Newsom v. Couch

• Decision Date: 29 March 1924
• Docket Number: (No. 10577.)
• Citation: 262 S.W. 155
• Parties: NEWSOM v. COUCH.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

262 S.W. 155

NEWSOM v. COUCH.

(No. 10577.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

March 29, 1924.

Rehearing Denied May 10, 1924.

Appeal from District Court, Haskell County.

Action by Mrs. John A. Couch against W. T. Newsom. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Smith & Grissom, of Haskell, for appellant.

Murchison & Davis, of Haskell, and Theodore Mack, of Fort Worth, for appellee.

BUCK, J.

Mrs. John A. Couch, joined pro forma by her husband, sued W. T. Newsom on a promissory note, executed by Newsom in favor of plaintiff for $1,100 principal, bearing interest from date at 10 per cent. per annum, and secured by a mortgage on 25 head of mules, 3 and 4 years old, and 25 mares and their increase. The defendant answered, acknowledging that he had executed said note, but denied that he had executed a mortgage on 25 head of mules and 25 head of mares and their increase, but alleged he had given a mortgage on only 20 head of mules, and 20 head of mares and their increase, and that the number of head of mules and mares had been changed subsequent to his signature, by changing the number from 20 to 25. He further alleged that as a consideration for the execution of the mortgage given by him, John A. Couch, acting for his wife, had agreed to extend the due date of the note, it being a demand note, dated January 21, 1922, to January 1, 1923. Defendant assumed the burden of proof and opened and closed the case. The cause was tried before a jury on special issues, and the jury found that the mortgage had not been changed subsequent to defendant's signature, and that no agreement or promise had been made by John A. Couch, on or about the date of the note, to extend the due date thereof to January 1, 1923. Other issues were submitted, but the court instructed the jury not to answer the same if they answered the first two in the negative. Upon this verdict, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff for principal and interest and costs of suit, and foreclosed a mortgage lien on the 25 head of mules and 25 head of mares and their increase, and further foreclosed attachment liens on "275 acres of land and being abst. No. 327, and being all of the E. McGary survey in Haskell county, Texas," and on "200 acres of land and being the N. 200 acres of the 300-acre tract of the B. F. Wood survey, in Haskell county, Texas, abst. No. 424." The defendant has appealed.

Error is urged that the trial court erred in foreclosing the mortgage on the livestock described, inasmuch as the mortgage was not introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, and was introduced by the defendant only for the purpose of showing or tending to show that the mortgage had been changed in the respects alleged by defendant. The plaintiff below alleged the execution of the mortgage by defendant and the delivery thereof to plaintiff, giving a general description of the instrument, and copying in the petition the description of the live stock covered thereby. Defendant in his answer acknowledged that he executed and delivered to plaintiff a mortgage, but claimed that the mortgage was only upon 20 head of mules and 20 head of mares, instead of 25 head of each. The defendant assumed the burden of proof to show that a forgery or change had been made in the instrument. In other words, the defendant admitted the execution of the note and the mortgage except as the liability under them might be defeated by the facts pleaded. We overrule this assignment. Montgomery v. Culton, 18 Tex. 736, 750; Montgomery v. Jones, 18 Tex. 752. No error is shown by this assignment, even if the introduction of the mortgage by defendant for the purpose of proving the alleged change in it would not authorize the jury and the court to consider it for the purpose of proving its contents and execution.

The second assignment complains of the giving of a charge that the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative of the first and second issues submitted, which, as aforesaid, were the only ones answered by the jury. Undoubtedly the defendant did assume the burden of proof of these issues, and we can see no impropriety in the court's so informing the jury. Chittim & Parr v. Martinez, 94 Tex. 141, 58 S. W. 948, in which Judge Brown, speaking for the Supreme Court, says that the mere fact that evidence upon an issue is conflicting does not make it improper to give a charge informing the jury as to which party has the burden of proof. Lancaster et al. v. Snider, 207 S. W. 560, by the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals. The charge on this respect did not constitute the giving of a general charge upon a case submitted on special issues, as prohibited under the law, and in the decision of La Grone v. C. R. I. & G. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 101; Payne, Agent, v. Kindel (Tex. Civ. App.) 239 S. W. 1011; F. W. & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Morrow (Tex. Civ. App.) 255 S. W. 674, and cases there cited.

Error is also urged in the judgment, in the foreclosure of the attachment lien upon two certain tracts of land. It is urged that neither in his pleadings nor in the evidence was there any mention of an attachment having been levied. Where an attachment process has been issued in an action, it is not necessary to allege or prove such fact, especially in a case tried on special issues. Frank v. Brown Hardware Co., 10 Tex. Civ. App. 430, 31 S. W. 64; Tyson v. Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 154 S. W. 1055. The court is the judge as to the regularity and service of such process.

It is further urged that the description of the lands upon which the process of attachment had been levied, and upon which the court gave a foreclosure, is insufficient to authorize an officer, when the order of sale is placed in his hands, to seize and sell the same. The description of the land as shown in the judgment is as follows:

"275 acres...