Ngomondjami v. Com., Record No. 0500-08-4.
Citation | 54 Va. App. 310,678 S.E.2d 281 |
Decision Date | 30 June 2009 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0500-08-4. |
Parties | Mathurin NGOMONDJAMI v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Amy K. Stitzel, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant.
John W. Blanton, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: FELTON, C.J., and FRANK and PETTY, JJ.
After a jury trial, Mathurin Ngomondjami ("appellant") was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of Code § 18.2-266. On appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of DUI, arguing it failed to prove he "operated" a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He also contends the trial court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction defining the term "operating a motor vehicle" within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. Additionally, he contends the trial court erred during the sentencing phase of his trial by admitting into evidence his Department of Motor Vehicles driving record (DMV record) pursuant to Code § 46.2-943, arguing the Commonwealth failed to comply with the notice requirements of Code § 19.2-295.1.
"Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). We must "examine the evidence that tends to support the conviction[ ] and to permit the conviction[ ] to stand unless [it is] plainly wrong or without evidentiary support." Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 520, 499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998) (citing Code § 8.01-680).
So viewed, the evidence proved that in the early morning hours of October 29, 2006, Corporal Arthur Tate of the Arlington County Police Department found appellant, unconscious, reclined in the driver's seat of a car with its engine running in a school parking lot. Appellant was its only occupant. After several attempts to get appellant's attention by knocking on the driver's door window, Tate opened the unlocked driver's door and woke him.
Corporal Tate determined that appellant had slurred speech, was unsteady on his feet, and had bloodshot eyes. He asked appellant if he would take field sobriety tests, and appellant agreed to do so. However, appellant laughed at Corporal Tate when he demonstrated the one-legged stand test, and refused to attempt it, stating he thought Tate wanted to make fun of him. Appellant also refused to attempt the heel-to-toe test and the alphabet test. Although he previously told Tate he had a degree in electrical engineering, appellant told Tate he had no education and therefore could not perform the alphabet test.
Appellant spoke in a soft voice but was belligerent, and repeatedly threatened Corporal Tate, stating he "prayed that [Tate's] wife and kids would die within three days. . . ." After talking with appellant for approximately 15 minutes, Corporal Tate arrested him for DUI.
At trial, appellant testified he was sleeping in his car because he was in the process of divorcing his wife and that he was homeless. He denied being intoxicated.
After the trial court denied appellant's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of DUI. During the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth sought to introduce appellant's DMV record, pursuant to Code § 46.2-943, for consideration by the jury in fixing his sentence. Appellant objected, contending the Commonwealth failed to provide him with notice pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.1 of its intent to introduce his driving record at sentencing.1
Appellant also objected to the trial court permitting the jury to consider his DMV record, arguing it was Appellant's counsel told the trial court that prior to trial she "got [her] own [copy of appellant's] DMV record and it was different from [the] one" offered by the Commonwealth. The only DMV record contained in the record on appeal is the DMV record offered by the Commonwealth.
The trial court overruled appellant's objections and admitted his DMV record, concluding it was admissible under Code § 46.2-943 and that statute did not contain a notice requirement. It also refused to grant appellant's proffered jury instruction defining "operating" a motor vehicle. The jury fixed appellant's sentence at an $800 fine.
On appeal, appellant first contends the trial court erred in not granting his proffered jury instruction defining "operating a motor vehicle."
"The trial judge has broad discretion in giving or denying instructions requested." Gaines v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 562, 568, 574 S.E.2d 775, 778 (2003) (en banc). "A reviewing court's responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is `to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.'" Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 485, 488, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)). "`When granted instructions fully and fairly cover a principle of law, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing another instruction relating to the same legal principle.'" Gaines, 39 Va.App. at 568, 574 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984)).
Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va. 434, 438, 416 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1992) (quoting Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 Va. 297, 300, 217 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1975)).
The trial court declined to give appellant's proffered instruction, which provided that: "Operating a motor vehicle means starting the engine or manipulating the electrical or mechanical equipment of the vehicle without actually putting the vehicle in motion but with the purpose of putting it in motion." (Emphasis added). It granted the Commonwealth's jury instruction on that issue, which provided that: "Operating a motor vehicle not only includes the process of moving the vehicle from one place to another, but also includes starting the engine, or manipulating the mechanical or electrical equipment of the vehicle without actually putting the car in motion."
Appellant's proffered instruction was not an accurate statement of the law. See Mouberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 576, 582, 575 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2003) . Consistent with prior decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, it was not necessary that the jury find appellant acted "with the purpose of putting [a car] in motion" to find he "operated" a car within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. See Stevenson, 243 Va. at 438, 416 S.E.2d at 438.
The instruction granted by the trial court fully and fairly covered the principles of law relevant to the question of whether appellant operated the car in which he was found, intoxicated and while the engine was running. We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to grant appellant's proffered jury instruction. See Gaines, 39 Va.App. at 568, 574 S.E.2d at 778.
Appellant also contends the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove he "operat[ed] [the vehicle,] because there is no evidence that supports a reasonable inference that he had any purpose to put his vehicle in motion on a highway." We find appellant's argument to be without merit.
The evidence at trial proved appellant was in his car and was intoxicated, that the key was in the ignition switch of his car, turned to the on position, and the car's engine was running. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude appellant was in actual physical control of the car, and was "operating" it within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. Accordingly, we find the jury did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to convict appellant of DUI in violation of Code § 18.2-266. See Stevenson, 243 Va. at 438, 416 S.E.2d at 438; see also Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 139 S.E.2d 37 (1964), citing with approval State v. Sweeney, 77 N.J.Super. 512, 187 A.2d 39, 45 (App.Div. 1962) ( ).
Appellant also contends the trial court erred at the sentencing phase of his bifurcated jury trial by admitting his DMV record into evidence...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Branch v. Commonwealth
-
Charles v. Commonwealth
... ... 14753 S.E.2d 860Raymond Charles CASEv.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.Record No. 2188–12–4.Court of Appeals of Virginia,Alexandria.Feb. 11, 2014 ... Ngomondjami v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 310, 317–18, 678 S.E.2d 281, 285 (2009) ... ...
-
Marblex Design Intern., Inc. v. Stevens
... ... Jill Ann STEVENS and Sebahat Cevikel ... Record No. 1545-08-4 ... Court of Appeals of Virginia, Alexandria ... June 30, ... ...
- Bryant v. Commonwealth