Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Regency Kawasaki, Inc., 1113

Citation367 S.E.2d 438,295 S.C. 138
Decision Date14 December 1987
Docket NumberNo. 1113,1113
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
Parties, 6 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 823 NICHOLS MOTORCYCLE SUPPLY, INC., Respondent, v. REGENCY KAWASAKI, INC., Appellant. . Heard

W. Jefferson Leath, Jr., of Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, Charleston, for appellant.

J. Randolph Pelzer, and Stephen P. Bucher, both of Pelzer and Associates, P.A., Charleston, for respondent.

BELL, Judge:

This is an action to set aside a sale for violation of the Uniform Commercial Code governing bulk transfers. 1 The case arises from a sale of inventory by Kawasaki of Charleston, Inc., a retail motorcycle dealer, to Regency Kawasaki, Inc., another dealer. Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc., a business creditor of Kawasaki of Charleston, alleges the transfer was ineffective against it because Regency did not comply with the Code. The circuit court agreed and entered judgment for Nichols. Regency appeals. We affirm.

The material facts are undisputed. Nichols is a wholesale distributor of motorcycle parts and supplies. At the time of the transfer in question, Kawasaki of Charleston owed Nichols $21,624.85 on account. Near the end of February 1985, Kawasaki of Charleston, without giving notice to Nichols, transferred substantially all of the equipment, fixtures, and inventory of its enterprise to third parties and closed its business.

Approximately one hundred new motorcycles, held by Kawasaki of Charleston under a floor plan financing with the manufacturer (who retained title), were redelivered to the manufacturer in satisfaction of its security interest. These motorcycles were valued at $200,000. Nichols does not challenge this transfer.

After the new motorcycles had been redelivered to the manufacturer, Kawasaki of Charleston sold all its used and junk motorcycles and a quantity of motorcycle parts and accessories to Regency for $30,000.00. Regency arrived at Kawasaki of Charleston's place of business on a weekend with two trucks, purchased the goods on the spot, and hauled them away the same day. The inventory and equipment remaining after this sale were valued at $20,000. Regency gave no notice of any kind to Nichols either before or after it took possession of the goods or paid for them. Kawasaki of Charleston's transfer to Regency forms the subject matter of this action.

The circuit court held Kawasaki of Charleston's sale to Regency was not effective against Nichols because Regency did not give Nichols statutory notice of the transfer at least ten days before taking possession of the goods, as required by the bulk transfers statute. See Code § 36-6-105. On appeal, Regency contends the court erred because: (1) the transfer is not subject to the Code; and (2) if the transfer is subject to the Code, Regency substantially complied with the statute.

I.

A bulk transfer of goods by an enterprise whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock is subject to the Code. Code § 36-6-102(3) and (4). A "bulk transfer" is

any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the ... inventory (§ 36-9-109) of an enterprise....

Code § 36-6-102(1). Goods are "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale. Code § 36-9-109(4).

Regency does not dispute that Kawasaki of Charleston was in the business of selling merchandise from stock nor that the transfer in question was a transfer of inventory, that it was in bulk, and that it was not in the ordinary course of business. Instead, Regency argues that the goods it purchased were not "a major part" of the inventory and so not subject to the Code.

Regency's position rests on the premise that the total value of the inventory, including the new motorcycles, was $250,000. Therein lies the fallacy of its argument. As stated above, goods are inventory if they are held by a person who holds them for sale. The key word is "held." Goods are not held for sale when the right to possess them is lost. County of Hennepin v. Honeywell, Inc., 297 Minn. 112, 210 N.W.2d 38 (1973). Thus, if possession is lawfully transferred to someone else, the goods are no longer "held" by the transferor and cease to be inventory for the purpose of subsequent transactions. As between any two parties, what goods constitute "inventory" under the Code is to be determined at the time of the transaction between them. Franklin Investment Co. v. Homburg, 252 A.2d 95 (D.C.App.1969).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the new motorcycles were not part of the inventory at the time of the bulk transfer to Regency. Kawasaki of Charleston had already given possession of the new motorcycles to the manufacturer in realization of its security interest. 2 The new motorcycles were not even on the premises when Regency came to deal with Kawasaki of Charleston. At that time, the property held by Kawasaki consisted of the $30,000 worth of inventory purchased by Regency and some $20,000 in remaining inventory and equipment. Without question, the transfer to Regency constituted a "major part" of the inventory. See...

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3 cases
  • Crosswell Enterprises, Inc. v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • March 16, 1992
    ...is sold lock, stock, and barrel, it is a bulk transfer within the meaning of § 36-6-102. See, Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Regency Kawasaki, Inc., 295 S.C. 138, 367 S.E.2d 438 (Ct.App.1988). Under the common law, restraints on the alienation of property were disfavored and generally t......
  • State v. Galloway
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 19, 1991
    ...the motion was untimely constitutes an independent ground for upholding the judgment. Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Regency Kawasaki, Inc., 295 S.C. 138, 142-43, 367 S.E.2d 438, 441 (Ct.App.1988). II. Galloway's next argument is that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the resisti......
  • Kendall v. Kendall, 1111
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 15, 1988

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