Newton Branch of Massachusetts Police Ass'n v. City of Newton

• Decision Date: 07 November 1985
• Citation: 396 Mass. 186,484 N.E.2d 1326
• Parties: NEWTON BRANCH OF the MASSACHUSETTS POLICE ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF NEWTON et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1326

484 N.E.2d 1326

396 Mass. 186

NEWTON BRANCH OF the MASSACHUSETTS POLICE ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF NEWTON et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Sept. 10, 1985.

Decided Nov. 7, 1985.

Neil Jacobs (Susan Winkler, Boston, with him) for plaintiff.

Harold F. Kowal, Boston, for the city of Newton & others.

John P. Reilly, Brookline, amicus curiae, for Intern. Broth. of Police Officers.

John M. Collins and Stanley L. Weinberg, Shrewsbury, amicus curiae, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Ass'n, Inc.

Philip Collins and Robert W. Garrett, Boston, amicus curiae, for Massachusetts Mun. Ass'n.

Paul J. McCarthy, Boston, amicus curiae, for Massachusetts Police ass'n.

Jonathan P. Hiatt, Boston, amicus curiae, for Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN & O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Judge.

In this case we are presented with a question reported by a Superior Court judge pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974). The question is: "After impasse has been reached, can the City lawfully implement, without the Union's agreement, the City's proposal to modify § 4.04 of the Newton Police Contract which limits police officers' rights to accidental disability leave as provided in M.G.L. c. 41 § 111F?" We answer this question in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below. The record contains a "joint agreed statement of facts" and a "joint amendment to joint agreed statement of facts" from which, in the main, the following summary of facts is drawn. ²

The Newton branch of the Massachusetts Police Association (association) ³ and the city of Newton (city) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that was operative from July 1, 1980, through June 30, 1982. In April of 1982, the association and the city began negotiating for a successor agreement. At the first bargaining session, the association introduced its "third-party doctor" proposal seeking a modification of the terms in § 4.04 of the 1980-1982 collective bargaining agreement relating to paid accidental disability leave granted to police officers by G.L. c. 41, § 111F (1984 ed.). ⁴ Under the association's proposed § 4.04, a neutral physician would be required to determine whether a police officer was capable of returning to duty in cases where there was a difference of opinion between the officer's own physician and the physician designated pursuant to G.L. c. 41, § 111F. ⁵ In 1983, the city made a counter proposal in which it sought to include a "limited duty" clause in the proposed § 4.04. Under the city's submission, a police officer would forfeit his right to paid accidental disability leave if the city's physician determined that the officer was capable of performing limited police duties on either a full or part-time basis and the officer failed to perform the duties. The chief of police was given the authority to prescribe the limited duties. ⁶

Negotiations continued for approximately two years, but the parties failed to reach an agreement on the "limited duty" modification of the proposed § 4.04. From April of 1983 through March of 1984, the city and the association engaged in mediation and fact finding under the direction of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Joint Labor-Management Committee. On March 29, 1984, the city, at the association's request, made a final, written proposal for a total contract settlement. The city's provision relating to the modification of the proposed § 4.04 was not acceptable to the association. ⁷ On March 30, 1984, the city declared an impasse. Shortly thereafter the city, through its attorney, sent the association a letter stating that it intended to implement all the provisions of its final offer on April 30, 1984. In its letter, the city provided the association with an opportunity to negotiate over the impact of its decision or any other matters. There were no further negotiations and the city unilaterally implemented its proposal as scheduled, and delivered a copy of the new contract to the association. The association refused to sign the contract and has not agreed to its implementation. The association filed this action in Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the city's unilateral implementation of the disputed "limited duty" provision in § 4.04. The case was reported to the Appeals Court on one controlling question of law, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

1. The duty to bargain. Collective bargaining negotiations between a public employer and its employees must be conducted in accordance with G.L. c. 150E, § 6 (1984 ed.). This statute provides that "[t]he employer and the exclusive representative shall meet at reasonable times ... and shall negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards or productivity and performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment." The statute further provides that the obligation to meet and negotiate "shall not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a concession." Id.

The association initiated discussions regarding the proposed § 4.04 of the collective bargaining agreement. Since this section involved a condition of employment and was therefor a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the city was obligated to meet with the association concerning this issue and to negotiate in good faith. G.L. c. 150E, § 6. To fulfil this obligation, the city was required to attend the negotiating sessions with an "open and fair mind" aimed at reaching an agreement. See School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 572, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983). In their joint agreed statement of facts, the parties admit that their negotiations were conducted in good faith and hence we need not address this point. The parties have also agreed, by virtue of the question reported, that their negotiations continued until they reached an impasse. It is well-established that "[a]fter good faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement, an employer may implement unilateral changes [in conditions of employment] which are reasonably comprehended within its pre-impasse proposals." Massachusetts Org. of State Eng'rs & Scientists v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 389 Mass. 920, 927, 452 N.E.2d 1117 (1983), quoting Hanson School Comm., 5 M.L.C. 1671, 1675-1676 (1979). See R.A. Gorman, Labor Law 445 (1976).

The thrust of the association's argument, however, is that those rights that are granted by statute and enumerated in G.L. c. 150E, § 7(d ), may only be eliminated by a collective bargaining agreement reached between the employer and the employee's exclusive representative. Therefore, the city is precluded from implementing its proposal unilaterally. Since we do not agree that the city's proposed § 4.04 "eliminated" any rights that Newton police officers were granted under G.L. c. 41, § 111F, we need not reach this issue.

2. General Laws c. 41, § 111F. As we indicated earlier, the legislative scheme of G.L. c. 41, § 111F, is designed to afford "some protection to a disabled officer pending recovery or pending a severance from employment due to factors beyond the officer's personal control." Hennessey v. Bridgewater, 388 Mass. 219, 226, 446 N.E.2d 58 (1983). "The statute clearly contemplates, in instances not resulting in retirement or pensioning, a return to duty." Id. The statute does not, however, qualify the term "duty" or require the city to continue paying the officer until he is capable of returning to the precise duty assignment he was performing at the time of the incapacitating injury. See G.L. c. 41, § 111F. Relying primarily on our decision in Votour v. Medford, 335 Mass. 403, 140 N.E.2d 177 (1957), the association argues that a police officer is "incapacitated for duty" under G.L. c. 41, § 111F, until he is capable of performing the "full duties" of a police officer. We disagree. The only issue before this court in Votour was whether the trial judge erred in denying three of the city's requests for rulings of law. Id. at 405, 140 N.E.2d 177. In its request numbered thirteen, the city asked the trial judge to rule that "[a] finding that the plaintiff ... is incapacitated for limited rehabilitating police work would be against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 405-406 n. 1, 140 N.E.2d 177. At trial, a medical report prepared by a panel of three physicians who had examined the plaintiff Votour was admitted in evidence. The report stated that the plaintiff's back condition rendered him totally and permanently disabled from performing "any kind of duty." Id. at 405, 140 N.E.2d 177. We held that the evidence warranted the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff was incapacitated for duty. ⁸ Although we did acknowledge that G.L. c. 41, § 111F, makes no distinction between total and partial incapacity, this acknowledgement does not support the interpretation of G.L. c. 41, § 111F, urged by the association. ⁹

As we read the city's proposal, it affords Newton police officers the same benefits the city is required to provide under G.L. c. 41, § 111F. The proposal does nothing more than allow the chief of police to assign an officer who may be incapacitated for purposes of performing one type of police duty to another which he is fully capable of performing. In its brief the city represents that all of the duty assignments listed in the proposed § 4.04 are contained within the civil service job description of a police officer, and that these assignments are presently being performed by full-time police officers in the Newton police department. If a police officer is not incapacitated from performing any one of the duties to which he might be legally assigned, he...