Nichols v. Bolding

Decision Date10 May 1973
Citation277 So.2d 868,291 Ala. 50
Parties, 83 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2561, 71 Lab.Cas. P 53,090 Billy Floyd NICHOLS et al. v. Russell BOLDING, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Decatur, et al. Russell BOLDING, Individually and as Mayor of the City of Decatur, et al. v. Billy Floyd NICHOLS et al. SC 119, SC 119--X.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Smith & Huckaby, Huntsville, for appellants and cross-appellees.

A. J. Coleman, Decatur, for appellees and cross-appellants.

JONES, Justice.

Appellants and cross appellees (Firefighters) were plaintiffs below seeking a declaratory judgment against the appellees and cross appellants (City) and appeal from a final decree declaring the rights of the parties thereunder.

We set forth in haec verba the decree issued by The Honorable Newton B. Powell, Circuit Judge, Morgan County, Alabama:

'This cause is submitted by agreement of the parties in open court for final judgment on the pleadings, stipulations and proof. The petition was filed by some individual members of the fire department of the City of Decatur and as members of Decatur Firefighters Association Local 1437, Labor Union, seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights as petitioners to deal with the governing body of the City of Decatur in the field of labor and management problems. The City, the Mayor and all except one Councilman, individually, and in their official capacity, were made defendants. It is alleged that Decatur Firefighters Association Local 1437 has thirty-seven members in good standing who are employees of the Decatur Fire Department and that this represents 71% Of the employees of the Fire Department of the City of Decatur. It is further alleged that representatives of this association proposed a contract relating to wages and working conditions to the defendants. It involves Union recognition, dues collection, pay rates, changes in the merit system and many other things related to the field of labor and management. It is further alleged that a controversy arose between the parties regarding the legal authority of the defendants to enter into such proposed contract with the petitioners--the defendants contending that they could not legally enter into such contract, and the petitioners contending to the contrary. It is further alleged that the defendants declined to negotiate with the petitioners on the subject involved. The respective rights (relating to the question of labor and management) of the parties have become the subject of controversy. . . . The proceeding is brought under the provisions of Section 156 et seq., Title 7 of the Code of Alabama. On demurrer to the petition as amended the Court eliminated the individual defendants, and left before the Court the individuals in their official capacity as well as the City of Decatur. The Court, also, determined that the demurrer was good to those aspects of the petition seeking an advisory opinion on the question of the right to picketing, dues check-off arrangement between the City and the Association, and some other provisions of the proposed contract over which there does not now exist a controversy, since the question of adopting the proposed contract is at issue. Because the petition was good in part, and the Court considered the demurrer general as to the aspects of the petition, it was overruled. The Court is of the opinion that the substantive law provides that courts should not issue advisory opinions, and that rights of the parties should not be declared on the aspects of the petition calling for an advisory opinion. This leaves the pleadings in the same state as if demurrer had been sustained to these aspects of the petition. The Court will consider the legality of an agreement between the petitioners and the respondents with reference to wages, working conditions, etc., and the related questions as to the extent that the law of the State of Alabama limits the right of the City and its officials to negotiate and to enter into any such agreement.

The rights of organized labor to have the governing bodies of governmental units deal with them as an employer is a relatively new field in the law. There is precedent in various jurisdictions on some of the legal questions raised in such controversy. It seems to be established in this jurisdiction that a public governing body cannot enter into a valid labor contract with a labor organization concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authority to do so. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 321 vs. Waterworks Board of The City of Birmingham, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So.2d 619. There has been a division of authority as to whether or not such contracts are permissible. Some have held they are permissible in certain limits if not prohibited by constitutional or staturory impediments. Our Alabama Court has held in the case cited above that there must be authorization by constitution or statute in order to justify such binding contract. In so holding our Court cites as a general rule that public employers cannot abdicate or bargain away their continuing legislative discretion with reference to the subject matter of any labor contract. It is said that public officials have no authority to surrender any of their responsibilities as public officials at a negotiating conference. A similar rule is set out in a note on this subject decided by our Supreme Court in the case cited above. See also 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, at page 1170.

'The case of International Union, etc. v. Waterworks, etc., supra, does not answer the questions presented in this proceeding. It is conceded in argument that the City may not be compelled to negotiate with the petitioners, nor will a labor contract resulting from such negotiations be binding on the public body. It is insisted, however, by the petitioners that though the public officials may not be compelled to negotiate, and though any contract would not be binding upon them, that the defendants are within their legal rights to exercise their discretion in negotiating with the petitioners in an effort to reach an agreement which will be acceptable to both petitioners and defendants, but which will be terminable at the will of the defendants. The case of International Union, etc. vs. Waterworks, etc., supra, was decided in 1964. In 1967 the Legislature of Alabama passed an act which prohibited any person to hold any commission or employment as a firefighter or fireman in the service of the State or any municipality who participates in any strike or asserts any right to strike against the State or any municipality of the State, or be a member of an organization who asserts the right to strike against the State or any municipality in the State knowing that the organization asserts such right. Act No. 229, Approved August 16, 1967, Section 450(3), Title 37, Code of Alabama. The same Act provides that any firefighter within the State who complies with the provisions of the Act cited above is assured the right and freedom to join a labor union and shall have the right to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment, etc. The parties make no issue of the rights of the petitioners to organize a labor union and be and remain members of the same under the provisions of this Act. It is noted that in 1953 our legislature passed an act which prohibited membership in any labor organization for all public employees, with some exceptions. Section 317, Title 55, Code of Alabama. The change in policy of the State of Alabama as expressed in the 1953 statutes, supra, and the 1967 statute, supra, giving the right to firefighters to organize labor unions and present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment, etc., is a significant change of policy by the State of Alabama in this field in the years between the two acts. Though there is no controversy between the parties as to the right of the petitioners to belong to a labor organization, there is disagreement as to the meaning of the phrase of this Act which provides: '. . . and shall have the right to present proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment by representatives of their own choosing.' Is this the statutory authority for public bodies to deal with labor unions which was referred to in International Union, etc. vs. Waterworks Board, etc., supra? Did the legislature anticipate the firemen who became members of unions and exercised their rights to present proposals relative to salaries and working conditions could not expect the reasonable discussion of these proposals by the public officials to whom they were presented? There is nothing in this statute which would indicate that the Legislature intended to force officials to negotiate in the sense that negotiation is required of private employers, and there is nothing to indicate that by this act the Legislature intended to vitiate the rule that public officials may not abdicate their responsibilities by negotiating a contract which would replace their discretion on important matters. There is some reason to conclude, however, that the legislature did not intend to limit the rights of firefighters to merely writing out proposals and depositing them silently with the proper authority.

The issue of the right of the firefighters associations to use a strike, a slowdown, or other such techniques used in private industry has been eliminated from the pleadings in this case; but, since the right to use such economic pressures might conceivably be asserted by proposals authorized by the statute, the Court observes that the State has the right to prohibit violence and strikes contrary to the public interest. The Court is of the opinion that the Legislature of Alabama did not intend to abrogate this right by the statute which gives firefighters the right to present proposals relative to salaries and other working conditions. It would...

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6 cases
  • Local 2238 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Stratton
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1989
    ...agencies do not have the authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements with public employees. See, e.g., Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 277 So.2d 868 (1973); Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 552 (Alaska 1976); AFSCME, Local 119 v. County of Los......
  • INTERN. ASS'N OF FIREFIGHTERS, ETC. v. City of Sylacauga
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    ...Conville and White and to fill these and future vacancies by competitive examination according to state law. III. In Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 277 So.2d 868 (1973), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that under Code of Ala., tit. 37, § 450(3), firefighters have the right to membership......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • March 30, 1977
    ...engaged in by the individual plaintiffs was in contravention of the public policy and law of the State of Alabama. Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 277 So.2d 868 (1973). 4. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property without due proces......
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    ...that the negotiations and subsequent union contract were illegal and in violation of the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. Bolding, 277 So.2d 868 (1973), because there was no express statutory or constitutional authority permitting the Department, a public body, to contract wit......
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