Newnam v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. COA10–905.,COA10–905.
• Citation: 711 S.E.2d 194
• Parties: Joan NEWNAM, Employee, Plaintiffv.NEW HANOVER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, Self–Insured (Allied Claims Administration, Servicing Agent), Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

711 S.E.2d 194

Joan NEWNAM, Employee, Plaintiff

v.NEW HANOVER REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, Self–Insured (Allied Claims Administration, Servicing Agent), Defendant.

No. COA10–905.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 7, 2011.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal by defendant from Opinion and Award entered 3 May 2010 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2011.

Kathleen Shannon Glancy, P.A., Wilmington, by Terrie Haydu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., Charlotte, by Kari A. Lee and Justin D. Robertson, for defendant-appellant.

CALABRIA, Judge.

New Hanover Regional Medical Center (“defendant” or “NHRMC”) and Allied Claims Administration appeal an Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission concluding that Joan Newnam (“plaintiff”) suffered a compensable occupational disease and awarding her temporary total disability payments. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1999, plaintiff began working for defendant as a magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) technologist. Plaintiff rotated to three different locations: NHRMC, Cape Fear Hospital (“Cape Fear”), and the “Medical Mall.” The standard procedure for each location required two MRI technologists to be on duty at the same time. In addition, plaintiff was on-call four to six times per month at Cape Fear, and volunteered to work extra hours or shifts when any of the locations were understaffed.

Plaintiff's basic duties included performing MRI scans. For each patient receiving a scan, plaintiff was also required to scan paper documents and input data into defendant's computer system, move and instruct the patient for the scan, adjust the coil for the body part to be scanned, and conduct the MRI scan using a computer keyboard and mouse. Plaintiff performed between four and nine MRI scans per eight-hour shift, depending on whether she worked alone or if other MRI technologists were on duty. Each MRI scan lasted approximately 35 to 45 minutes. When plaintiff was the only MRI technologist on duty, she was responsible for all of these duties, but when other MRI technologists were on duty, the responsibilities were shared.

Each of plaintiff's three work locations had two separate work stations. One work station was used for ordering MRI studies, scanning paper documents, and inputting data into defendant's computer system. The second work station was for conducting the MRI scan. This second station had a large computer monitor, mouse, and keyboard. When plaintiff was engaged in her duties at the second work station, she constantly used the computer mouse and keyboard in order to adjust certain parameters associated with the MRI scan. The duration of plaintiff's duties at this second work station was between 16 seconds to several minutes.

In 2001, plaintiff reported to defendant that she experienced problems with tightness in her right shoulder and arm. On 22 March 2001, David Clawson (“Clawson”), an occupational therapist employed by defendant, performed an ergonomic assessment of plaintiff's work stations at NHRMC and the Medical Mall. According to Clawson, plaintiff's duties consisted of operating a computer 90 to 100 percent of the time, and the remaining 10 percent of her work duties involved transferring patients. Clawson recommended neck and shoulder stretches to help alleviate plaintiff's complaints of tightness in her right shoulder and arm. Clawson also recommended that plaintiff obtain a foam or gel padded wrist rest on which to rest her forearms when using the computer and mouse. Plaintiff subsequently obtained a wrist rest and keyboard tray to provide support for her arms.

On 19 March 2004, plaintiff fell from an MRI mobile truck while working for defendant. She sustained injuries to, inter alia, her right thumb, left shoulder, and left wrist. Defendant accepted the compensability of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Richard Moore (“Dr. Moore”), an orthopaedist with a subspecialty in hand surgery, and was unable to work for two to three weeks. Plaintiff subsequently returned to light duty work with defendant, which involved screening patients via telephone.

In October 2004, plaintiff reported to defendant that she experienced pain in her right shoulder, neck, and arm. On 13 October 2004, Clawson performed a second ergonomic assessment of plaintiff's work station at NHRMC. Clawson discovered that the height of plaintiff's desktop, combined with the face board under the desktop at her work station, prevented her from sitting close enough to the desk unless she lowered her chair. However, Clawson determined that if plaintiff lowered her chair, her elbows were too far below the desktop. Defendant allowed plaintiff to obtain a new chair which would suit plaintiff's needs at her work station.

On 20 August 2007, plaintiff obtained a “permanent” work assignment at the Medical Mall. Plaintiff's new duties required her to spend approximately 75 percent of her working hours at the Medical Mall, and the remaining 25 percent rotating between NHRMC and Cape Fear. Shortly after plaintiff began her new work assignment, she reported to defendant that she experienced pain in her right shoulder, trapezius, and arm as well as bilateral hand numbness, cramping, and tingling. Plaintiff reported to defendant that her pain began in the morning, increased throughout the day, and awakened her at night.

On 10 September 2007, Karla Santacapita (“Santacapita”), an occupational therapist employed by defendant, evaluated plaintiff's work station at the Medical Mall. Santacapita recommended the following: lowering the height of plaintiff's “desk area one” approximately one-and-one-half inches in order to allow for the proper angle of plaintiff's upper extremities to the keyboard and mouse; gel wrist rests for the keyboard and mouse; removing the drawers mounted under the desktop of “desk area two”; and either lowering the height of desk area two approximately three to four inches or, alternatively, providing plaintiff a foot stool and adjustable-height chair with removable arm rests. Defendant accommodated some, but not all, of Santacapita's recommendations.

On 18 October 2007, plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Moore for bilateral hand pain and bilateral hand numbness and tingling. Dr. Moore recommended a consultation with Dr. Patrick T. Boylan (“Dr. Boylan”), a pain management specialist, and also recommended that plaintiff obtain an ergonomic evaluation of her work stations. Plaintiff sought treatment on 30 November 2007 from Dr. Boylan for hand and wrist pain and numbness. Dr. Boylan's examination revealed that plaintiff suffered from moderate bilateral medial neuropathy at the wrist, consistent with moderate bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. As a result of the examination, Dr. Boylan ordered conservative treatment including wrist splints for plaintiff to wear at night and use of pain medication.

On 7 February 2008, Dr. Moore agreed with Dr. Boylan's diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and discussed surgical options with plaintiff. Since Dr. Moore previously completed a Form 18M regarding plaintiff's 19 March 2004 work injury, he amended the Form 18M and indicated that plaintiff developed bilateral post-traumatic carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her 19 March 2004 work injury and that plaintiff required surgery. Dr. Moore performed carpal tunnel injection therapy on plaintiff on 29 April 2008.

On 14 May 2008, plaintiff filed a Form 18 “Notice of Accident” with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“the Commission” or “the Full Commission”), which defendant subsequently denied. On 27 May 2008, plaintiff reported relief of her carpal tunnel symptoms in her left hand, and elected to undergo carpal tunnel injection therapy in her right hand since it had become more symptomatic. Plaintiff reported improvement in her right hand following the second injection. On 21 August 2008, plaintiff filed a Form 33R and requested that her claim be assigned for a hearing.

On 24 November 2008, plaintiff returned to Dr. Moore, complaining of carpal tunnel symptoms in both hands. Plaintiff received bilateral carpal tunnel injections, with temporary relief. On 22 January 2009, plaintiff reported to Dr. Moore an exacerbation of her carpal tunnel symptoms due to increased activity. Dr. Moore recommended that plaintiff undergo limited open carpal tunnel release surgery, which plaintiff underwent on 11 March 2009. The surgery was successful. However, Dr. Moore did not release plaintiff to return to work.

On 30 September 2009, following a hearing, Deputy Commissioner Robert Harris entered an Opinion and Award concluding that plaintiff had not established that her employment caused or significantly contributed to her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, or placed her at an increased risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff appealed, and on 3 May 2010, the Full Commission entered an Opinion and Award concluding that plaintiff suffered a compensable occupational disease, and awarded her temporary total disability payments. Defendant appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may appeal an Opinion and Award of the Full Commission “to the Court of Appeals for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals from the superior court to the Court of Appeals in ordinary civil actions.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97–86 (2009).

Under the Workers' Compensation Act, “[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433–34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965). Therefore, on appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, review is limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission's conclusions of law. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681–82, 509...