Newman v. Coakley, 6051.

• Decision Date: 11 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 6051.,6051.
• Citation: 285 A.2d 690
• Parties: Edith NEWMAN, Appellant, v. Charles COAKLEY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

285 A.2d 690

Edith NEWMAN, Appellant, v. Charles COAKLEY, Appellee.

No. 6051.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 7, 1971.

Decided January 11, 1972.

Jacob A. Stein, Washington, D. C., for appellant. Glenn A. Mitchell, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.

William R. Scanlin, Bethesda, Md., for appellee.

Before FICKLING, GALLAGHER, and REILLY, Associate Judges.

REILLY, Associate Judge:

This appeal challenges an order reducing a jury verdict of $14,000 to $10,000 on the ground that the amount of damages awarded by the jury exceeded the statutory limit of $10,000 applicable to actions begun in the Court of General Sessions, where appellant on May 14, 1967 had filed a negligence suit to recover damages for personal injuries incurred in an automobile accident.

The case did not come to trial until March 10, 1971. At this time the matter was heard in the Superior Court — the statutory successor to the Court of General Sessions. On the eve of trial, appellant, mindful of the fact that the new court had jurisdiction over civil actions filed there if the amount in controversy did not exceed $50,000, moved to amend the ad damnum clause in her complaint to specify a demand of $30,000. That motion was denied without prejudice to its resubmission in the event of a verdict in excess of $10,000.

Ultimately the jury, after adjudging defendant negligent, returned a verdict of $14,000 in favor of appellant, who thereupon moved to amend her complaint to conform to the proof (i. e., to support a judgment reflecting the jury verdict). The trial court denied the motion and in an order — in the nature of remittitur — entered judgment for appellant in the amount of $10,000.

In a written opinion, the trial court observed that in the absence of any legislative history or appellate decision bearing on the problem, its judgment was based entirely on the text of the statute establishing the Superior Court. The opinion went on to state:

. . . The Court of General Sessions was a statutory court of limited jurisdiction. It was superseded by the Superior Court on February 1, 1971. Clearly, a verdict in excess of $10,000 prior to February 1 would have required reduction to the jurisdictional limit. Beginning February 1, two relevant factors became effective. First, all of the cases which had been filed in the Court of General Sessions thenceforth were to come within the jurisdiction of the new Superior Court. D.C.Code § 11-921(a) (I) (Supp.IV, 1971). Second, the jurisdictional limit in civil cases filed after Superior Court came into existence was raised to $50,000. D.C.Code § 11-921 (a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971).

The two provisions are separate and exclusive. In creating a new court which ultimately would have unlimited local jurisdiction, Congress unquestionably contemplated a phased period of expanding jurisdiction. It is concluded that the jurisdictional limit of cases which had been filed in the Court of General Sessions was unaffected by court reorganization, and that a Superior Court jury verdict in excess of $10,000 cannot stand in civil cases filed prior to February 1, 1971.

This is the first time we have been squarely confronted with the task of construing the statute governing the jurisdiction of the new Superior Court with respect to civil actions still pending in the Court of General Sessions on February 1, 1971, the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970.¹ Prior to that date, there were three trial courts of limited jurisdiction in the District, viz., General Sessions, the Juvenile Court, and the Tax Court. The Reorganization Act abolished these courts, vesting jurisdiction over matters pending in those tribunals in the Superior Court which, in turn, was established as the trial court of general jurisdiction in cases arising under District of Columbia law — the Act transferring to the Superior Court from the United States District Court in a three-stage process, jurisdiction over all non-Federal cases.

The provisions of the Act which bear directly upon the question before us are concerned with the first stage of expanding civil jurisdiction of the Superior Court and are found in § 11-921 of D.C.Code 1967 (Supp.IV, 1971). Insofar as relevant, this section provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia. Such jurisdiction shall vest in the court as follows:

(1) Beginning on the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter begun before such effective date in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, or the District of Columbia Tax Court.

(2) Beginning on such effective date, the court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter, at law or in equity, which is begun in the Superior Court on or after such effective date and in which the amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000.

The key word in both the numbered paragraphs quoted from this subsection is "begun". Apparently the trial court relied upon the repetition of this word in § 11-921(a) (1) and (a) (2) in concluding that the Superior Court's jurisdiction over pending cases described in paragraph (1), supra, was not changed or enlarged by paragraph (2), supra, which on its face seems to apply only to actions begun after the effective date of the statute.

With respect to actions begun in the Juvenile Court prior thereto, this court recently came to a similar conclusion in what might be regarded as the converse of the situation, Cupo v. District of Columbia, D. C.App., 285 A.2d 696 (decided January 6, 1972). This was a bastardy proceeding filed by the corporation counsel in behalf of a nonresident mother in the Juvenile Court, and subsequently tried in the Superior Court. Under another provision of the Act, § 16-2341, D.C.Code 1967 (Supp. IV, 1971), such official may not prosecute unless complainant is likely to become a public charge here. We rejected an argument by the putative father challenging the authority of the corporation counsel to maintain the suit after the effective date of the Act, on the ground that the rights of parties, in actions already pending on such date, were preserved after the transfer of jurisdiction of such matters to the Superior Court by reason of the language of § 11-921(a) (1), supra.

Appellant's counsel contends, however, that considerations of expeditious judicial administration militate against so literal a construction of the statute. He argues that the judgment of the court below, if permitted to stand, would cause unnecessary circuity of action. He points out that plaintiffs who had filed suit in General Sessions and have subsequently concluded that they are entitled to more damages than the old jurisdictional limits of that court envisaged, could move for a voluntary nonsuit under Rule 46 of the civil rules of the Superior Court and start a new action in the United States District Court where there is currently no jurisdictional ceiling on damage actions. In such event, the judges of that court, if they continue current practice, would certify the case to the Superior Court, where judge or jury would be free to award damages exceeding $10,000. Should a plaintiff adopt this roundabout course of action,² he could achieve the same result in the Superior Court which appellant in this case sought to accomplish when she invoked the policy of allowing liberal amendments to the pleadings.

In short appellant urges that in the interest of avoiding additional filing fees, unnecessary pretrial hearings in another...