * * * per year, payable in equal monthly installments,' such payments to close upon the death of either or upon her remarriage, except that if he dies within ten years she shall continue to receive the payments for the balance of such ten-year period unless she dies or remarries during said period.

The husband's promise to make these payments to the wife was an integral, inseparable part of the property settlement agreement. When 'ratified, confirmed and approved' by the interlocutory and final decrees, each of which decreed that 'pursuant to said Property Settlement Agreement,' defendant is ordered and directed to pay plaintiff the sum of $22,000 annually (using the very words of the 13th paragraph of the agreement except for the substitution of 'defendant' for 'husband' and 'plaintiff' for 'wife'), this obligation to pay $22,000 annually became fixed and is not subject to modification except by consent of the parties, the plaintiff and the defendant herein.

This agreement (and these 'support' payments) meet the test expressed in Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal.2d 820, 313 P.2d 549:

'An agreement is integrated if the parties have agreed that the provisions relating to division of property and the provisions relating to support constitute reciprocal consideration. The support provisions are then necessarily part and parcel of a division of property. Such an agreement would be destroyed by subsequent modification of a support order based thereon, without the consent of the parties. Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d , at pages 41-42, 265 P.2d , at page 876; Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d , at pages 626, 627-628, 297 P.2d , at page 992; Herda v. Herda, 48 Cal.2d 228, 231-232, 308 P.2d 705. It is immaterial whether or not the marital property is divided equally. Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at page 43, 265 P.2d at page 877; Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46, Cal.2d at pages 627-628, 297 P.2d at pages 992-993. It is immaterial that the amount of the marital property is small. Herda v. Herda, supra, 48 Cal.2d at page 232, 308 P.2d at page 707. It is likewise immaterial that the agreement calls for payments for 'support' or 'alimony.' Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pages 624-625, 297 P.2d at pages 990, 991 and cases there cited.

'A support order based upon an integrated agreement may be modified if the parties so provide. Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 61, 265 P.2d 865. Absent such a provision, it cannot. An agreement providing that the purpose of the parties is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties with respect to both property and support, that they intend each provision to be in consideration for each of the other provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out of the marital relationship except those expressly set out in the agreement, will be deemed conclusive evidence that the parties intended an integrated agreement. Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 628, 297 P.2d at page 993; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.2d 274, 279, 303 P.2d 539; Herda v. Herda, supra, 48 Cal.2d at page 232, 308 P.2d at page 707. Even absent one or more of the foregoing provisions, there may be other proof that the parties intended an integrated agreement. Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal. at page 41, 265 P.2d at page 876. Thus, the parties may be uncertain as to the value or legal ownership of property. They may be uncertain which of them is entitled to a divorce and on what grounds and therefore uncertain as to their legal rights with respect to support and the division of property. An agreement for a specified division of property and specified support payments settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof that the parties intended it to be severable. See Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at page 43, 265 P.2d at page 877; Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pages 627-628, 297 P.2d at pages 992, 993.' 48 Cal.2d at pages 824-825, 313 P.2d at page 552.

Defendant says our case does not meet this test because no property was divided. We are not convinced. The following provisions of the agreement are consistent with the concept that this agreement marks the culmination of a division of their properties: 'Husband and wife acknowledge that there is no community property'; the wife 'now owns as her separate property' a certain parcel of realty; the husband 'heretofore has conveyed to wife and wife now owns as her separate property' a certain other parcel. (Emphasis added.) This view that a division of property was involved receives support and emphasis from the clause whereby she 'agrees to quitclaim to' him 'any and all interest which she may now have' as 'joint tenant or tenant...