Newport v. Hedges
Decision Date | 05 June 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 8084,8084 |
Parties | Lawrence R. NEWPORT and Roy Hessee, d/b/a Newport & Hessee, contractors, a partnership, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. W. E. HEDGES and Georgia L. Hedges, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Neale, Newman, Bradshaw, Freeman & Neale, F. B. Freeman, O. J. Taylor, Springfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.
John B. Newberry, Springfield, for defendants-respondents.
This appeal involves the question as to whether a landowner's property can be subjected to a lien for improvements constructed by the lien claimant under a contract with the lessee.
The lease was dated October 24, 1959. By it (the owners-defendants) Hedges leased to Lloyd and Mary Cramer an irregular-shaped vacant lot located on South Grant Avenue in Springfield, at a rental of $150 per month, to commence on or before January 1, 1960. The term of the lease was ten years with option for renewal for five years. The lessees were given an option to purchase the land at any time during the first seven years at a price of $18,500.
Under a paragraph entitled 'Use of the Premises' the lease stated, 'It is agreed that the premises are to be used by Lessee for the operation thereof of a Dog 'n Suds Drive-In restaurant building.'
Under 'Building and Improvements' it was stated that 'It is recognized that the premises hereby let and leased are at present a vacant lot, tract and parcel of land. The Parties hereto have discussed and agreed that a one-story building known as a
Under 'Insurance,' 'Lessee herein agrees to pay all fire and other hazard insurance premiums covering the building to be erected, and shall carry a sufficient amount of insurance to replace the building in the event of loss.'
Under 'Health and Safety,' lessees agreed to comply with all ordinances, laws, et cetera, 'provided however, that nothing in this paragraph shall require the Lessee to make or pay for any improvements, repairs, alternations, additions or structural changes to said premises that are not required of Lessee by other terms and conditions in this Lease set out in other paragraphs thereof.'
Under 'Taxes,' lessors agreed to pay taxes and special assessments on the land, and lessees agreed to pay all taxes assessed against any and all improvements placed on the land during the term, said division of taxes to be based on the plats and assessment sheets maintained by the assessor's office.
Under 'Failure to Pay Rent or Other Default,' lessors might, after notice, immediately dispossess lessees, take possession, and re-rent or re-lease, and 'may make such changes, alterations or modifications in the building and premises as might be necessary in order to re-rent the premises.'
The 'Dog 'n Suds' was a franchised operation described as a drive-in restaurant.
On April 4, 1960, the lessees entered into contract with plaintiffs Newport and Hessee for the construction of a restaurant building at the above site. The contractors were to furnish work and materials 'as designated in the plans on sheets 1, 2 and 3 attached,' with the exception that 'contractor shall not be required to pave with 'asphald paving as shown on the plans, but instead shall be required to grade and pave with tar and gravel surface at a cost figure of $1870.' The contract further provided for installation of water and gas lines from meter locations. The total price was $16,029, of which $3000 was to be paid when the work was half finished.
The construction was completed sometime that summer. The lessees were unable to pay therefor except the initial $3000, and a lien was filed for the balance. The contractors claim a lien on the whole estate.
The negotiations for the lease were conducted by one Westmoreland (deceased), who acted as agent for the owners. There is no dispute as to the foregoing. The only disputes of fact were (a) as to the value of the vacant lot and (b) as to whether or not the owner-lessor had seen and approved the plans. As to the value, the owner said it is worth $18,500, the option price; that he had purchased the lot in 1956 for 'something in the neighborhood of' $3500; that since then he had paid a paving bill in the approximate amount of $1100, a sewer tax bill of about $700, and had the additional cost of getting gas service of $200 or $300; that the $18,500 was about three times what he had in the place but thought that value was justified because of a proposed thoroughfare plan of the city. Defendant was and is an engineer by profession and Director of Public Works and City Engineer of the City of Springfield.
Plaintiffs' evidence from a real estate broker was that the value of the bare lot is $50 per front foot, or a total of $8710. 'It's higher than it was in October of 1959.'
As to whether the owner had knowledge of and approved the plans: Plaintiff Lawrence Newport, one of the contractors, testified that he went to the city department headed by owner Hedges in order to get a building permit, but He took the plans to Mr. Hedges' office and laid them on Hedges' desk; Hedges did not go over them in small detail; he and Hedges went over 'those boundaries, and all, and the building, and where it was, the street, where the street come in there, so we could get a street number.' Over and over the witness insisted that 'he went over the plans with me' and that a building permit was issued by Hedges' department subsequently on the same day; that the plans are what is called a 'franchised plan' and they had to be altered for the city approval. And such plans, as so altered, were those followed in the construction.
On the other hand, owner Hedges insists that he never approved the plans; that he never saw them until the building was finished; that they were never presented to him for his personal review as an individual; that permits are issued by people in his department who are considered qualified to judge whether they meet the code. But 'to the best of my knowledge' he never saw the plans and specifications before the building was finished. He did say he had seen a picture of a 'Dog 'n Suds' franchise on a letterhead shown him by Westmoreland. He did know the construction was going on. He saw it a few times as he was driving by on his way to work or lunch. But he did not direct, assist, or suggest in the actual building. Neither did he protest.
Our learned brother below had some difficulty with this case. So do we. Evidence was first heard; then the case was reopened for further testimony. A judgment was rendered, a motion for new trial was sustained, and further evidence was received. Thereafter the court in rendering judgment remarked that 'the law certainly needs to be clarified,' found that the lease did not require the tenants to build; that the owner did not approve the plans; and denied the lien against the owners' property. From that judgment the contractors have appealed.
The liability of the owner's property for a lien on account of improvements placed thereon by the tenant usually arises, when it does arise, out of an agency implied in law. This agency is found where the lease requires the tenant to make substantial improvements, and also where the premises are let for a specific use or purpose and such purpose cannot be accomplished except by the making of substantial improvements. Utley v. Wear, Mo.App., 333 S.W.2d 787, and the cases cited therein. 1
As we have heretofore said in the Utley case, l. c. 793, the courts have sometimes been required to consider the whole circumstances of the letting. (See 79 A.L.R. 962, 974, anno.; 163 A.L.R. 992, anno.) but that does not mean that the parties can testify to intentions and purposes which are at variance with the written instrument. We must gather the intention of the parties, if possible, from the instrument itself. Curtin-Clark Hardware Co. v. Churchill, 126 Mo.App. 462, 104 S.W. 476, 478; Sol Abrahams & Son Const. Co. v. Osterholm, Mo.App., 136 S.W.2d 86, 92. Neither is it important that the whole project may later have proved to have been mistaken and, as the events later worked out, did not really enhance the value of the property. It is a question of the intention of the parties, to be gathered if possible from their contract at the time of its execution. And the value which the owner expects to realize does not...
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