Rogers v. Mays

• Decision Date: 03 August 2022
• Docket Number: 19-5427
• Citation: 43 F.4th 530
• Parties: William Glenn ROGERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tony MAYS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

43 F.4th 530

William Glenn ROGERS, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Tony MAYS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-5427

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 26, 2021

Decided and Filed: August 3, 2022

ARGUED: Kelley J. Henry, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelley J. Henry, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, Kimberly S. Hodde, HODDE & ASSOCIATES, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Richard D. Douglas, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, WHITE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., joined in full, and WHITE, J., joined in part. WHITE, J. (pp. 568–69), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from Sections II.B.3.b.2, II.C.1, and II.C.2.b.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

A Tennessee jury convicted William Glenn Rogers of kidnapping, rape, and murder, and imposed a sentence of death. Rogers appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On appeal, Rogers raises claims related to sufficiency of the evidence and the state's limitation of evidence and cross-examination, as well as five groups of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt/innocence, sentencing, and motion-for-a-new-trial stages. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's opinion with respect to the guilt/innocence phase of trial. We conclude, however, that Rogers's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase that makes us doubt whether this phase of trial produced a fair result. We further hold that, in Tennessee, ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can establish cause to excuse a defendant's procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at the motion-for-a-new-trial stage. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows:

At the guilt phase of the trial, the State presented proof that on July 3, 1996, nine-year-old Jacqueline ("Jackie") Beard was playing with her twelve-year-old brother, Jeremy Beard, and her eleven-year-old cousin, Michael Carl Webber, at a mud puddle near her home in the Cumberland Heights area of Clarksville in Montgomery County. The defendant, thirty-four-year-old William Glenn Rogers, approached the children and introduced himself as "Tommy Robertson." He said he was an undercover police officer, offered the children fireworks, and invited them to go swimming. Jackie went home and told her mother, Jeannie Meyer, about the man. Mrs. Meyer took Jackie back to the mud puddle to investigate. While the children played with the fireworks, Mrs. Meyer talked with Rogers, who continued to identify himself as undercover officer Tommy Robertson. After approximately thirty-five minutes, Rogers left in his car.

At around 1:30 p.m. on July 8, 1996, Rogers appeared at the Meyer residence asking about a lost key. Jackie was with her mother when Mrs. Meyer spoke with Rogers. Rogers was last seen walking down the road toward a nearby abandoned trailer. A few minutes later, Mrs. Meyer gave Jackie permission to pick blackberries to take to the doctor's office where Mrs. Meyer had an appointment that afternoon. Jackie changed her shorts immediately before leaving the house. At 1:55 p.m., Mrs. Meyer was ready to leave and called for Jackie but could not find her. At around 2:00 p.m., a neighbor, Mike Smith, saw a car matching the description of Rogers’ car leaving the immediate area. Smith had seen the same car heading in the direction of the Meyer residence about an hour or two earlier. Mrs. Meyer searched the area by car and on foot to no avail. Jackie was never seen alive again.

State v. Rogers ("Rogers II "), 188 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tenn. 2006).

After Beard's disappearance, the police questioned Rogers. Id. at 599. At first, Rogers denied seeing Beard that day; later, he said that he accidentally struck her with his car and then threw her body off a bridge into the river. Id . ; R. 25-5 (Tr. at 127–32) (Page ID #3894–99). After the police asked Rogers about a child's fingerprints in his car, he said that Beard briefly sat in his car and spoke with him. Rogers II , 188 S.W.3d at 599. Throughout police questioning, he denied any sexual abuse. Id.

On November 8, 1996, two deer hunters found Beard's remains in a wooded area in Land between the Lakes, approximately forty-eight miles from her home. Id. at 599–600. Her shoes, shirt, and shorts were near her remains. Id. The shirt was inside out. Id. at 600 ; R. 25-7 (Tr. at 231) (Page ID #4376). Later tests revealed sperm heads on the inside of the crotch area of her shorts. Rogers II , 188 S.W.3d at 600.

At the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the jury convicted Rogers on each of nine counts, including one count of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation. R. 25-11 (Tr. at 221–22) (Page ID #5132–33).

At the penalty phrase, several mitigation witnesses testified. The most significant mitigation witness was Rogers's sibling Sam,¹ who testified that their stepfather "often" "slapp[ed]," "hit[ ]" and "punch[ed]" them, starting from the time that Rogers was four or five years old. R. 25-13 (Tr. at 112–13, 138–39) (Page ID #5383–84, 5409–10). Sam explained that Rogers was often chained to the bed, for up to days on end. Id. at 119–22 (Page ID #5390–93). If Rogers soiled the bed or his pants, their stepfather would rub Rogers's face in the soiled pants or mattress. Id. at 124–25, 130 (Page ID #5395–96, 5401). Their stepfather would also lock himself and Rogers in the bathroom, and Sam believed that he was forcibly giving Rogers enemas. Id. at 133–36 (Page ID #5404–07). Additional family members and other lay witnesses also briefly testified that Rogers was abused. Three expert witnesses also testified. Cecille Guin, a social worker, testified in general terms about the violent and abusive conditions at the Louisiana Training Institute (LTI), an institution at which Rogers had been confined. Id. at 119–24 (Page ID #5777–82). Psychologist Tom Neilson testified that he had diagnosed Rogers with posttraumatic stress disorder

, which resulted from the trauma he experienced, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, dissociative disorder not otherwise specified, and a personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial and borderline features. R. 25-14 (Tr. at 287–309) (Page ID #5559–81). Psychiatrist Keith Caruso testified that Rogers met "diagnostic criteria for anti-social personality disorder and for border line personality disorder." R. 25-16 (Tr. at 149–50) (Page ID #5813–14).

The jury sentenced Rogers to death. R. 25-17 (Tr. at 38) (Page ID #5983). It found four aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies that involve the use of violence; (2) the murder was committed with the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; (3) the murder was committed against a person younger than twelve and the defendant was at least eighteen; and (4) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing, or attempting to commit, rape or kidnapping. Id. at 36–37 (Page ID #5981–82); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i) (1996). The jury unanimously found that these aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 25-17 (Tr. at 37) (Page ID #5982).

The trial court denied Rogers's motion for a new trial. R. 24-5 (Order) (Page ID #1168–90). Rogers appealed, first to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and then to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Both courts affirmed Rogers's convictions and sentence. State v. Rogers ("Rogers I "), No. M2002-01798-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 1462649, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. June 30, 2004) ; Rogers II , 188 S.W.3d at 598.

Rogers then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 26-7 (Second Am. Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief) (Page ID #7755–80). The post-conviction court denied the petition. R. 26-8 (Order) (Page ID #7863–8056). The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Rogers v. State ("Rogers III "), M2010-01987-CCA-R3-PD, 2012 WL 3776675, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2012). The Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. R. 26-19 (Order) (Page ID #10186).

Rogers filed a habeas petition in federal district court. R. 14 (Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus) (Page ID #44–139). The district court denied the petition.

Rogers v. Westbrooks ("Rogers IV "), No. 3:13-cv-00141, 2019 WL 1331035 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2019). Rogers timely appealed. R. 156 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #27325–26).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny a writ of habeas corpus. Foust v. Houk , 655 F.3d 524, 533 (6th Cir. 2011). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "Where the state court fails to adjudicate a claim on...