Newman v. Suny Broome Community College
| Decision Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-0199 (MAD/ML) |
| Parties | JOHN H. NEWMAN, JR. Plaintiff, v. SUNY BROOME COMMNITY COLLEGE; and DR. CAROL SCOTT-ROSS, Vice President for Student Development and Chief Diversity Officer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
JOHN H. NEWMAN JR. Plaintiff, Pro Se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) filed by John H. Newman, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Application for an Order Directing Service by the United States Marshal (Dkt. No. 3). For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No 2), recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice and with leave to amend, and I deny Plaintiff's Application for an Order Directing Service (Dkt. No. 3) as moot if the Court adopts my recommendation and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff commenced this action on February 22, 2021 by filing a verified Complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)
Construed as liberally[1] as possible, the Complaint generally alleges that Plaintiff's civil rights were violated by State University of New York Broome Community College (“SUNY Broome”) and Dr. Carol Scott-Ross, Vice President for Student Development and Chief Diversity Officer, in her “[o]fficial capacity and individual capacity” (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was a student at SUNY Broome and enrolled in classes beginning on January 25, 2021. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also alleges that, while he was enrolled, he maintained passing grades in all classes and was never accused of misconduct. (Id.) On February 9, 2021, however, Plaintiff alleges that a Public Safety Officer removed him from campus. (Id. at 2-3.)
Approximately four hours after he was removed from campus, Plaintiff alleges that he received an e-mail attaching a letter signed by Defendant Scott-Ross that stated Plaintiff's continued enrollment at SUNY Broome was disallowed and that “[t]he committee based decision is predicated on the information about your conviction.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, Attach. 1 at 15 [Pl.'s Exs.].)[2] Plaintiff alleges that on February 13, 2021, he wrote an e-mail to Defendant Scott-Ross requesting information about “the administrative remedies for appealing [the committee's] decision.” (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. at 18.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Scott-Ross responded on February 16, 2021 and stated that “the committee decision is final.” (Id.)
Prior to being removed from campus by the Public Safety Officer and receiving the letter from Defendant Scott-Ross on February 9, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that he was not notified that a committee was reviewing his enrollment status or that he would be afforded an “opportunity to be heard while [the] decision was being [c]onsidered.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, the Complaint asserts three claims against Defendant SUNY Broome and Defendant Scott-Ross “as Vice President for Student Development and Chief Diversity Officer” for Defendant SUNY Broome: (1) Plaintiff was denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Plaintiff was denied equal protection based on his status as a felon in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Plaintiff was discriminated against based on his status as a felon in violation of New York State Human Rights Law §§ 292(4) and 296(15). (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-6.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks “automatic reinstatement into all of [his] classes” and $5, 600, 000.00 in punitive damages for each of his three claims. (Id. at 6.)
For a more complete statement of Plaintiff's claims, refer to the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.)
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).[3] Having reviewed Plaintiff's application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets the standard to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.[4]
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Court, however, also has an overarching obligation to determine that a claim is not legally frivolous before permitting a pro se plaintiff's complaint to proceed. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (). “Legal frivolity . . . occurs where ‘the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory [such as] when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Aguilar v. United States, 99-MC-0304, 99-MC-0408, 1999 WL 1067841, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 1999) (quoting Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) ().
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to afford him notice and the opportunity to respond prior to the decision to ban him from campus violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5) For the following reasons, I recommend that this claim be dismissed without prejudice.
Generally to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Attallah v. New York Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 94 F.Supp.3d 448, 454 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (quoting Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.3d 825, 828 (2d Cir. 1985)) aff'd, 643 Fed.Appx. 7 (2d Cir. 2016). Importantly, § 1983 does not create any independent substantive right, but rather “provides a civil claim for damages” to “redress . . . the deprivation of [federal] rights established elsewhere.” Thomas v. Roach, 165...
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