Newman v. Metrish

• Decision Date: 06 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-1782.,07-1782.
• Parties: Daniel Albert NEWMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Linda METRISH, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

543 F.3d 793

Daniel Albert NEWMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Linda METRISH, Warden, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 07-1782.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 24, 2008.

Decided and Filed: October 6, 2008.

ARGUED: Thomas C. Cameron, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Bradley R. Hall, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Raina I. Korbakis, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Bradley R. Hall, Andrew N. Wise, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. Daniel Albert Newman, Kincheloe, Michigan, pro se.

Before: MOORE and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.^*

ALDRICH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined. SUTTON, J. (pp. 798-801), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

ANN ALDRICH, District Judge.

The State of Michigan appeals a judgment granting Daniel Albert Newman's application for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime, we affirm.

I. Background

A. The crime

In February of 1992, Henry Chappelear ("Chappelear") was fatally shot during the robbery of his home. Chappelear, a known drug dealer, regularly stored marijuana in his freezer. On the day of the murder, one of Chappelear's friends came to his house, noticed a porch lightbulb removed and smashed on the ground, and entered the house. Inside, the friend saw the open freezer door, discovered Chappelear's dead body, and called the police. (J.A. 707.) Evidence recovered from the scene established that Chappelear was shot by a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9-millimeter handgun.

The day after the homicide, two men found a gym bag by the side of the road that contained a jean jacket, a 9-millimeter handgun, a sawed-off shotgun with tape wrapped around the grip, a skimask-type hat, two walkie-talkies, and some gloves. (J.A. 131-37.) The bag and its contents were turned over to the police. Subsequent analysis of the items strongly suggested that they belonged to Newman and had been used in Chappelear's murder.

B. Trial

Newman was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury for first-degree premeditated murder and felony firearm.

At trial, the prosecution sought to prove that Newman had planned to rob and kill Chappelear by introducing evidence that Newman had intended to rob drug dealers for drugs or money, that Chappelear was a known drug dealer who stored drugs in his freezer, that Newman may have ordered drugs from Chappelear in the past, and that Chappelear's freezer was open and empty after the homicide. In addition, the prosecution attempted to establish a motive by offering testimony that Newman had previously seen Chappelear make a pass at his girlfriend.

The prosecution also introduced evidence supporting an inference that Newman had possessed the murder weapons. First, hairs found on the ski-mask were found to match all visual characteristics of Newman's hair and the hair of one of his dogs. Second, evidence was introduced that a hacksaw had been seized from Newman's home, and there were markings on the shotgun barrel and stock that were not inconsistent with markings that could have been created by a hacksaw. Third, twine found in the gym bag was similar to twine seized from Newman's house. Fourth, debris found inside the gym bag and on the jean jacket chemically and visually matched a container of drywall seized from the car of Newman's girlfriend. Fifth, a firearms expert testified that the spent cartridges and bullet recovered from Chappelear's body matched the 9-millimeter handgun found in the gym bag. Last, testimony established that the gun used in the homicide had been purchased by Newman in 1991, and that a friend of his had seen a similar gun in Newman's home a couple of weeks prior to the homicide. However, the friend could not say for sure that the murder weapon was the same one that she had seen because it was dark and the gun was in a laundry bin.¹

Although the prosecution offered ample evidence to support an inference that Newman had previously possessed at least one of the murder weapons, the prosecution did not offer any evidence that Newman had used or possessed the weapons on the day of the murder. There was no eyewitness testimony, nor were the police able to recover any latent fingerprints from the crime scene or the items in the gym bag.

Newman did not testify. Instead, he called several witnesses to establish an alibi.

Newman's conviction for first-degree murder was subsequently vacated, and an order of second-degree murder was entered in its stead.

C. Direct appeal and post-conviction relief in state court

Newman appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. In an opinion dated July 2, 1999, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied his appeal because "[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution ... a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt" all of the elements of the crimes. (J.A. 679.)

The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the lack of eyewitnesses was not dispositive, stating that the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to "support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that [Newman] either committed the murder himself or aided and abetted in its commission." (J.A. 679.) Accordingly, the court affirmed Newman's convictions and denied his motion for a rehearing.²

Newman was subsequently denied post-conviction relief in the state trial and appellate courts.

D. Application for a writ of habeas corpus

Having exhausted the remedies available to him in state court, Newman filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he participated in the murder, either directly or as an aider and abettor.³ Upon review, the district court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals had failed to consider three important pieces of evidence, that the prosecution had failed to establish a solid chain of inferences at trial, and that there was no evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime. Newman v. Metrish, 492 F.Supp.2d 721, 730-31 (E.D.Mich.2007). Accordingly, the district court determined that the Michigan Court of Appeals had not reasonably applied the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, noting that although the facts relied on by the court of appeals "may have supported a `reasonable speculation' that [Newman] participated in the murder," they did "not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 729, 732. Thus, the district court unconditionally granted Newman's application for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing a district court order granting an application for a writ of habeas corpus relief, we review legal conclusions de novo. Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir.2005). Although we generally review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, we review de novo "when the district court's decision in a habeas case is based on a transcript from the petitioner's state court trial, and the district court thus makes no credibility determination or other apparent finding of fact." King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted).

Newman's application is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his application for a writ of habeas corpus:

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).

At issue here is whether the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals involved such an "unreasonable application" of federal law. A district court may not issue a writ upon concluding only that the state court applied the law erroneously or incorrectly. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). "Rather, that application must also be unreasonable," meaning that the state court "unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 411, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

III. Discussion

At issue here is whether the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under Jackson, habeas relief is warranted "if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In considering whether there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the crime, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

The Jackson standard is as easy to articulate as it is difficult to apply. Where there is only circumstantial evidence available, as in the instant case, this ineffable standard is especially challenging, and even more so when that evidence supports a host of permissible inferences.

As a starting point, we note that "[c]ircumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction, and it is not necessary for the evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 992 (6th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). In Johnson, we found Johnson's conviction to be fully supported by circumstantial evidence where (1) he had been angry with the victim and was the last known...